Narrative:

Dfw was in a north flow configuration and I was working local assist east one (LAE1). It was a typical RNAV departure flow while instrument approaches were being conducted to runways 35R and 31R staffed by a cpc working local east three (LAE3). Local east one (LE1) cleared air carrier X for an RNAV departure outside track. Later; LE3 asked if we could radio check air carrier Y who was on final to runway 35R. Air carrier X was cleared for takeoff when air carrier Y was about six miles south of dfw. LE1 cleared air carrier Y to land yet received no reply. I immediately conveyed this information to LE3. No further information was forthcoming on air carrier Y. When air carrier Y was approximately two mile final I received coordination from TRACON that air carrier Y was going around. The TRACON called the wrong position. I asked what heading but the controller came off the coordination line before I could complete my question and receive an answer. I turned to LAE3 and shouted that air carrier Y was going around! I heard that LAE3 was coordinating with AR1 (arrival radar one). I discussed with LE1 that LE3 was talking to AR1 about air carrier Y. There were several witnesses who where watching air carrier Y. It was observed that air carrier Y was climbing above 2;400. I told LE1 and LE1 asked air carrier X if he could maintain 2;000. Air carrier X responded he would try. Air carrier X descended to 2;000. Then it appeared that air carrier Y had descended to 2;100 around the departure end of runway 35R. I told LE1 to climb air carrier X to 10;000. I had heard LE3 tell approached control that he had figured it out so I assumed that someone was talking to air carrier Y. I received no coordination that air carrier Y was not responding to ATC instructions. Air carrier Y drifted to the east and began to climb again. One concern was air carrier Y had accelerated above 250 KTS. Air carrier X was out climbing air carrier Y who by this time contacted AR1 to ask for instructions. After observing air carrier X climb; LE1 instructed air carrier X to contact departure control. I coordinated with departure radar that air carrier X was climbing to 10;000. Recommendation; the incident was born out of the failure of air carrier Y to comply with ATC instructions and contact tower which the pilot never did. The pilot was instructed four times to contact tower. There was training in progress on AR1. After the initial coordination that air carrier Y was going around there was a mutual understanding that a standard missed approach/go around would ensue. The assumption that the pilot was on tower frequency was in error. But nothing based on the coordination I received indicated otherwise. LE3 did not verify that air carrier Y was turning; nor did approach control verify the status of air carrier Y who had missed numerous radio transmissions. LE1 did the best job possible with the information available. The pilot's unusual behavior contributed to this event. The unusual climb/descend /climb profile of air carrier Y's go around created a delayed climb for air carrier X who was asked to stop climb and maintain 2;000. Had the climb not been delayed perhaps altitude separation would have existed; since air carrier Y did not turn to the go around heading until the pilot of air carrier Y asked approach control for instructions; and was turned to heading 050. The importance of aircraft being on tower frequency in a timely manner cannot be overstated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DFW Controller described conflict event between an arrival and departure when the arrival failed to make timely contact with the Tower; initiated a go around and the confused coordination resulted in a separation event.

Narrative: DFW was in a north flow configuration and I was working Local Assist East One (LAE1). It was a typical RNAV departure flow while instrument approaches were being conducted to Runways 35R and 31R staffed by a CPC working Local East Three (LAE3). Local East One (LE1) cleared Air Carrier X for an RNAV departure outside track. Later; LE3 asked if we could radio check Air Carrier Y who was on final to Runway 35R. Air Carrier X was cleared for takeoff when Air Carrier Y was about six miles south of DFW. LE1 cleared Air Carrier Y to land yet received no reply. I immediately conveyed this information to LE3. No further information was forthcoming on Air Carrier Y. When Air Carrier Y was approximately two mile final I received coordination from TRACON that Air Carrier Y was going around. The TRACON called the wrong position. I asked what heading but the Controller came off the coordination line before I could complete my question and receive an answer. I turned to LAE3 and shouted that Air Carrier Y was Going Around! I heard that LAE3 was coordinating with AR1 (Arrival Radar One). I discussed with LE1 that LE3 was talking to AR1 about Air Carrier Y. There were several witnesses who where watching Air Carrier Y. It was observed that Air Carrier Y was climbing above 2;400. I told LE1 and LE1 asked Air Carrier X if he could maintain 2;000. Air Carrier X responded he would try. Air Carrier X descended to 2;000. Then it appeared that Air Carrier Y had descended to 2;100 around the departure end of Runway 35R. I told LE1 to climb Air Carrier X to 10;000. I had heard LE3 tell Approached Control that he had figured it out so I assumed that someone was talking to Air Carrier Y. I received no coordination that Air Carrier Y was not responding to ATC instructions. Air Carrier Y drifted to the east and began to climb again. One concern was Air Carrier Y had accelerated above 250 KTS. Air Carrier X was out climbing Air Carrier Y who by this time contacted AR1 to ask for instructions. After observing Air Carrier X climb; LE1 instructed Air Carrier X to contact Departure Control. I coordinated with Departure RADAR that Air Carrier X was climbing to 10;000. Recommendation; the incident was born out of the failure of Air Carrier Y to comply with ATC instructions and contact Tower which the pilot never did. The pilot was instructed four times to contact Tower. There was training in progress on AR1. After the initial coordination that Air Carrier Y was going around there was a mutual understanding that a standard missed approach/go around would ensue. The assumption that the pilot was on Tower frequency was in error. But nothing based on the coordination I received indicated otherwise. LE3 did not verify that Air Carrier Y was turning; nor did Approach Control verify the status of Air Carrier Y who had missed numerous radio transmissions. LE1 did the best job possible with the information available. The pilot's unusual behavior contributed to this event. The unusual climb/descend /climb profile of Air Carrier Y's go around created a delayed climb for Air Carrier X who was asked to stop climb and maintain 2;000. Had the climb not been delayed perhaps altitude separation would have existed; since Air Carrier Y did not turn to the go around heading until the pilot of Air Carrier Y asked Approach Control for instructions; and was turned to heading 050. The importance of aircraft being on Tower frequency in a timely manner cannot be overstated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.