Narrative:

While planning for departure; a required maintenance item was sent to maintenance for a wing anti-ice fault light in the switch as well as the right valve showing amber. A decision was made to defer with the valve locked open and the paperwork was sent to the aircraft for the outsource maintenance to review and follow. The procedure was announced completed to the crew and a deferred sticker was installed. All pre-flight planning steps were accomplished for the MEL. Once airborne a flight test of the wing air was performed as it had faulted on both sides the day before and our destination was reporting ice (according to dispatch). The test caused an ECAM and maintenance was consulted. During the consult with maintenance and dispatch; it was determined the station mechanic had probably skipped a few steps in the MEL instructions causing the ECAM. Specifically the maintenance sec 'C' of MEL where some circuit breakers were to be pulled during the outside procedure. Neither crew member saw the mechanic pull any circuit breaker's. During the conversation; the ECAM self-cleared. We decided to continue to destination. Some minutes later the wai system fault ECAM re-appeared and the flight was diverted to an enroute station to avoid icing conditions as per the flight manual; in conjunction with dispatch. Few observations. 1.there were two administrative personnel at the departure station since they had just repaired the same aircraft's APU. While one would hope the outsource mechanic would perform at the same level as a company mechanic; it is my experience that they do not. I am wondering why the company personnel were not used; as I always prefer a our employed mechanic over the outsourced one any day. Much better quality work; gained from years of experience. 2.the departure station mechanic signed off work not done and the aircraft dispatched not in compliance with the MEL. I have a hard time tolerating a learning curve for mechanics where my life or the lives of others can be put in jeopardy due to cutting corners and missed steps on procedures. The crew did not review the mechanic's information until airborne and it certainly isn't in our job description to supervise supposedly credentialed professionals. 3. If the crew had waited until approaching our scheduled destination to test or even use the wing anti-ice system; we might not have been able to avoid icing conditions with our fuel on board and been forced to put the aircraft and the crew at high risk to land.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 Crew diverted because a Contract Mechanic failed to properly fix an Airfoil Anti-ice system malfunction and the scheduled destination was forecast for icing.

Narrative: While planning for departure; a required maintenance item was sent to maintenance for a Wing Anti-ice Fault light in the switch as well as the right valve showing amber. A decision was made to defer with the valve locked open and the paperwork was sent to the aircraft for the outsource maintenance to review and follow. The procedure was announced completed to the crew and a deferred sticker was installed. All pre-flight planning steps were accomplished for the MEL. Once airborne a flight test of the wing air was performed as it had faulted on both sides the day before and our destination was reporting ice (according to Dispatch). The test caused an ECAM and maintenance was consulted. During the consult with Maintenance and Dispatch; it was determined the station Mechanic had probably skipped a few steps in the MEL instructions causing the ECAM. Specifically the maintenance sec 'C' of MEL where some Circuit Breakers were to be pulled during the outside procedure. Neither crew member saw the Mechanic pull any Circuit Breaker's. During the conversation; the ECAM self-cleared. We decided to continue to destination. Some minutes later the WAI SYS FAULT ECAM re-appeared and the flight was diverted to an enroute station to avoid icing conditions as per the flight manual; in conjunction with Dispatch. Few observations. 1.There were two administrative personnel at the departure station since they had just repaired the same aircraft's APU. While one would hope the outsource Mechanic would perform at the same level as a Company Mechanic; it is my experience that they do not. I am wondering why the Company personnel were not used; as I always prefer a our employed Mechanic over the outsourced one any day. Much better quality work; gained from years of experience. 2.The departure station Mechanic signed off work not done and the aircraft dispatched not in compliance with the MEL. I have a hard time tolerating a learning curve for mechanics where my life or the lives of others can be put in jeopardy due to cutting corners and missed steps on procedures. The crew did not review the Mechanic's information until airborne and it certainly isn't in our job description to supervise supposedly credentialed professionals. 3. If the crew had waited until approaching our scheduled destination to test or even use the Wing Anti-ice system; we might not have been able to avoid icing conditions with our fuel on board and been forced to put the aircraft and the crew at high risk to land.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.