Narrative:

The autopilot was engaged at approximately 2;000 ft and we were given a climb clearance to 12;000 ft MSL and told to proceed direct ditch. At approximately; 10;500 ft MSL; we were given a frequency change to center. At approximately; 11;000 ft MSL; we had gen 2 off master caution. I acknowledged it and looked down and to my left to retrieve the QRH. While my head was down; the captain; inadvertently; powered off gen 1. The air driven generator deployed and the power transfer took place. During the transfer; multiple screens went black. After a few seconds of disorientation; I figured out what had happened and asked the captain if he had hit gen 1. He nodded in acknowledgement. The screens reappeared and I noticed we were still climbing and turning left with the autopilot disengaged. The flight director reappeared in roll/pitch mode when he pushed the autopilot button and commanded a climbing left turn. He began to follow the flight director rather than my instructions and I; again; prompted him to push the nose down and turn right to reestablish course direct ditch. He did not and I pushed the nose down myself and begin turning the plane toward the fix. He still seemed very disoriented; so I asked him multiple times if he had the airplane. He acknowledged and I contacted our new frequency and said we had had an autopilot malfunction and were descending back to assigned altitude and needed a heading to reestablish course. This entire episode lasted maybe 90-120 seconds. We were given delaying vectors and we started on the checklists. I; then; ran the gen 2 off QRH and was unsuccessful in restoring power. I ran the inadvertent air driven generator deployment QRH and reestablished normal electrical power. I called the flight attendant and advised her of the situation and told her we would most likely be returning. We contacted dispatch and told them we thought returning was best option and she agreed. I called operations and got a gate for the return and then advised the passengers of the situation. I told the flight attendant that there was no need to prepare the cabin and to expect a normal landing and taxi-in to the gate. We then ran normal checklists and briefed a visual approach; and the approach and landing were normal. The main issue here was the lack of CRM and following of checklist protocol/SOP's. The captain's decision to pull a lever-locked switch without running the QRH and; more importantly; without even confirming it with me; led to much worse situation than the original gen 2 malfunction. It is also; ultimately; what caused the altitude/course deviation. To be honest; I really do not know what I could have done differently. I was reaching down for the QRH and his arm movement was out of my sight plane. I did not even know what he; exactly; had done until after the action was taken. After figuring out what had occurred; I did the best I could to deal with the situation at hand. I tried to make sure we reestablished heading and altitude as quickly as possible. We ran the appropriate checklists and landed normally thereafter. On a separate note; the captain seemed to have trouble reestablishing control of the airplane for several minutes after the power transfer took place. I kept having to assist him with reminders about his headings and altitudes. I am sure this was due to some level of disorientation; but it was also due to fact he kept trying to re-engage the autopilot rather than just hand-flying the airplane. The stab trim had not been re-engaged at any point until I pointed it out to him. Therefore; the autopilot would not keep up. We kept having ap nu/nd caution messages and altitude deviations of about 200 ft. I wish our training department would rethink this march toward automation we have been on. I really think some emphasis of hand-flying would help in these situations because some of my stress about the airplane's flight path could have been alleviated if the captain had not been ingrained with use of the automation to the fullest extent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reports generator #2 failed during climb with the Captain selecting #1 generator off without referring to the QRH or informing the First Officer; this resulted in ADG deployment with attendant cockpit system failures. Flight crew returned to their departure airport.

Narrative: The autopilot was engaged at approximately 2;000 FT and we were given a climb clearance to 12;000 FT MSL and told to proceed direct DITCH. At approximately; 10;500 FT MSL; we were given a frequency change to Center. At approximately; 11;000 FT MSL; we had GEN 2 OFF Master Caution. I acknowledged it and looked down and to my left to retrieve the QRH. While my head was down; the Captain; inadvertently; powered off Gen 1. The ADG deployed and the power transfer took place. During the transfer; multiple screens went black. After a few seconds of disorientation; I figured out what had happened and asked the Captain if he had hit Gen 1. He nodded in acknowledgement. The screens reappeared and I noticed we were still climbing and turning left with the autopilot disengaged. The flight director reappeared in Roll/Pitch mode when he pushed the autopilot button and commanded a climbing left turn. He began to follow the flight director rather than my instructions and I; again; prompted him to push the nose down and turn right to reestablish course direct DITCH. He did not and I pushed the nose down myself and begin turning the plane toward the fix. He still seemed very disoriented; so I asked him multiple times if he had the airplane. He acknowledged and I contacted our new frequency and said we had had an autopilot malfunction and were descending back to assigned altitude and needed a heading to reestablish course. This entire episode lasted maybe 90-120 seconds. We were given delaying vectors and we started on the checklists. I; then; ran the GEN 2 OFF QRH and was unsuccessful in restoring power. I ran the Inadvertent ADG Deployment QRH and reestablished normal electrical power. I called the Flight Attendant and advised her of the situation and told her we would most likely be returning. We contacted Dispatch and told them we thought returning was best option and she agreed. I called Operations and got a gate for the return and then advised the passengers of the situation. I told the Flight Attendant that there was no need to prepare the cabin and to expect a normal landing and taxi-in to the gate. We then ran normal checklists and briefed a visual approach; and the approach and landing were normal. The main issue here was the lack of CRM and following of checklist protocol/SOP's. The Captain's decision to pull a lever-locked switch without running the QRH and; more importantly; without even confirming it with me; led to much worse situation than the original Gen 2 malfunction. It is also; ultimately; what caused the altitude/course deviation. To be honest; I really do not know what I could have done differently. I was reaching down for the QRH and his arm movement was out of my sight plane. I did not even know what he; exactly; had done until after the action was taken. After figuring out what had occurred; I did the best I could to deal with the situation at hand. I tried to make sure we reestablished heading and altitude as quickly as possible. We ran the appropriate checklists and landed normally thereafter. On a separate note; the Captain seemed to have trouble reestablishing control of the airplane for several minutes after the power transfer took place. I kept having to assist him with reminders about his headings and altitudes. I am sure this was due to some level of disorientation; but it was also due to fact he kept trying to re-engage the autopilot rather than just hand-flying the airplane. The Stab Trim had not been re-engaged at any point until I pointed it out to him. Therefore; the autopilot would not keep up. We kept having AP NU/ND caution messages and altitude deviations of about 200 FT. I wish our training department would rethink this march toward automation we have been on. I really think some emphasis of hand-flying would help in these situations because some of my stress about the airplane's flight path could have been alleviated if the Captain had not been ingrained with use of the automation to the fullest extent.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.