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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 869210 |
Time | |
Date | 201001 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 170/175 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Hydraulic Lines Connectors Fittings |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Person 2 | |
Function | Technician |
Qualification | Maintenance Airframe Maintenance Powerplant |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural MEL Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Picked up aircraft from inbound crew. We were waiting on the ramp when the aircraft pulled up to the gate. Inbound captain opened side window and said to stay away from brakes that they were all hot. I completed walk-around of aircraft; could see that brakes were hot. Went up jetway; inbound captain said that he had a caution message of 'lg no dispatch' on the EICAS screen; we asked inbound crew to take care of logbook etc; which they did. Contract maintenance was called out to the aircraft. There was a prior log entry of 'lg no dispatch' prior to this one. Eventually after reset procedures were completed; the inbound crew said that the caution message cleared on its own. Maintenance said that it would be signed-off and we were good to go. The captain and I were not satisfied with this as the # 1 brake temperature (temp) was 4 and the other 3 brakes were between 150 and 180 degrees centigrade. Captain talked with maintenance control and dispatch about the problem. Company personnel wanted to defer to MEL that referenced bad temperature indication on the multi functional display (mfd) and defer the indication of the mfd. Captain and I agreed that we thought that it was a temp probe problem and it should be deferred under the bad temp probe. While I was doing my duties; captain informed me that per the MEL we would have to leave the gear down for seven minutes after takeoff. I immediately told captain that anytime the gear is down; my concern was for second segment climb and engine failure. Captain had a conversation with dispatch concerning this. Captain showed me the MEL and I read under the operation section that it stated if there is engine failure to raise the gear; and after obstacle clearance was met to lower the gear. The MEL concerning the temp probe was added to the release with time and initials. We discussed the weather and performance and briefed that if we had an engine failure that we would raise the gear and continue with the special engine out procedure. For the field conditions and performance for our MEL situation; we did not use the original printed takeoff and landing data and I requested new performance data via a takeoff data request through the ACARS. We received and used the new data. Engine performance used was a full power TO1 (takeoff); environmental control system (ecs) on; engine anti-ice (eai) on; noflex takeoff. We did not receive any further information from dispatch. The weather at ZZZ was VFR sunny skies. I was to be the pilot flying (PF). Planned departing runway was 12. Upon departure; the climb was completed with the gear down for seven minutes. I maintained 210 KTS in the climb until the seven minutes expired. During the climb; we were never 3-4 miles from the airport; when we passed over the ZZZ VOR we were above 10000 feet. I called for gear up after the seven minutes; and we proceeded on the rest of the flight plan to ZZZ1. During taxi in at ZZZ1; we received a 'lg no dispatch' caution message on the EICAS. Captain called maintenance; and upon deplaning at the gate we were met by our chief pilot; I went out to do post-flight walk-around. During this walk-around I saw a number of maintenance personnel around the left gear. Upon inquiry on what was going on; it turns out the # 1 brake was cold to the touch; and a mechanic told me that the quick disconnect lines were not totally engaged on the brake; and that there was no hydraulic pressure getting to the #1 brake. He also informed me that this was the 3rd time that he has recently seen this problem. I asked if he meant the lines were dangling loose? He said no; just not engaged all the way and that they have a tendency to back off. I went back up the jetbridge; told chief pilot about the brake; and he said that he was pulling us off the rest of our pairing; and that he would dead-head (DH) us back to ZZZ2 or release us in ZZZ1. I asked him; released until when? He said until your next report for your next trip.I do not know the specific procedures for the 'lg no dispatch' or how maintenance clears this item; but when a recurring event such as this occurs I would think that a more through investigation is warranted of the problem. As far as my personal performance; I will definitely in the future recheck and double check all performance data when special conditions arise. If dispatch thought that there was a problem with performance data I would have liked to have received some kind of notification; phone call/ ACARS; from them regarding the issue prior to departure.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An EMB-170 Pilot and two Maintenance Technicians allege a lack of adequate performance data from Dispatch for an MEL Brake Temperature deferral and aircraft release. Failure to follow the Fault Isolation Manual trouble shooting procedures; which includes check of quick-disconnect for hydraulic line; by the Contract Maintenance provider added to the later re-occurrence of the 'LG No Dispatch' EICAS message.
Narrative: Picked up aircraft from inbound Crew. We were waiting on the Ramp when the aircraft pulled up to the gate. Inbound Captain opened side window and said to stay away from brakes that they were all hot. I completed Walk-around of aircraft; could see that brakes were hot. Went up jetway; inbound Captain said that he had a caution message of 'LG No Dispatch' on the EICAS screen; we asked inbound crew to take care of logbook etc; which they did. Contract Maintenance was called out to the aircraft. There was a prior log entry of 'LG No Dispatch' prior to this one. Eventually after reset procedures were completed; the inbound crew said that the caution message cleared on its own. Maintenance said that it would be signed-off and we were good to go. The Captain and I were not satisfied with this as the # 1 Brake Temperature (temp) was 4 and the other 3 brakes were between 150 and 180 degrees centigrade. Captain talked with Maintenance Control and Dispatch about the problem. Company personnel wanted to defer to MEL that referenced bad temperature indication on the Multi Functional Display (MFD) and defer the indication of the MFD. Captain and I agreed that we thought that it was a Temp probe problem and it should be deferred under the bad Temp probe. While I was doing my duties; Captain informed me that per the MEL we would have to leave the gear down for seven minutes after takeoff. I immediately told Captain that anytime the gear is down; my concern was for second segment climb and engine failure. Captain had a conversation with Dispatch concerning this. Captain showed me the MEL and I read under the operation section that it stated if there is engine failure to raise the gear; and after obstacle clearance was met to lower the gear. The MEL concerning the Temp probe was added to the release with time and initials. We discussed the weather and performance and briefed that if we had an engine failure that we would raise the gear and continue with the special Engine Out Procedure. For the field conditions and performance for our MEL situation; we did not use the original printed takeoff and landing data and I requested new performance data via a takeoff data request through the ACARS. We received and used the new data. Engine performance used was a full power TO1 (Takeoff); Environmental Control System (ECS) on; Engine Anti-ice (EAI) on; Noflex Takeoff. We did not receive any further information from Dispatch. The weather at ZZZ was VFR sunny skies. I was to be the Pilot Flying (PF). Planned departing runway was 12. Upon departure; the climb was completed with the gear down for seven minutes. I maintained 210 KTS in the climb until the seven minutes expired. During the climb; we were never 3-4 miles from the airport; when we passed over the ZZZ VOR we were above 10000 feet. I called for gear up after the seven minutes; and we proceeded on the rest of the flight plan to ZZZ1. During taxi in at ZZZ1; we received a 'LG No Dispatch' caution message on the EICAS. Captain called Maintenance; and upon deplaning at the gate we were met by our Chief Pilot; I went out to do post-flight Walk-around. During this Walk-around I saw a number of Maintenance personnel around the left gear. Upon inquiry on what was going on; it turns out the # 1 Brake was cold to the touch; and a Mechanic told me that the Quick Disconnect lines were not totally engaged on the brake; and that there was no hydraulic pressure getting to the #1 Brake. He also informed me that this was the 3rd time that he has recently seen this problem. I asked if he meant the lines were dangling loose? He said no; just not engaged all the way and that they have a tendency to back off. I went back up the Jetbridge; told Chief Pilot about the brake; and he said that he was pulling us off the rest of our pairing; and that he would Dead-Head (DH) us back to ZZZ2 or release us in ZZZ1. I asked him; released until when? He said until your next report for your next trip.I do not know the specific procedures for the 'LG No Dispatch' or how maintenance clears this item; but when a recurring event such as this occurs I would think that a more through investigation is warranted of the problem. As far as my personal performance; I will definitely in the future recheck and double check all performance data when special conditions arise. If Dispatch thought that there was a problem with performance data I would have liked to have received some kind of notification; phone call/ ACARS; from them regarding the issue prior to departure.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.