Narrative:

Captain's first flight following IOE and several weeks not flying. Second officer's first flight as second officer on widebody transport type X following extensive experience as widebody transport type Y. Third seat irr first officer experienced and current on type. Following vectors to intercept hnl 8L ILS, 'cleared for the ILS, maintain 3000' till established.' descent continued through 3000' on intercept heading. First officer announced error and suggested climb back to 3000'. Approach controller announced error. Captain elected to maintain altitude since he now had G/south reception. First officer late tuning #2 VHF navigation to ILS account tuned to hnl VOR for DME. No altitude alert warning noted although 3000' selected. First officer late calling altitude error account heavy workload at this point in flight: talking to approach control, setting headings, airspds, altitudes, flaps, running checklist with second officer, monitoring aircraft position via hnl VOR DME, tuning VHF navigation receivers, attempting to monitor and assist new captain and second officer with their duties, concern over barbers point NAS control zone. Hnl approach control, while pointing out altitude error, issued no instruction to climb. Conversation with approach control supervisor on following day indicated no safety problem account operations not being conducted at barbers point NAS, presumably account WX. Recommendation: 1) install DME on hnl 8L ILS. 2) limit crew compliment to one inexperienced or less than current crew member. 3) eliminate if possible emission of false ILS G/south signals above and below normal G/south, and/or train crews in simulator for false G/south reception and recognition. (Captain rejected first officer's suggestion of possible false G/south because he 'had never seen one.' first officer has, on hnl 8L ILS, on steep visual approach. Whether or not our initial G/south reception was valid could neither be agreed upon nor determined by first officer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING DESCENT INTO HNL.

Narrative: CAPT'S FIRST FLT FOLLOWING IOE AND SEVERAL WKS NOT FLYING. S/O'S FIRST FLT AS S/O ON WDB TYPE X FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE AS WDB TYPE Y. THIRD SEAT IRR F/O EXPERIENCED AND CURRENT ON TYPE. FOLLOWING VECTORS TO INTERCEPT HNL 8L ILS, 'CLRED FOR THE ILS, MAINTAIN 3000' TILL ESTABLISHED.' DSCNT CONTINUED THROUGH 3000' ON INTERCEPT HDG. F/O ANNOUNCED ERROR AND SUGGESTED CLB BACK TO 3000'. APCH CTLR ANNOUNCED ERROR. CAPT ELECTED TO MAINTAIN ALT SINCE HE NOW HAD G/S RECEPTION. F/O LATE TUNING #2 VHF NAV TO ILS ACCOUNT TUNED TO HNL VOR FOR DME. NO ALT ALERT WARNING NOTED ALTHOUGH 3000' SELECTED. F/O LATE CALLING ALT ERROR ACCOUNT HEAVY WORKLOAD AT THIS POINT IN FLT: TALKING TO APCH CTL, SETTING HDGS, AIRSPDS, ALTS, FLAPS, RUNNING CHKLIST WITH S/O, MONITORING ACFT POS VIA HNL VOR DME, TUNING VHF NAV RECEIVERS, ATTEMPTING TO MONITOR AND ASSIST NEW CAPT AND S/O WITH THEIR DUTIES, CONCERN OVER BARBERS POINT NAS CTL ZONE. HNL APCH CTL, WHILE POINTING OUT ALT ERROR, ISSUED NO INSTRUCTION TO CLB. CONVERSATION WITH APCH CTL SUPVR ON FOLLOWING DAY INDICATED NO SAFETY PROB ACCOUNT OPS NOT BEING CONDUCTED AT BARBERS POINT NAS, PRESUMABLY ACCOUNT WX. RECOMMENDATION: 1) INSTALL DME ON HNL 8L ILS. 2) LIMIT CREW COMPLIMENT TO ONE INEXPERIENCED OR LESS THAN CURRENT CREW MEMBER. 3) ELIMINATE IF POSSIBLE EMISSION OF FALSE ILS G/S SIGNALS ABOVE AND BELOW NORMAL G/S, AND/OR TRAIN CREWS IN SIMULATOR FOR FALSE G/S RECEPTION AND RECOGNITION. (CAPT REJECTED F/O'S SUGGESTION OF POSSIBLE FALSE G/S BECAUSE HE 'HAD NEVER SEEN ONE.' F/O HAS, ON HNL 8L ILS, ON STEEP VISUAL APCH. WHETHER OR NOT OUR INITIAL G/S RECEPTION WAS VALID COULD NEITHER BE AGREED UPON NOR DETERMINED BY F/O.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.