Narrative:

On the last leg of a 4 day trip I was the pilot flying. The visibility was less than 1 mile with the sky obscured. I elected to have the first officer start the #2 engine early for warm up requirements and also so greater attention could be given to the taxi out. As we approached the ILS hold short line I could tell the airplane did not sound 'normal' but could not tell why. The take off was normal but the engine sound seemed to have a slightly higher pitch. As we were climbing through about 5000; I realized that the packs were not on. I immediately told the first officer to turn on one pack; allow the cabin to stabilize; then turn on the second pack. I did not notice any bump or sense of pressure change. The flight continued without incident. I knew the airplane did not sound right and continued to look for a reason to support my feeling. I think the bottom line is I did not follow up behind my first officer. The packs show up on the checklist multiple times so there is no excuse for me to miss the pack switch position. Our trip was scheduled to finish with this leg and we were to then deadhead to our crew base. My first officer commutes from our destination so it is my personal belief that he had mentally checked out. His plan was to get to our destination and go home.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 flight crew failed to insure the air conditioning packs were on prior to takeoff. The oversight was noted during the initial climb and the packs turned on.

Narrative: On the last leg of a 4 day trip I was the pilot flying. The visibility was less than 1 mile with the sky obscured. I elected to have the First Officer start the #2 engine early for warm up requirements and also so greater attention could be given to the taxi out. As we approached the ILS hold short line I could tell the airplane did not sound 'normal' but could not tell why. The take off was normal but the engine sound seemed to have a slightly higher pitch. As we were climbing through about 5000; I realized that the packs were not on. I immediately told the First Officer to turn on one pack; allow the cabin to stabilize; then turn on the second pack. I did not notice any bump or sense of pressure change. The flight continued without incident. I knew the airplane did not sound right and continued to look for a reason to support my feeling. I think the bottom line is I did not follow up behind my First Officer. The packs show up on the checklist multiple times so there is no excuse for me to miss the pack switch position. Our trip was scheduled to finish with this leg and we were to then deadhead to our crew base. My First Officer commutes from our destination so it is my personal belief that he had mentally checked out. His plan was to get to our destination and go home.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.