Narrative:

We were flying the last leg on an extended duty day to sfo. The leg was approximately 4 hours in duration with a night landing. We were cleared and had briefed the modesto 3 arrival and were expecting and had briefed the ILS 28R. We had been held high and given speed restrictions that increased our workload with trying to slow down and descend at the same time. We also were in some intermittent icing conditions during the transition descent. We had broken out in the clear when we were issued the clearance to fly direct to oomen and intercept the 095 degree radial for the quiet bridge visual; intercept the localizer for 28R; maintain 180 KTS until the bridge. In the very limited amount of time we had available; we used the FMS to establish a heading for oomen and then went to display the 095 degree radial off the sfo VOR and we armed navigation mode to intercept that radial. At this time; approach advised us of a commuter aircraft on a simultaneous approach to 28L. We established visual contact with that aircraft and noted the reduced lateral separation that is standard procedure in sfo. We crossed the bridge at 180 KTS; manually tuned the ILS; intercepted it; started to reduce our speed and descend for a landing when we got a TA followed by an RA climb command. Since we were still above the glideslope; I was unable to visually reacquire the commuter aircraft below and slightly behind us against the ground lights. I was unable to verify with any certainty that we weren't descending on top of the commuter; which might have lined up on the wrong runway; or another aircraft that we didn't know anything about; so we executed the RA climb and went missed approach. The TCAS showed the target to be directly below us. An uneventful left hand visual pattern to 28L followed with a normal landing. Questions: 1. Should we have accepted an extended duty day to a final destination night landing with a reduced lateral separation approach? 2. Is it proper for approach control to issue the quiet bridge visual with the added restriction of direct oomen; intercept the sfo 095 degree radial and fly the localizer to 28R? This is a visual approach. Once I am cleared for it; no further electronic navigation should be required. What sfo approach control did by issuing this clearance is to require us to maintain IFR lateral navigation standards; while dumping the responsibility for traffic separation onto a crew that they will say accepted a visual approach and is VFR. 3. Would better FMS skills have expedited the lateral and vertical navigation and reduced the workload enough to have avoided the RA? 4. If we had been able to maintain positive visual contact with the commuter aircraft and verify adequate lateral separation; would it have been proper to disregard the RA? 5. Aren't reduce lateral separation approaches supposed to be staggered? 6. How could we get an RA without the commuter aircraft; approach control; and tower showing a traffic conflict? Did they ignore them in this circumstance? This event represents normal; prudent; cautious operation. I don't think it was a hazard or an exceedance; and it barely qualifies as an incident. But to be proactive in risk management; it requires that some questions be asked and answered. I don't feel that fatigue was a factor. I do feel that sub-optimal skills in man-machine avionics interface on the part of both crew members was a factor. I think that sub-par performance on the part of approach control was a factor. I think that sfo approach gave us an improper clearance in order to expedite their traffic flow. I think that habits and skills developed from good training caused and enabled the crew to react properly to the situation and avoid what could have been a disaster.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Corporate aircraft crew executed a missed approach on the SFO 28R ILS because they lost visual contact with TCAS traffic on a closely spaced parallel approach VMC; at night and responded to the RA.

Narrative: We were flying the last leg on an extended duty day to SFO. The leg was approximately 4 hours in duration with a night landing. We were cleared and had briefed the Modesto 3 arrival and were expecting and had briefed the ILS 28R. We had been held high and given speed restrictions that increased our workload with trying to slow down and descend at the same time. We also were in some intermittent icing conditions during the transition descent. We had broken out in the clear when we were issued the clearance to fly direct to OOMEN and intercept the 095 degree radial for the Quiet Bridge Visual; intercept the localizer for 28R; maintain 180 KTS until the bridge. In the very limited amount of time we had available; we used the FMS to establish a heading for OOMEN and then went to display the 095 degree radial off the SFO VOR and we armed NAV mode to intercept that radial. At this time; approach advised us of a commuter aircraft on a simultaneous approach to 28L. We established visual contact with that aircraft and noted the reduced lateral separation that is standard procedure in SFO. We crossed the bridge at 180 KTS; manually tuned the ILS; intercepted it; started to reduce our speed and descend for a landing when we got a TA followed by an RA climb command. Since we were still above the glideslope; I was unable to visually reacquire the commuter aircraft below and slightly behind us against the ground lights. I was unable to verify with any certainty that we weren't descending on top of the commuter; which might have lined up on the wrong runway; or another aircraft that we didn't know anything about; so we executed the RA climb and went missed approach. The TCAS showed the target to be directly below us. An uneventful left hand visual pattern to 28L followed with a normal landing. Questions: 1. Should we have accepted an extended duty day to a final destination night landing with a reduced lateral separation approach? 2. Is it proper for approach control to issue the Quiet Bridge Visual with the added restriction of direct OOMEN; intercept the SFO 095 degree radial and fly the localizer to 28R? This is a visual approach. Once I am cleared for it; no further electronic navigation should be required. What SFO Approach Control did by issuing this clearance is to require us to maintain IFR lateral navigation standards; while dumping the responsibility for traffic separation onto a crew that they will say accepted a visual approach and is VFR. 3. Would better FMS skills have expedited the lateral and vertical navigation and reduced the workload enough to have avoided the RA? 4. If we had been able to maintain positive visual contact with the commuter aircraft and verify adequate lateral separation; would it have been proper to disregard the RA? 5. Aren't reduce lateral separation approaches supposed to be staggered? 6. How could we get an RA without the commuter aircraft; approach control; and tower showing a traffic conflict? Did they ignore them in this circumstance? This event represents normal; prudent; cautious operation. I don't think it was a hazard or an exceedance; and it barely qualifies as an incident. But to be proactive in risk management; it requires that some questions be asked and answered. I don't feel that fatigue was a factor. I do feel that sub-optimal skills in man-machine avionics interface on the part of both crew members was a factor. I think that sub-par performance on the part of approach control was a factor. I think that SFO Approach gave us an improper clearance in order to expedite their traffic flow. I think that habits and skills developed from good training caused and enabled the crew to react properly to the situation and avoid what could have been a disaster.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.