Narrative:

Aircraft X requested the RNAV GPS 7R approach into dvt while still in luf airspace; coordination was made by the biltmore hand off with luf for control and approval. Hand off assumed I wanted to send aircraft X to aznup; a fix 8NM northeast of their current position and that was what they coordinated and received approval for from luf. I was being called by a few VFR pop ups so instead of taking the time to clarify the fact it would be more direct to send aircraft X to boles; (about a 10NM straight in fix on the approach still sufficiently outside the final approach fix); I let the hand off coordinate their idea and continued providing additional service to the VFR pop ups. After luf approved the request I issued aircraft X cleared direct aznup; cleared GPS 7R approach dvt and called traffic 12 o'clock; 5 miles; west bound; altitude indicates 5;500. Another VFR pop up or two called along with an IFR departure or two. Perhaps the untracked VFR traffic was conducting rapid climb/descent air work because it seemed to happen very quickly; I do not know if the conflict alert alarm had been going off for some time but it seemed to start going off at the same time that aircraft X began to repeatedly report a near miss off their wing; two numbers stand out; 30 feet and 50 feet as the proximity the pilot reported. Aircraft X was adamant that that aircraft should not have been allowed to be any where near that instrument approach and several other statements of extreme peril and the fact that it was their closest encounter in 7500 flight hours. This was class east airspace. When aircraft X passed aznup and began the southbound leg to boles the same traffic again became a conflict; eastbound this time approaching aircraft X from the west. I issued another radar traffic call 2 o'clock; 3 miles; eastbound; altitude indicates (do not recall what it was this time as I was completely shaken up). Then the traffic turned back to the west. Recommendation; it is clear that flight in a GA aircraft is extremely dangerous due to the possibility for such occurrences when untracked VFR aircraft are operating in and around airports to which controlled traffic is worked in and out of. I'm not sure what it will take for TCAS; or similar technology; to become a requirement for GA; I understand it is a costly addition. I hear it regularly remarked by fellow controllers how 'crazy' biltmore and pima get due to the number of VFR aircraft that operate uncontrolled in the practice areas around the phoenix area through which we have to regularly guide controlled flights due to the proximity of the practice areas to the satellite airports. Had one or both of these aircraft been equipped with a collision avoidance technology this near miss seems far less likely to have occurred. Perhaps VFR aircraft ought not be allowed to conduct air work within a certain distance of busy satellite airports. However; ultimately I take responsibility for failing to provide priority to this aircraft and not more closely monitor the VFR traffic near my IFR traffic aircraft X. Had I been paying more precise attention to what the traffic was doing I might have been able to issue a a traffic alert and instructions to avoid the traffic in a timely manner; perhaps I lulled myself into a false sense of security as 'I had a hand off' and 'I called the traffic' and other general aviation aircraft were sighting called traffic 3-4 mile away leading up to this event. I do not think the hand off should have been open for this volume of traffic. It is evident to me that often we staff the hand off merely because we have too many bodies on the break list. In fact; shortly before this occurred; the flm made a broadcast to us that; 'we should expect lots of hand off time because there are lots of people here today.' the clear impression we get is that it is more important to make everything look good than to take into account that in many cases; having a hand off open when it is not needed creates the opportunity for complacency; boredom; distraction; and encountering the drone zone. Without a doubt it is a challenge for the supervisors; because certainly I would not want to answer for having 'alot' of people on the break list when an incident or worse occurred. It seems that sometimes we really are walking a razor's edge fine line. Had the hand off not been 'loudly and arrogantly' running my hand off sector; I know for a fact other choices would have been made; specifically I would have just sent aircraft X direct boles; and honestly; had he not been talking so loud I might not have been distracted from what could have been an earlier conflict alert. Again; this was my sector and I am responsible; I am the one who chose the minimum volume level for my conflict alarm for my presets; and I was the one making the choices as the radar controller. I am the one who failed to lead the sector from the radar seat and get the hand off in line with my plan.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: P50 controller described a conflict event when an IFR aircraft being vectored for an approach to DVT reported a near miss; the reporter indicating VFR aircraft should be restricted from operating near approach paths.

Narrative: Aircraft X requested the RNAV GPS 7R approach into DVT while still in LUF airspace; coordination was made by the Biltmore Hand off with LUF for control and approval. Hand off assumed I wanted to send Aircraft X to AZNUP; a fix 8NM Northeast of their current position and that was what they coordinated and received approval for from LUF. I was being called by a few VFR pop ups so instead of taking the time to clarify the fact it would be more direct to send Aircraft X to BOLES; (about a 10NM straight in fix on the approach still sufficiently outside the final approach fix); I let the Hand off coordinate their idea and continued providing additional service to the VFR pop ups. After LUF approved the request I issued Aircraft X cleared direct AZNUP; cleared GPS 7R approach DVT and called traffic 12 o'clock; 5 miles; West bound; altitude indicates 5;500. Another VFR pop up or two called along with an IFR departure or two. Perhaps the untracked VFR traffic was conducting rapid climb/descent air work because it seemed to happen very quickly; I do not know if the conflict alert alarm had been going off for some time but it seemed to start going off at the same time that Aircraft X began to repeatedly report a near miss off their wing; two numbers stand out; 30 feet and 50 feet as the proximity the pilot reported. Aircraft X was adamant that that aircraft should not have been allowed to be any where near that instrument approach and several other statements of extreme peril and the fact that it was their closest encounter in 7500 flight hours. This was class E airspace. When Aircraft X passed AZNUP and began the southbound leg to BOLES the same traffic again became a conflict; Eastbound this time approaching Aircraft X from the West. I issued another RADAR traffic call 2 o'clock; 3 miles; Eastbound; altitude indicates (do not recall what it was this time as I was completely shaken up). Then the traffic turned back to the West. Recommendation; it is clear that flight in a GA aircraft is extremely dangerous due to the possibility for such occurrences when untracked VFR aircraft are operating in and around airports to which controlled traffic is worked in and out of. I'm not sure what it will take for TCAS; or similar technology; to become a requirement for GA; I understand it is a costly addition. I hear it regularly remarked by fellow controllers how 'crazy' Biltmore and Pima get due to the number of VFR aircraft that operate uncontrolled in the practice areas around the Phoenix area through which we have to regularly guide controlled flights due to the proximity of the practice areas to the satellite airports. Had one or both of these aircraft been equipped with a collision avoidance technology this near miss seems far less likely to have occurred. Perhaps VFR aircraft ought not be allowed to conduct air work within a certain distance of busy Satellite airports. However; ultimately I take responsibility for failing to provide priority to this aircraft and not more closely monitor the VFR traffic near my IFR traffic Aircraft X. Had I been paying more precise attention to what the traffic was doing I might have been able to issue a a traffic alert and instructions to avoid the traffic in a timely manner; Perhaps I lulled myself into a false sense of security as 'I had a hand off' and 'I called the traffic' and other general aviation aircraft were sighting called traffic 3-4 mile away leading up to this event. I do not think the Hand Off should have been open for this volume of traffic. It is evident to me that often we staff the Hand Off merely because we have too many bodies on the break list. In fact; shortly before this occurred; the FLM made a broadcast to us that; 'we should expect lots of Hand Off time because there are lots of people here today.' The clear impression we get is that it is more important to make everything look good than to take into account that in many cases; having a Hand Off open when it is not needed creates the opportunity for complacency; boredom; distraction; and encountering the drone zone. Without a doubt it is a challenge for the supervisors; because certainly I would not want to answer for having 'alot' of people on the break list when an incident or worse occurred. It seems that sometimes we really are walking a razor's edge fine line. Had the Hand Off not been 'loudly and arrogantly' running my Hand Off sector; I know for a fact other choices would have been made; specifically I would have just sent Aircraft X direct BOLES; and honestly; had he not been talking so loud I might not have been distracted from what could have been an earlier conflict alert. Again; this was my sector and I am responsible; I am the one who chose the minimum volume level for my conflict alarm for my presets; and I was the one making the choices as the RADAR controller. I am the one who failed to lead the sector from the RADAR seat and get the Hand Off in line with my plan.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.