37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 870102 |
Time | |
Date | 201001 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | DCA.Airport |
State Reference | DC |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Ground Conflict Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Clearance |
Narrative:
The first officer was the flying pilot; wet runway conditions; the approach and landing were uneventful. Light traffic load; light radio communications; and nobody waiting to depart. On landing rollout; at about 40 knots; I informed the first officer that 'I am on the brakes'. He was closing the thrust reversers and stated 'your aircraft'; whereupon I assumed control; continued the deceleration and planned to clear the runway on taxiway north. As I came close to the turnoff taxiway; I saw another aircraft stopped on the north/K intersection; and told my first officer to inform tower we would clear on inactive runway 33. As we cleared on taxiway left; ground instructed us to contact the tower on a land line; and gave us the phone number. Five minutes later; the tower supervisor informed me that they had to instruct another aircraft landing right behind me to go around.I later learned that this event occurred because as I was assuming control of the aircraft; with a loud thrust reverser noise; tower stated 'no delay on the runway; traffic close behind you; contact ground'. I never heard that transmission; as I was occupied in the transfer of the aircraft control on a wet runway; in a loud; high workload environment; and with another aircraft appearing to be obstructing my clearing the runway safely. I told the first officer to inform tower of my intention to turn off on runway 33 but by now he had switched to ground as tower had instructed him; so he informed ground instead. Tower controller was not aware that I would clear in time; so he chose to issue a go around. Although I had started to veer away from the centerline towards taxiway november; when I saw the taxiway blocked; I continued approximately another 200 feet to the next available turnoff; which was runway 33. I never cleared my landing runway 1 and then came back onto it; as tower thought I did. We were not informed about another aircraft close behind us; nor asked to keep our speed up on the final; and not asked to clear expeditiously until the very last seconds of our landing rollout. We did not hear that last instruction; although the first officer later informed me that he did. I did not know that another aircraft had been issued a go-around until at the gate.tower controllers need to provide timely instructions of desired actions by pilots well in advance of the critical moment. Controllers should also be reminded that every landing is different; and that the environment in our cockpit varies greatly with activity and environmental conditions; especially during full reverse and aircraft control changes; and that they should not assume the aircraft can always do what they want. Tower controllers could also try to avoid issuing simultaneous multiple instructions when at least one of those instructions is of a critical nature; i.e.; 'aircraft close behind you'; then followed by a routine 'contact ground'. Pilots are always willing to accommodate expeditious movement at controller request; but regretfully today was not to be.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A319 flight crew reports being accused of not clearing Runway 1 at DCA; after landing; in a timely manner causing a go around.
Narrative: The First Officer was the Flying Pilot; wet runway conditions; the approach and landing were uneventful. Light traffic load; light radio communications; and nobody waiting to depart. On landing rollout; at about 40 knots; I informed the First Officer that 'I am on the brakes'. He was closing the thrust reversers and stated 'your aircraft'; whereupon I assumed control; continued the deceleration and planned to clear the runway on taxiway N. As I came close to the turnoff taxiway; I saw another aircraft stopped on the N/K intersection; and told my First Officer to inform Tower we would clear on inactive runway 33. As we cleared on taxiway L; Ground instructed us to contact the Tower on a land line; and gave us the phone number. Five minutes later; the Tower Supervisor informed me that they had to instruct another aircraft landing right behind me to go around.I later learned that this event occurred because as I was assuming control of the aircraft; with a loud thrust reverser noise; Tower stated 'no delay on the runway; traffic close behind you; contact Ground'. I never heard that transmission; as I was occupied in the transfer of the aircraft control on a wet runway; in a loud; high workload environment; and with another aircraft appearing to be obstructing my clearing the runway safely. I told the First Officer to inform Tower of my intention to turn off on runway 33 but by now he had switched to Ground as Tower had instructed him; so he informed Ground instead. Tower Controller was not aware that I would clear in time; so he chose to issue a go around. Although I had started to veer away from the centerline towards taxiway November; when I saw the taxiway blocked; I continued approximately another 200 feet to the next available turnoff; which was runway 33. I NEVER cleared my landing runway 1 and then came back onto it; as Tower thought I did. We were not informed about another aircraft close behind us; nor asked to keep our speed up on the final; and not asked to clear expeditiously until the very last seconds of our landing rollout. We did not hear that last instruction; although the First Officer later informed me that he did. I did not know that another aircraft had been issued a go-around until at the gate.Tower controllers need to provide timely instructions of desired actions by pilots well in advance of the critical moment. Controllers should also be reminded that every landing is different; and that the environment in our cockpit varies greatly with activity and environmental conditions; especially during full reverse and aircraft control changes; and that they should not assume the aircraft can always do what they want. Tower controllers could also try to avoid issuing simultaneous multiple instructions when at least one of those instructions is of a critical nature; i.e.; 'aircraft close behind you'; then followed by a routine 'contact Ground'. Pilots are always willing to accommodate expeditious movement at Controller request; but regretfully today was not to be.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.