Narrative:

The southeast area was impacted by severe weather and I had been working several ord inbounds on the watsn STAR. I cleared air carrier Y into the hold at watsn at FL260; and climbed air carrier X to FL270 to ensure separation with the air carrier Y flight. I then cleared air carrier X to hold at watsn. Another carrier (I'm not sure which one) was landing day and I had descended that aircraft to FL280 opposite direction of the first two aircraft I had holding. My intention was to clear air carrier X and then expedite the day inbound down to FL240 to get the aircraft out of my airspace. Once the air carrier Y aircraft began its outbound turn in the holding pattern I noticed air carrier X's altitude readout was FL264 and descending. I issued an immediate right turn to the air carrier Y flight ensuring separation with the deviating flight. After that; I asked air carrier X to verify he was at FL270. He said; 'we are trying to maintain that altitude; but our autopilot kicked off and we're getting back up to it.' my day arrival was about to leave FL290 for FL280 when I noticed air carrier X's altitude readout to be climbing back up to FL270; then FL274; then FL278. The day inbound and air carrier X were 10 miles apart; head on; and my day arrival was leaving FL289. I issued a traffic alert to the day arrival; and an immediate left hand turn to a 050 heading. This would not have ensured separation; but at this point I wanted to avoid a mid-air collision. I then told the day arrival to stop his descent and level off wherever he was at. The aircraft did so; and I then noticed air carrier X's altitude readout in a descent back to FL270. The pilot then said he thought he had control of the aircraft; but that holding at watsn was almost impossible due to weather there. Other pilots (I was clearing four aircraft to hold at watsn) were telling me similar reports. After vectoring the day arrival around my holding pattern and getting him out of the way; I started vectoring all my aircraft to the east of the watsn holding pattern; knowing the weather there is a little clearer. Then our bearz sector took me out of the hold; and I was able to bring those aircraft back in and hand them off to bearz. I have no idea how close air carrier X came to that day arrival. It was close enough to scare me; and the fact that the pilot did not appear to be in control of his aircraft worried me even more. This situation spiraled out of control due to my having to work too many aircraft in an area of known weather; and I had no where else to go. Recommendation; first of all; our supervisor had allowed a dangerous situation to escalate. The controllers in the southeast area knew there was severe weather impacting arrivals; and that nearly all ord and mdw arrivals through the area were unable to make it through the weather. Throughout the night I heard and voiced to myself that the situation was going to escalate out of control. That being said; we were still forced to work several arrivals that had little chance of making it to their destination. Had our supervisor had intimate knowledge of how the traffic flow in the southeast area worked; we could have avoided the situation. In the past; years ago; operational supervisors had to be certified on all positions in their area they are charged with. Now; supervisors are allowed to be certified on only one position; usually the position with the least amount of traffic or the least complex traffic. Couple this with a supervisor who may not have the fortitude to stand up to a demanding tmu supervisor who wishes nothing more than to push the maximum amount of aircraft into a sector; and you invite a dangerous situation. I had no choice but to hold aircraft near weather; because that was what was handed to me; and my supervisor and flow control stated that this plan would work. This is obvious proof that safety of the operation was not on the minds of these parties. My situation was onlyone (though a very dangerous one) of several situations that occurred that night creating unneeded safety hazards and an unprecedented amount of work by myself and other controllers in an attempt to ensure safety. Air carrier X stated he could barely control his aircraft. I placed him in a precarious situation by clearing him into holding at the watsn intersection; in close proximity to weather. The sad part is I had little other choice. I was working a normal traffic load in abnormal conditions where severe weather created numerous weather deviations and a huge increase in workload. I had no other airspace to hold my ord arrivals - they were taken by enroute aircraft attempting to deviate around weather. Had I not been taken out of the hold in a timely manner; I really do not know what I would have done with the four aircraft I had to hold. I had no place to go with them. Had safety been a priority; these aircraft bound to ord and mdw would have been routed around the weather; and clear of our airspace. Our supervisor would have the fortitude to protect his area from having a dangerous situation present itself. Instead; in an attempt to get as many ord arrivals into the airport as possible; ZAU's management and flow control jeopardized the lives of countless people aboard those aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAU Controller described a heavy complex traffic period when holding was required for ORD arrivals and aircraft were unable to maintain altitude because of weather; reporter claiming supervisory/traffic management oversight and planning was lacking and safety was compromised.

Narrative: The southeast area was impacted by severe weather and I had been working several ORD inbounds on the WATSN STAR. I cleared Air Carrier Y into the hold at WATSN at FL260; and climbed Air Carrier X to FL270 to ensure separation with the Air Carrier Y flight. I then cleared Air Carrier X to hold at WATSN. Another Carrier (I'm not sure which one) was landing DAY and I had descended that aircraft to FL280 opposite direction of the first two aircraft I had holding. My intention was to clear Air Carrier X and then expedite the DAY inbound down to FL240 to get the aircraft out of my airspace. Once the Air Carrier Y aircraft began its outbound turn in the holding pattern I noticed Air Carrier X's altitude readout was FL264 and descending. I issued an immediate right turn to the Air Carrier Y flight ensuring separation with the deviating flight. After that; I asked Air Carrier X to verify he was at FL270. He said; 'We are trying to maintain that altitude; but our autopilot kicked off and we're getting back up to it.' My DAY arrival was about to leave FL290 for FL280 when I noticed Air Carrier X's altitude readout to be climbing back up to FL270; then FL274; then FL278. The DAY inbound and Air Carrier X were 10 miles apart; head on; and my DAY arrival was leaving FL289. I issued a traffic alert to the DAY arrival; and an immediate left hand turn to a 050 heading. This would not have ensured separation; but at this point I wanted to avoid a mid-air collision. I then told the DAY arrival to stop his descent and level off wherever he was at. The aircraft did so; and I then noticed Air Carrier X's altitude readout in a descent back to FL270. The Pilot then said he thought he had control of the aircraft; but that holding at WATSN was almost impossible due to weather there. Other pilots (I was clearing four aircraft to hold at WATSN) were telling me similar reports. After vectoring the DAY arrival around my holding pattern and getting him out of the way; I started vectoring all my aircraft to the east of the WATSN holding pattern; knowing the weather there is a little clearer. Then our BEARZ sector took me out of the hold; and I was able to bring those aircraft back in and hand them off to BEARZ. I have no idea how close Air Carrier X came to that DAY arrival. It was close enough to scare me; and the fact that the Pilot did not appear to be in control of his aircraft worried me even more. This situation spiraled out of control due to my having to work too many aircraft in an area of known weather; and I had no where else to go. Recommendation; first of all; our Supervisor had allowed a dangerous situation to escalate. The controllers in the southeast area knew there was severe weather impacting arrivals; and that nearly all ORD and MDW arrivals through the area were unable to make it through the weather. Throughout the night I heard and voiced to myself that the situation was going to escalate out of control. That being said; we were still forced to work several arrivals that had little chance of making it to their destination. Had our Supervisor had intimate knowledge of how the traffic flow in the southeast area worked; we could have avoided the situation. In the past; years ago; Operational Supervisors had to be certified on all positions in their area they are charged with. Now; Supervisors are allowed to be certified on only one position; usually the position with the least amount of traffic or the least complex traffic. Couple this with a Supervisor who may not have the fortitude to stand up to a demanding TMU Supervisor who wishes nothing more than to push the maximum amount of aircraft into a sector; and you invite a dangerous situation. I had no choice but to hold aircraft near weather; because that was what was handed to me; and my Supervisor and Flow Control stated that this plan would work. This is obvious proof that safety of the operation was not on the minds of these parties. My situation was onlyone (though a very dangerous one) of several situations that occurred that night creating unneeded safety hazards and an unprecedented amount of work by myself and other controllers in an attempt to ensure safety. Air Carrier X stated he could barely control his aircraft. I placed him in a precarious situation by clearing him into holding at the WATSN intersection; in close proximity to weather. The sad part is I had little other choice. I was working a normal traffic load in abnormal conditions where severe weather created numerous weather deviations and a huge increase in workload. I had no other airspace to hold my ORD arrivals - they were taken by enroute aircraft attempting to deviate around weather. Had I not been taken out of the hold in a timely manner; I really do not know what I would have done with the four aircraft I had to hold. I had no place to go with them. Had safety been a priority; these aircraft bound to ORD and MDW would have been routed around the weather; and clear of our airspace. Our Supervisor would have the fortitude to protect his area from having a dangerous situation present itself. Instead; in an attempt to get as many ORD arrivals into the airport as possible; ZAU's Management and Flow Control jeopardized the lives of countless people aboard those aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.