Narrative:

The takeoff roll appeared normal until approximately 110 kts when the severe vibration occurred. Engine operating parameters all appeared nominal and the takeoff was continued. After liftoff the gear was raised and it stowed normally. With no adverse flight characteristics; the decision was made to continue to destination. All checklists were run; and radio calls made to tower to alert them of the possible blown tire(s) on take off. Tower advised us of a frequency change and told us if they found anything; they would pass it along to departure radio. The QRH was consulted for guidance; if any. Finding nothing in the QRH; the captain was preparing for a call to the company when the left pack suddenly went to -17 degrees. We once again consulted the QRH for guidance on an in-op temp controller; both in auto mode and manual mode. Finding no guidance; we elected to shut down the pack and follow QRH guidance regarding single pack operation. ATC then advised us that ground personnel had found quite a bit of rubber on our departing runway. Contacting dispatch to advise them of the pack problem and receive data involving our lower than planned cruise altitude as well as the nose tire(s) failure; we also asked dispatch to secure communications with maintenance. Speaking with maintenance we reconfirmed the pack temp control failure and procedure; if any. We also advised them of the disposition on the nose wheel and told them we would be continuing to destination. Concluding the conversation with maintenance; dispatch then advised us they have our numbers for our cruise altitude change and also informed us that the chief pilot was standing by for consultation. Speaking with the chief pilot and discussing various options; I informed him of what our intentions would be. Not knowing the extent of damage that occurred on takeoff; I explained to the chief pilot that we would be doing a tower fly-by for ground personnel to get a look at the nose gear and possibly report the amount of damage. He concurred with the plan and we continued to destination. En route we discussed all possible scenarios and contingencies for this emergency. We discussed the use of the longest runway; braking; use of thrust reverser's; performance data; aircraft handling problems; and other events including a review of evacuate/evacuation procedures and division of duties utilizing the jump seat captain. Having as much information at hand as possible; contact was established with the flight attendant. The flight attendant was given a thorough briefing of our condition and an explanation of what our intentions were. He told me what he needed to do in the cabin to prepare for the emergency landing. I explained to him that we would need the cabin fully prepared for an evacuation if necessary. He acknowledged the situation and conveyed that he understood what was necessary to be done. I gave him the time line as best I knew; and told him I would give him an update in approximately 15-20 minutes.ATC was well aware of our condition and asked us for fuel and souls on board. I could not however; remember officially declaring an emergency. As a matter of procedure; I made sure the center was aware that we were declaring an emergency. Approach switched us over to tower and we coordinated with tower for the best altitude to do the fly-by. Tower suggested 500' AGL to which we agreed. Configuring the aircraft for the fly-by the landing gear extended normally. We commenced the fly-by; completed the fly-by; and received a report from the tower that all landing gear appeared to be down and normal. We made left closed traffic; extended the downwind to allow a margin of time to reconfirm that all checklists and last minute items were completed. On final approach with the aircraft fully configured; no noticeable changes in flight characteristics were observed. At approximately 1minute prior to touchdown the cabin was given the brace command. Touchdown was normal on main landing gear and elevator pressure was applied to keep nose wheel off runway as long as possible. When elevator authority diminished; the nose wheel touched down smoothly and severe vibration was observed. Directional control was maintained with no increased deceleration characteristics. At that time light braking was applied and the aircraft maintained directional control and responded well to the braking. Crash fire rescue equipment was present and immediately approached the aircraft; as well as maintenance. Tower queried our intentions; as maintenance was approaching the aircraft with a nose wheel in hand; we informed them we would be shutting down while maintenance replaced the nose wheel. Crash fire rescue equipment indicated that all was clear; i.e. No fire or smoke. Maintenance replaced 1 nose wheel and maintenance gave us the clearance to proceed. Taxi to the gate was normal (except for the torque link becoming unpinned; which was quickly reconnected by maintenance).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ50 flight crew experiences a nose tire failure at 110 knots during takeoff and elects to continue to destination. The left pack temperature becomes uncontrollable enroute and the pack is shut is down. Landing at destination is normal with high nose gear vibration.

Narrative: The takeoff roll appeared normal until approximately 110 kts when the severe vibration occurred. Engine operating parameters all appeared nominal and the takeoff was continued. After liftoff the gear was raised and it stowed normally. With no adverse flight characteristics; the decision was made to continue to destination. All checklists were run; and radio calls made to Tower to alert them of the possible blown tire(s) on take off. Tower advised us of a frequency change and told us if they found anything; they would pass it along to departure radio. The QRH was consulted for guidance; if any. Finding nothing in the QRH; the Captain was preparing for a call to the company when the left pack suddenly went to -17 degrees. We once again consulted the QRH for guidance on an in-op temp controller; both in auto mode and manual mode. Finding no guidance; we elected to shut down the pack and follow QRH guidance regarding single pack operation. ATC then advised us that ground personnel had found quite a bit of rubber on our departing runway. Contacting Dispatch to advise them of the pack problem and receive data involving our lower than planned cruise altitude as well as the nose tire(s) failure; we also asked dispatch to secure communications with maintenance. Speaking with maintenance we reconfirmed the pack temp control failure and procedure; if any. We also advised them of the disposition on the nose wheel and told them we would be continuing to destination. Concluding the conversation with Maintenance; Dispatch then advised us they have our numbers for our cruise altitude change and also informed us that the Chief Pilot was standing by for consultation. Speaking with the Chief Pilot and discussing various options; I informed him of what our intentions would be. Not knowing the extent of damage that occurred on takeoff; I explained to the Chief Pilot that we would be doing a tower fly-by for ground personnel to get a look at the nose gear and possibly report the amount of damage. He concurred with the plan and we continued to destination. En route we discussed all possible scenarios and contingencies for this emergency. We discussed the use of the longest runway; braking; use of thrust reverser's; performance data; aircraft handling problems; and other events including a review of EVAC procedures and division of duties utilizing the jump seat Captain. Having as much information at hand as possible; contact was established with the Flight Attendant. The Flight Attendant was given a thorough briefing of our condition and an explanation of what our intentions were. He told me what he needed to do in the cabin to prepare for the emergency landing. I explained to him that we would need the cabin fully prepared for an evacuation if necessary. He acknowledged the situation and conveyed that he understood what was necessary to be done. I gave him the time line as best I knew; and told him I would give him an update in approximately 15-20 minutes.ATC was well aware of our condition and asked us for fuel and souls on board. I could not however; remember officially declaring an emergency. As a matter of procedure; I made sure the Center was aware that we were declaring an emergency. Approach switched us over to Tower and we coordinated with Tower for the best altitude to do the fly-by. Tower suggested 500' AGL to which we agreed. Configuring the aircraft for the fly-by the landing gear extended normally. We commenced the fly-by; completed the fly-by; and received a report from the tower that all landing gear appeared to be down and normal. We made left closed traffic; extended the downwind to allow a margin of time to reconfirm that all checklists and last minute items were completed. On final approach with the aircraft fully configured; no noticeable changes in flight characteristics were observed. At approximately 1minute prior to touchdown the cabin was given the brace command. Touchdown was normal on main landing gear and elevator pressure was applied to keep nose wheel off runway as long as possible. When elevator authority diminished; the nose wheel touched down smoothly and severe vibration was observed. Directional control was maintained with no increased deceleration characteristics. At that time light braking was applied and the aircraft maintained directional control and responded well to the braking. CFR was present and immediately approached the aircraft; as well as Maintenance. Tower queried our intentions; as Maintenance was approaching the aircraft with a nose wheel in hand; we informed them we would be shutting down while Maintenance replaced the nose wheel. CFR indicated that all was clear; i.e. no fire or smoke. Maintenance replaced 1 nose wheel and Maintenance gave us the clearance to proceed. Taxi to the gate was normal (except for the torque link becoming unpinned; which was quickly reconnected by Maintenance).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.