37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 874297 |
Time | |
Date | 201002 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZDV.ARTCC |
State Reference | CO |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-900 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Traffic Management |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was getting currency on a sector. I had two air carrier aircraft on basically the same route of flight with a 15-KT overtake at FL350; which was the top of my airspace. I quick-looked the sector above me and saw that my aircraft were crossing with other traffic at FL370. Since a climb to FL370 on either of my 2 aircraft would put them in conflict with other traffic; I elected to assign compatible speeds to maintain in-trail spacing until they crossed with the higher traffic. I then called the adjacent sector and coordinated that the trailing aircraft was requesting FL370 when it became available to get out of the speed restriction; and that both the aircraft were their control from me. They acknowledged the coordination. About 4-5 minutes later I noticed that the adjacent sector was climbing one aircraft to FL370; and I assumed that they had decided to swap him out with the crossing traffic. I then glanced over and saw that they only had a limited data block on the climbing aircraft who was out of about FL364 in the climb; and still well inside their airspace. I alerted the controller to the aircraft's presence. There was no traffic confliction involved. Subsequently; I heard the d-side controller yell over that they were watching traffic 'now'; in a joking manner. The trainee yelled back that he had '3 people telling him/her this was all coordinated.' recommendation; in my limited currency time of 8-hours per month I have nevertheless had ample opportunity to observe many very junior; and often not even fully certified controllers cutting a lot of corners; and doing some very sloppy coordination; much of which never makes it onto a recorded line. Obviously this type of vague and generic communication increases the odds greatly of a negative outcome. Some of this may be due to very young controllers only being checked out themselves for a year or two at most before instantly having to train even younger new-hires; before they've had much time to gain real world experience. I also have to question the role of the training department at this facility which in my estimation does an extremely poor job of any type of meaningful ongoing training for cpcs (certified professional controller). After you become a fully certified controller here the only training you receive is the occasional multiple choice cbi; or oset phraseology check. There is no emphasis on continuous improvement; or best practices; or anything approaching the type of recurrent training that our airline customers receive on an annual basis. This lack of any type of structured learning opportunity ensures that new controllers have to learn on the job; and frequently the hard way. Personally I believe this is what lies at the heart of most of our recent oes (operational errors) and ods (operational deviations).
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Enroute Controller described perceived over coordination event while completing currency requirements; noting some newer certified controllers are cutting corners during coordination efforts.
Narrative: I was getting currency on a sector. I had two air carrier aircraft on basically the same route of flight with a 15-KT overtake at FL350; which was the top of my airspace. I quick-looked the sector above me and saw that my aircraft were crossing with other traffic at FL370. Since a climb to FL370 on either of my 2 aircraft would put them in conflict with other traffic; I elected to assign compatible speeds to maintain in-trail spacing until they crossed with the higher traffic. I then called the adjacent sector and coordinated that the trailing aircraft was requesting FL370 when it became available to get out of the speed restriction; and that both the aircraft were their control from me. They acknowledged the coordination. About 4-5 minutes later I noticed that the adjacent sector was climbing one aircraft to FL370; and I assumed that they had decided to swap him out with the crossing traffic. I then glanced over and saw that they only had a limited data block on the climbing aircraft who was out of about FL364 in the climb; and still well inside their airspace. I alerted the controller to the aircraft's presence. There was no traffic confliction involved. Subsequently; I heard the D-side controller yell over that they were watching traffic 'now'; in a joking manner. The trainee yelled back that he had '3 people telling him/her this was all coordinated.' Recommendation; In my limited currency time of 8-hours per month I have nevertheless had ample opportunity to observe many very junior; and often not even fully certified controllers cutting a lot of corners; and doing some very sloppy coordination; much of which never makes it onto a recorded line. Obviously this type of vague and generic communication increases the odds greatly of a negative outcome. Some of this may be due to very young controllers only being checked out themselves for a year or two at most before instantly having to train even younger new-hires; before they've had much time to gain real world experience. I also have to question the role of the training department at this facility which in my estimation does an extremely poor job of any type of meaningful ongoing training for CPCs (Certified Professional Controller). After you become a fully certified controller here the only training you receive is the occasional multiple choice CBI; or OSET phraseology check. There is no emphasis on continuous improvement; or best practices; or anything approaching the type of recurrent training that our airline customers receive on an annual basis. This lack of any type of structured learning opportunity ensures that new controllers have to learn on the job; and frequently the hard way. Personally I believe this is what lies at the heart of most of our recent OEs (Operational Errors) and ODs (Operational Deviations).
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.