Narrative:

[We were] dispatched with MEL 52-70-30 aft cargo door warning inoperative; condition H. This MEL describes the safety of flight issues such as false cautions repeatedly occurring on cockpit ECAM; reminding of aft cargo door warning with the MEL permitting operation after maintenance verification of 'door secured' prior to each flight departure. The MEL describes ECAM warnings and how to clear the warnings when they occur--after engine start; when advancing thrust levers to take off power; and after takeoff; a reminder that the aircraft must be flown at 10;000 ft unpressurized. These are all false cautions that must be cleared on ECAM. Status messages become the norm for the duration of the flight. On this crew's second leg; we had also learned of collateral loss of most ACARS functions; as the disabled door warning permitted only messages sent or received; while at the gate (where the aircraft always assumes it is; (during this aft cargo door inoperative light); so the crew had only one short leg to learn of the MEL ramifications before we were dispatched on a two hour leg. First officer was the flying pilot; captain as pilot not flying during flight. Normal departure with all three ECAM caution faults cleared during departure; and after switching to second [X] center frequency; we were switched to a [Y] center frequency; (probably my mistake by acquiring the freq change while the first officer pilot flying reported times to operations via radio 2). We were listening in; cruising at an intermediary altitude; awaiting further climb; on a very busy frequency; and were not able to hear any further instructions for our flight. The [Y] center seemed correct; the TCAS positioning of traffic surrounding us at within 2;000 ft of our current altitude; all made the congestion on frequency the likely reason for our unsuccessful check in. After a long 15 minutes of cruise; the first officer heard a [Y] center response to his query for a higher altitude; and we quickly found we had been off frequency and were assigned a correct [Y] sector and uneventful climb to final cruise and flight completion. When I learned [X center] had been missing our flight; pilot not flying (captain) called to apologize and found they had tried two calls on VHF radio changeover while a single pilot was guarding each radio. The dispatcher for our flight; had sent two ACARS messages requesting our contact for a frequency; but the messages on the crippled ACARS were never signaled or viewed until we had crew awareness of their presence. We remain puzzled that no other attempts were made to locate us on guard frequency; as it would have resulted in a quicker return to two-way communication. The event was a simple; misunderstood frequency during normal; busy radio communication. The loss of ACARS function was not mentioned in the MEL descriptions; and the crippled ACARS caused task loading; distraction; and crew functions to decay by requiring the times to be passed when in critical phases of flight. Once a simple error occurred; the situational positioning of the aircraft during climbout from 12;000 MSL to FL230 seemed normal. After further climb was not issued; we attempted a single call but seemed to time the transmission with other traffic cutting each other out. After about 15 minutes; the first officer keyed the mike to ask if higher altitude was available and we were advised of being on wrong frequency and we quickly re-established communications. MEL 70-30-H is a 10-day MEL; a ridiculous length of time for the aircraft to be operated in such an impaired condition. With just the door warning; the conditioning of the crew to expect ECAM warnings as normal is very flawed. The use of door warn for ACARS triggers and function make the MEL re-write imperative; and please shorten this repair interval!

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 flight crew experiences ACARS anomalies due to aircraft being dispatched with MEL for door warning light; which is also the trigger for out and in times. A brief lost communication with ATC occurs enroute and is exacerbated by lack of ACARS.

Narrative: [We were] dispatched with MEL 52-70-30 AFT CARGO DOOR WARNING INOP; CONDITION H. This MEL describes the safety of flight issues such as false CAUTIONS repeatedly occurring on cockpit ECAM; reminding of AFT CARGO DOOR WARNING with the MEL permitting operation after Maintenance verification of 'door secured' prior to each flight departure. The MEL describes ECAM warnings and how to clear the Warnings when they occur--after engine start; when advancing thrust levers to Take Off power; and after takeoff; a reminder that the aircraft must be flown at 10;000 FT unpressurized. These are all false CAUTIONS that must be cleared on ECAM. Status messages become the norm for the duration of the flight. On this crew's second leg; we had also learned of collateral loss of most ACARS functions; as the disabled door warning permitted only messages sent or received; while at the gate (where the aircraft always assumes it is; (during this AFT CARGO DOOR INOP light); so the crew had only one short leg to learn of the MEL ramifications before we were dispatched on a two hour leg. First Officer was the flying pilot; Captain as pilot not flying during flight. Normal departure with all three ECAM Caution faults cleared during departure; and after switching to second [X] Center frequency; we were switched to a [Y] Center frequency; (probably my mistake by acquiring the freq change while the First Officer pilot flying reported times to Operations via radio 2). We were listening in; cruising at an intermediary altitude; awaiting further climb; on a very busy frequency; and were not able to hear any further instructions for our flight. The [Y] Center seemed correct; the TCAS positioning of traffic surrounding us at within 2;000 FT of our current altitude; all made the congestion on frequency the likely reason for our unsuccessful check in. After a LONG 15 minutes of cruise; the First Officer heard a [Y] Center response to his query for a higher altitude; and we quickly found we had been off frequency and were assigned a correct [Y] sector and uneventful climb to final cruise and flight completion. When I learned [X Center] had been missing our flight; pilot not flying (Captain) called to apologize and found they had tried two calls on VHF radio changeover while a single pilot was guarding each radio. The Dispatcher for our flight; had sent two ACARS messages requesting our contact for a frequency; but the messages on the crippled ACARS were never signaled or viewed until we had crew awareness of their presence. We remain puzzled that no other attempts were made to locate us on guard frequency; as it would have resulted in a quicker return to two-way communication. The event was a simple; misunderstood frequency during normal; busy radio communication. The loss of ACARS function was not mentioned in the MEL descriptions; and the crippled ACARS caused task loading; distraction; and crew functions to decay by requiring the times to be passed when in critical phases of flight. Once a simple error occurred; the situational positioning of the aircraft during climbout from 12;000 MSL to FL230 seemed normal. After further climb was not issued; we attempted a single call but seemed to time the transmission with other traffic cutting each other out. After about 15 minutes; the First Officer keyed the mike to ask if higher altitude was available and we were advised of being on wrong frequency and we quickly re-established communications. MEL 70-30-H is a 10-day MEL; a ridiculous length of time for the aircraft to be operated in such an impaired condition. With just the Door Warning; the conditioning of the crew to expect ECAM warnings as normal is very flawed. The use of DOOR WARN for ACARS triggers and function make the MEL re-WRITE imperative; and please shorten this repair interval!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.