Narrative:

Pismo and orcut sectors were combined at pismo. Traffic was very slow with showers moving through the sector area. Ceiling at sbp; about 10 NM northwest of mqo was reported at 2;500 ft for the last hour. I had no aircraft or target returns on my scope. I received a call from aircraft X; a flight of three VFR military helicopters at 1;800 ft that encountered IFR conditions 8 NM northwest of mqo requesting IFR clearance to sba. Based on the reported position which put the helicopters west of the coastline; the fact that I did not see any target returns on my scope and that the reported ceiling at sbp was reported above the helicopters altitude I assumed that the helicopters were below the ceiling; approaching IFR conditions and were still able to see each other. I asked if aircraft X could maintain own terrain/obstruction clearance through 2;800 ft (my MVA in that area). Aircraft X responded affirmative and I issued IFR clearance to sba via mqo; gvo at 4;000 ft. Aircraft X read back the clearance and requested squawk codes for him to pass to the rest of his flight. I issued the squawks; advised aircraft X that the IFR clearance is valid only for his aircraft and that the rest of the flight will need to call me separately for their clearances. A few seconds later aircraft X popped up on my scope over mqo at 4;000 ft. I identified him and at the same time the remainder of his flight tagged up next to him at same altitude; 4;000 ft. Aircraft Y tagged up right next to aircraft X; I believe the primary targets were nearly touching. I issued traffic and asked if aircraft Y (the helicopter not identification'd and not on IFR clearance that appeared behind aircraft X) if he had company in sight. Aircraft Y responded 'negative; IMC'. Looking at the scope I now had both aircraft Y and aircraft Z who was about a mile behind the first two helicopters; identing. Since I did not have positive identification on the second helo closest to aircraft X I did not issue vectors for separation being afraid that I will turn the wrong helicopter. I only issued 'use extreme caution'. It took a few more moments to get positive identification on the rest of the flight. Once identification'd I issued control vectors to separate the flight and once I had appropriate IFR separation I issued IFR clearances to sba. I believe I created a wrong mental picture of the situation after the initial call from aircraft X. It appears I did not recognize that the flight was already IMC and in fact an emergency. I should have been more inquisitive and should have clarified the status of the flight. I don't believe I violated any FAA orders as vectors were issued above the MVA and IFR clearances were issued after positive separation was established. Sba training program includes annual simulation refresher on how to handle VFR aircraft encountering IMC. It appears we need to include how to handle a flight of two or more VFR aircraft encountering IMC. Controllers need to ask more questions; assume less and ensure more.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SBA Controller described a pop-up IFR request by a flight of military helicopters and the handling of the request.

Narrative: Pismo and Orcut Sectors were combined at Pismo. Traffic was very slow with showers moving through the sector area. Ceiling at SBP; about 10 NM northwest of MQO was reported at 2;500 FT for the last hour. I had no aircraft or target returns on my scope. I received a call from Aircraft X; a flight of three VFR military helicopters at 1;800 FT that encountered IFR conditions 8 NM northwest of MQO requesting IFR clearance to SBA. Based on the reported position which put the helicopters west of the coastline; the fact that I did not see any target returns on my scope and that the reported ceiling at SBP was reported above the helicopters altitude I assumed that the helicopters were below the ceiling; approaching IFR conditions and were still able to see each other. I asked if Aircraft X could maintain own terrain/obstruction clearance through 2;800 FT (my MVA in that area). Aircraft X responded affirmative and I issued IFR clearance to SBA via MQO; GVO at 4;000 FT. Aircraft X read back the clearance and requested squawk codes for him to pass to the rest of his flight. I issued the squawks; advised Aircraft X that the IFR clearance is valid only for his aircraft and that the rest of the flight will need to call me separately for their clearances. A few seconds later Aircraft X popped up on my scope over MQO at 4;000 FT. I identified him and at the same time the remainder of his flight tagged up next to him at same altitude; 4;000 FT. Aircraft Y tagged up right next to Aircraft X; I believe the primary targets were nearly touching. I issued traffic and asked if Aircraft Y (the helicopter not ID'd and not on IFR clearance that appeared behind Aircraft X) if he had company in sight. Aircraft Y responded 'negative; IMC'. Looking at the scope I now had both Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z who was about a mile behind the first two helicopters; identing. Since I did not have positive ID on the second helo closest to Aircraft X I did not issue vectors for separation being afraid that I will turn the wrong helicopter. I only issued 'use extreme caution'. It took a few more moments to get positive ID on the rest of the flight. Once ID'd I issued control vectors to separate the flight and once I had appropriate IFR separation I issued IFR clearances to SBA. I believe I created a wrong mental picture of the situation after the initial call from Aircraft X. It appears I did not recognize that the flight was already IMC and in fact an emergency. I should have been more inquisitive and should have clarified the status of the flight. I don't believe I violated any FAA orders as vectors were issued above the MVA and IFR clearances were issued after positive separation was established. SBA training program includes annual simulation refresher on how to handle VFR aircraft encountering IMC. It appears we need to include how to handle a flight of two or more VFR aircraft encountering IMC. Controllers need to ask more questions; assume less and ensure more.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.