Narrative:

Departed dca, 4/88, after receiving WX briefing that stated that there was some convective activity north of the airport. But, toward the south in the direction of raleigh, nc, which was my destination, any convective activity was widely scattered. Before taking off I was cleared for a northwest departure on a radial of the dca VOR. As I was given position and hold on runway 33 I was informed of a mild wind shear detected by the airports low-level wind shear alert system. Takeoff roll and initial climb out were normal. Dca tower told me to contact departure about the time I entered IMC conditions and started to see some lightning reflected around inside the clouds that I was in. I had to call departure several times before they responded, and by the time that they did I encountered severe turbulence. The turbulence was the worst that I have ever encountered. I was just barely able to maintain the aircraft in an upright attitude and had no control over direction or altitude. At this time my VOR receivers both began to wildly fluctuate and I noticed st elmo's fire had appeared fairly brightly on the tips of the propellers. The turbulence was so severe that I could not read the flight instruments very accurately, therefore I am not sure of what my heading was. I attempted to contact departure and inform them of my situation, but apparently my xmissions were extremely garbled and unreadable by them. The st elmo's fire had covered most of the front section of the plane. The aircraft did not have static discharge ropes and I have attributed the radio problems to static buildup on the aircraft. Departure tried to contact me several times, all of which I responded to, but either they did not hear me or I was totally garbled. I thought that I heard them say that I had overflown part of the prohibited area which I have interpreted as being P56. Departure was having me squawk identify to acknowledge their messages and they apparently realized that I was in heavy WX because they said they would try to vector me out of it. Eventually I was vectored clear of WX. I should have realized that the convective activity reported north of the airport could be a significant factor since departures that evening were to the north. I wrongly expected that I would be turned south before encountering any of the activity. I also should have realized that the low level wind shear warning that I had right before takeoff was a clue that thunderstorms were near by. Departure informed me during climb out that they were suppressing WX returns on their radar and only had minimal avoidance help for me. Although I admit that I should not have taken off until the WX had passed, it would have been a big help if there were adequate ground based WX radar for controllers. The technology certainly exists and probably the main hinderance to this is budgetary constraints.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA UNAUTH PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE AND INFLT ENCOUNTER WITH SEVERE TURBULENCE.

Narrative: DEPARTED DCA, 4/88, AFTER RECEIVING WX BRIEFING THAT STATED THAT THERE WAS SOME CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY N OF THE ARPT. BUT, TOWARD THE S IN THE DIRECTION OF RALEIGH, NC, WHICH WAS MY DEST, ANY CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY WAS WIDELY SCATTERED. BEFORE TAKING OFF I WAS CLRED FOR A NW DEP ON A RADIAL OF THE DCA VOR. AS I WAS GIVEN POS AND HOLD ON RWY 33 I WAS INFORMED OF A MILD WIND SHEAR DETECTED BY THE ARPTS LOW-LEVEL WIND SHEAR ALERT SYS. TKOF ROLL AND INITIAL CLBOUT WERE NORMAL. DCA TWR TOLD ME TO CONTACT DEP ABOUT THE TIME I ENTERED IMC CONDITIONS AND STARTED TO SEE SOME LIGHTNING REFLECTED AROUND INSIDE THE CLOUDS THAT I WAS IN. I HAD TO CALL DEP SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE THEY RESPONDED, AND BY THE TIME THAT THEY DID I ENCOUNTERED SEVERE TURB. THE TURB WAS THE WORST THAT I HAVE EVER ENCOUNTERED. I WAS JUST BARELY ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE ACFT IN AN UPRIGHT ATTITUDE AND HAD NO CTL OVER DIRECTION OR ALT. AT THIS TIME MY VOR RECEIVERS BOTH BEGAN TO WILDLY FLUCTUATE AND I NOTICED ST ELMO'S FIRE HAD APPEARED FAIRLY BRIGHTLY ON THE TIPS OF THE PROPS. THE TURB WAS SO SEVERE THAT I COULD NOT READ THE FLT INSTRUMENTS VERY ACCURATELY, THEREFORE I AM NOT SURE OF WHAT MY HDG WAS. I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT DEP AND INFORM THEM OF MY SITUATION, BUT APPARENTLY MY XMISSIONS WERE EXTREMELY GARBLED AND UNREADABLE BY THEM. THE ST ELMO'S FIRE HAD COVERED MOST OF THE FRONT SECTION OF THE PLANE. THE ACFT DID NOT HAVE STATIC DISCHARGE ROPES AND I HAVE ATTRIBUTED THE RADIO PROBS TO STATIC BUILDUP ON THE ACFT. DEP TRIED TO CONTACT ME SEVERAL TIMES, ALL OF WHICH I RESPONDED TO, BUT EITHER THEY DID NOT HEAR ME OR I WAS TOTALLY GARBLED. I THOUGHT THAT I HEARD THEM SAY THAT I HAD OVERFLOWN PART OF THE PROHIBITED AREA WHICH I HAVE INTERPRETED AS BEING P56. DEP WAS HAVING ME SQUAWK IDENT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR MESSAGES AND THEY APPARENTLY REALIZED THAT I WAS IN HEAVY WX BECAUSE THEY SAID THEY WOULD TRY TO VECTOR ME OUT OF IT. EVENTUALLY I WAS VECTORED CLR OF WX. I SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT THE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY RPTED N OF THE ARPT COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR SINCE DEPS THAT EVENING WERE TO THE N. I WRONGLY EXPECTED THAT I WOULD BE TURNED S BEFORE ENCOUNTERING ANY OF THE ACTIVITY. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT THE LOW LEVEL WIND SHEAR WARNING THAT I HAD RIGHT BEFORE TKOF WAS A CLUE THAT TSTMS WERE NEAR BY. DEP INFORMED ME DURING CLBOUT THAT THEY WERE suppressing WX RETURNS ON THEIR RADAR AND ONLY HAD MINIMAL AVOIDANCE HELP FOR ME. ALTHOUGH I ADMIT THAT I SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN OFF UNTIL THE WX HAD PASSED, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A BIG HELP IF THERE WERE ADEQUATE GND BASED WX RADAR FOR CTLRS. THE TECHNOLOGY CERTAINLY EXISTS AND PROBABLY THE MAIN HINDERANCE TO THIS IS BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.