Narrative:

Flight originally departed enroute to our destination; at XA36 local. We were advised that our destination weather was gusty and moderate turbulence in the area before departure by dispatch. Taf for arrival time was 06022g37kt 1SM RA br OVC004 WS015/08055KT our alternate was assigned as the due to it being further west and hopefully the weather system would have rolled through there and give us a more calm alternate as opposed to nearer alternates which were also suffering from gusty winds; windshear; and moderate or worse turbulence. Taf for arrival at alternate from dispatch release 05018g25 2SM RA br OVC004 WS020/10045KT. Still not ideal but gave us lots of alternate fuel to work with. The plan was to monitor our destination and alternate enroute and amend alternate if required. Enroute dispatch messaged us an amended taf for our time of arrival taf amd ZZZ1 1318/1424 05024g35 2SM RA br OVC010 WS020/10070KT when we got this ACARS we started to get the alternate weather again and it was 11005KT 6SM RA OVC025 09/06 A2941. And the taf from dispatch confirmed similar weather for the foreseeable future. As we got closer to our destination we were advised of holding into our destination due to numerous go-arounds for windshear and turbulence on approach. We started running fuel numbers and bingo fuel and determined we had less than 1000 lbs of fuel until bingo. We were issued holding instructions with an efc time 45-50 minutes later. We didn't have time to hold so the captain contacted dispatch to see if we had a better; closer alternate to allow us to hold a bit to see if we would be able to get into our destination. After conferring with dispatch and most of the nearby alternates in the same situation or similar as our destination we elected to divert to our alternate. We arrived the first time at our alternate with plenty of fuel. Dispatch had advised via ACARS to deplane when we arrived and we did so. After deplaning the captain called dispatch to determine what the plan was. We were advised that they had prepared paperwork and we were going to try it again. We were also advised that all our other flights to our destination were cancelled but they wanted us to try it again since we were already enroute. We found this odd and inquired as to whether or not anyone was getting into our destination and was assured from dispatch that they were. The captain obtained the release and weather packet and reviewed them. The forecast weather was much the same as the first time we were dispatched there. The taf was taf amd 1318/1424 05024g35 2SM RA br OVC010 WS020/10070KT FM132100 05020g30kt 2SM RA br OVC006 ws 015/08055KT. The new taf would apply to us with 57 minutes enroute. So the captain contacted dispatch again and asked for pireps and whether or not other people were getting in. Again we were assured that other planes were getting in and our destination was only in a ground delay program; not ground stop; so the airport was open to arrivals.we expressed concern over having the same weather forecast and ultimately ending back at our alternate again but since it was legal and what dispatch wanted us to try; we agreed and planned to take as much fuel as possible and again try to eventually change the alternate to a closer alternate to give us more holding fuel if we needed it. We amended the release to take more fuel; got a fuel upload and were underway. Departure was normal; enroute on the arrival we were advised to expect holding that our destination was having the same issue; go-arounds; turbulence; and possible windshear. We set up the hold in the FMS; advised dispatch and started computing bingo fuel. We advised the flight attendants of the hold and expected ride conditions. At some point on our way to our destination before we were issued holding instructions the captain and I discussed other closer alternates. Our discussion was inconclusive since most places were reporting gusty weather and we anticipated ride conditions tobe nearly the same as our destination. To help with this issue; the captain decided to call dispatch. When he finally got a hold of them; we discussed changing alternates. In the middle of the conversation; we were cleared inbound to our destination. Since we were still above minimum fuel arriving we continued inbound and the captain advised dispatch that we were going to give it a shot; but if we encountered any windshear or executed any go-around we were going straight to our alternate and would be getting low on fuel. Somewhere in here we inquired with ATC to see if people were getting into our destination and what the ride was on final. We were advised people were getting in and to expect moderate turbulence. On our way inbound to the destination we were vectored a bit more than planned. Approach advised us we were number 3; so we didn't anticipate that much vectoring; but were turned onto about a 20 or 25 mile final. During the vectoring we were in continuous moderate turbulence. Also during the vectoring we reinforced and briefed bottom lines; windshear and go-around call outs and procedures; and our intentions in the event of a missed approach.about 10 miles out on the approach at 3000 we were switched to tower and checked on. We were cleared to land. I was flying; then configured and was working really hard monitoring the autopilot and overriding the auto thrust to maintain airspeed. While on final the airspeed was fluctuating between +/- 10 KTS; occasionally a bit more but never 15 or more KTS. After a few minutes we heard tower issue a PIREP of moderate occasional severe turbulence above 2000 feet on final and airspeed +/- 15 KTS below 2000 feet. At this point we were intercepting the glide slope. As I thought about it; it seemed the quickest way to exit was to continue on the approach and we would be below 2000 feet in a matter of approx 1 minute. Up to this point we had continuous moderate turbulence. We subsequently encountered windshear and severe turbulence. The windshear advisory/warning never appeared on the pfd. The airspeed was +25 KTS and we were immediately in a 40 degree left bank. I called for windshear/go-around and we executed the windshear escape maneuver using maximum thrust. The autothrust disengaged. I advised ATC which gave us runway heading; 3000 feet and a frequency change. We maintained configuration. The captain made the frequency switch but was very busy helping me attempt to maintain airspeed and climb. As I was adjusting thrust; I commanded the autothrust back; the captain then re-engaged the autothrust. During this time I had over sped the flaps and gotten 1 stick shaker. We also had EICAS messages appear; which we didn't review until later; but they were aoa limit fail; shaker anticipated; and windshear fail. After the flight path; airspeed; and altitude were stabilizing we were at 3300 ft and approximately runway heading; and were cleaning up the aircraft. At some point the autothrust had disengaged again; and the captain verbalized the situation; I asked for the engagement and he complied. The captain checked in with ATC and immediately notified them of being at 3300 ft; which was above our assigned altitude of 3000. We were still in moderate turbulence. ATC inquired to our intentions; the captain immediately advised them direct our alternate and that we were declaring minimum fuel. The FMS/mfd had displayed landing with 3500 pounds of fuel at our alternate. Since this was without an approach loaded and direct routing; we figured it would be a bit less than that. We were given routing and started climbing and heading towards our alternate. The captain advised that he was going to execute the QRH procedures for all the EICAS messages. The capitan executed all QRH procedures. The basic limitations that these QRH procedures imposed was to land with flaps full and set vref full; and use normal wind corrections for vap. It also limited us to .5 mach enroute. The captain notified dispatch.he then called the flight attendants to inquire about the passenger and flight attendant status. A flight attendant advised him that many passengers were vomiting but that everyone was safe and no one was hurt. Enroute to our alternate we encountered moderate mixed icing at our assigned lower altitude which they gave us for a direct route. We got clearance to a higher altitude to exit the icing conditions. We checked the alternate fuel on the release and verified that we were landing with approximately 3000 pounds of fuel at alternate arrival. We also obtained the latest weather which was 08006KT 4SM RA br BKN030 OVC040. At this point; in hindsight; due to our .5 mach limitation we should have inquired with dispatch to verify the enroute burn to our alternate. The captain briefed the flight attendants on the diversion as well as the time enroute; then briefed the passengers and told them we would advise them more on the ground. Since we had had a discussion of different alternates; and were at minimum fuel; at some point we were thinking about changing alternates to possibly something closer. As we thought about it; with aoa limit fail; shaker anticipated; and windshear fail; we didn't want to possibly encounter those situations again with failed warning systems. We were confident in being able to execute a successful approach into our alternate and we briefed the approach. We also briefed that we were minimum fuel so all measures to prevent a missed approach should be exercised including stabilized approach and being configured early and on speed. The approach was executed normally and terminated in a successful landing. We taxied to the gate and shut the engines down with 3100 lbs of fuel. The captain contacted dispatch and maintenance to advise them of the failures; use of max thrust; and flap overspeed.the captain and I debriefed the situation. We reviewed our decision making and the events of the flights and decided that if we had the advantage of knowing the outcome we obviously would have made different decisions; but without knowing the outcome we would have made the same decisions. The only decision we would possibly have changed was to continue the approach after the report of severe turbulence. Since the time between the severe turbulence report and our windshear event was so short; we didn't really have time to discuss that before the event. In my debriefing with the flight attendants they advised me that as flight attendant call buttons were pressed they made an announcement to the effect of 'we are required to be seated and seat belts fastened by the captain; if this is a medical emergency that requires our immediate attention raise your hand; otherwise if passengers in your immediate vicinity can help you; that is the best we can do.' the flight attendants also advised me that during this time they knew the flight deck crew was busy; but were unsure of the flight's status and our intentions. They were observing the sterile light and knew based on our experience flying together (good rapport; and the trust they had in us); that we would brief them workload permitting and to standby. They utilized this time via interphone to reassure each other and shared with each other that they were mentally reviewing to themselves test questions and other emergency memory items and procedures. I am very impressed at their discipline actions and keeping their head in the game and making preparing themselves for the worst of their own accord. That should be a model for all flight attendants.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB170 First Officer describes the circumstances surrounding two diversions for weather. The first after being unable to hold due to fuel and the second due to windshear.

Narrative: Flight originally departed enroute to our destination; at XA36 local. We were advised that our destination weather was gusty and moderate turbulence in the area before departure by Dispatch. TAF for arrival time was 06022G37KT 1SM RA BR OVC004 WS015/08055KT our alternate was assigned as the due to it being further west and hopefully the weather system would have rolled through there and give us a more calm alternate as opposed to nearer alternates which were also suffering from gusty winds; windshear; and moderate or worse turbulence. TAF for arrival at alternate from dispatch release 05018G25 2SM RA BR OVC004 WS020/10045KT. Still not ideal but gave us lots of alternate fuel to work with. The plan was to monitor our destination and alternate enroute and amend alternate if required. Enroute Dispatch messaged us an amended TAF for our time of arrival TAF AMD ZZZ1 1318/1424 05024G35 2SM RA BR OVC010 WS020/10070KT When we got this ACARS we started to get the alternate weather again and it was 11005KT 6SM RA OVC025 09/06 A2941. And the TAF from Dispatch confirmed similar weather for the foreseeable future. As we got closer to our destination we were advised of holding into our destination due to numerous go-arounds for windshear and turbulence on approach. We started running fuel numbers and bingo fuel and determined we had less than 1000 lbs of fuel until bingo. We were issued holding instructions with an EFC time 45-50 minutes later. We didn't have time to hold so the Captain contacted Dispatch to see if we had a better; closer alternate to allow us to hold a bit to see if we would be able to get into our destination. After conferring with Dispatch and most of the nearby alternates in the same situation or similar as our destination we elected to divert to our alternate. We arrived the first time at our alternate with plenty of fuel. Dispatch had advised via ACARS to deplane when we arrived and we did so. After deplaning the Captain called Dispatch to determine what the plan was. We were advised that they had prepared paperwork and we were going to try it again. We were also advised that all our other flights to our destination were cancelled but they wanted us to try it again since we were already enroute. We found this odd and inquired as to whether or not anyone was getting into our destination and was assured from Dispatch that they were. The Captain obtained the release and weather packet and reviewed them. The forecast weather was much the same as the first time we were dispatched there. The TAF was TAF AMD 1318/1424 05024G35 2SM RA BR OVC010 WS020/10070KT FM132100 05020G30KT 2SM RA BR OVC006 WS 015/08055KT. The new TAF would apply to us with 57 minutes enroute. So the Captain contacted Dispatch again and asked for PIREPs and whether or not other people were getting in. Again we were assured that other planes were getting in and our destination was only in a ground delay program; not ground stop; so the airport was open to arrivals.We expressed concern over having the same weather forecast and ultimately ending back at our alternate again but since it was legal and what Dispatch wanted us to try; we agreed and planned to take as much fuel as possible and again try to eventually change the alternate to a closer alternate to give us more holding fuel if we needed it. We amended the release to take more fuel; got a fuel upload and were underway. Departure was normal; enroute on the arrival we were advised to expect holding that our destination was having the same issue; go-arounds; turbulence; and possible windshear. We set up the hold in the FMS; advised Dispatch and started computing bingo fuel. We advised the Flight Attendants of the hold and expected ride conditions. At some point on our way to our destination before we were issued holding instructions the Captain and I discussed other closer alternates. Our discussion was inconclusive since most places were reporting gusty weather and we anticipated ride conditions tobe nearly the same as our destination. To help with this issue; the Captain decided to call Dispatch. When he finally got a hold of them; we discussed changing alternates. In the middle of the conversation; we were cleared inbound to our destination. Since we were still above minimum fuel arriving we continued inbound and the Captain advised Dispatch that we were going to give it a shot; but if we encountered any windshear or executed any go-around we were going straight to our alternate and would be getting low on fuel. Somewhere in here we inquired with ATC to see if people were getting into our destination and what the ride was on final. We were advised people were getting in and to expect moderate turbulence. On our way inbound to the destination we were vectored a bit more than planned. Approach advised us we were number 3; so we didn't anticipate that much vectoring; but were turned onto about a 20 or 25 mile final. During the vectoring we were in continuous moderate turbulence. Also during the vectoring we reinforced and briefed bottom lines; windshear and go-around call outs and procedures; and our intentions in the event of a missed approach.About 10 miles out on the approach at 3000 we were switched to Tower and checked on. We were cleared to land. I was flying; then configured and was working really hard monitoring the autopilot and overriding the auto thrust to maintain airspeed. While on final the airspeed was fluctuating between +/- 10 KTS; occasionally a bit more but never 15 or more KTS. After a few minutes we heard tower issue a PIREP of moderate occasional severe turbulence above 2000 feet on final and airspeed +/- 15 KTS below 2000 feet. At this point we were intercepting the glide slope. As I thought about it; it seemed the quickest way to exit was to continue on the approach and we would be below 2000 feet in a matter of approx 1 minute. Up to this point we had continuous moderate turbulence. We subsequently encountered windshear and severe turbulence. The windshear advisory/warning never appeared on the PFD. The airspeed was +25 KTS and we were immediately in a 40 degree left bank. I called for windshear/go-around and we executed the windshear escape maneuver using maximum thrust. The autothrust disengaged. I advised ATC which gave us runway heading; 3000 feet and a frequency change. We maintained configuration. The Captain made the frequency switch but was very busy helping me attempt to maintain airspeed and climb. As I was adjusting thrust; I commanded the autothrust back; the Captain then re-engaged the autothrust. During this time I had over sped the flaps and gotten 1 stick shaker. We also had EICAS messages appear; which we didn't review until later; but they were AOA limit fail; Shaker anticipated; and Windshear Fail. After the flight path; airspeed; and altitude were stabilizing we were at 3300 FT and approximately runway heading; and were cleaning up the aircraft. At some point the autothrust had disengaged again; and the Captain verbalized the situation; I asked for the engagement and he complied. The Captain checked in with ATC and immediately notified them of being at 3300 FT; which was above our assigned altitude of 3000. We were still in moderate turbulence. ATC inquired to our intentions; the Captain immediately advised them direct our alternate and that we were declaring minimum fuel. The FMS/MFD had displayed landing with 3500 LBS of fuel at our alternate. Since this was without an approach loaded and direct routing; we figured it would be a bit less than that. We were given routing and started climbing and heading towards our alternate. The Captain advised that he was going to execute the QRH procedures for all the EICAS messages. The Capitan executed all QRH procedures. The basic limitations that these QRH procedures imposed was to land with flaps full and set Vref full; and use normal wind corrections for Vap. It also limited us to .5 mach enroute. The Captain notified Dispatch.He then called the Flight Attendants to inquire about the passenger and Flight Attendant status. A Flight Attendant advised him that many passengers were vomiting but that everyone was safe and no one was hurt. Enroute to our alternate we encountered moderate mixed icing at our assigned lower altitude which they gave us for a direct route. We got clearance to a higher altitude to exit the icing conditions. We checked the alternate fuel on the release and verified that we were landing with approximately 3000 LBS of fuel at alternate arrival. We also obtained the latest weather which was 08006KT 4SM RA BR BKN030 OVC040. At this point; in hindsight; due to our .5 mach limitation we should have inquired with Dispatch to verify the enroute burn to our alternate. The Captain briefed the Flight Attendants on the diversion as well as the time enroute; then briefed the passengers and told them we would advise them more on the ground. Since we had had a discussion of different alternates; and were at minimum fuel; at some point we were thinking about changing alternates to possibly something closer. As we thought about it; with AOA Limit Fail; Shaker Anticipated; and Windshear Fail; we didn't want to possibly encounter those situations again with failed warning systems. We were confident in being able to execute a successful approach into our alternate and we briefed the approach. We also briefed that we were minimum fuel so all measures to prevent a missed approach should be exercised including stabilized approach and being configured early and on speed. The approach was executed normally and terminated in a successful landing. We taxied to the gate and shut the engines down with 3100 lbs of fuel. The Captain contacted Dispatch and Maintenance to advise them of the failures; use of max thrust; and flap overspeed.The Captain and I debriefed the situation. We reviewed our decision making and the events of the flights and decided that if we had the advantage of knowing the outcome we obviously would have made different decisions; but without knowing the outcome we would have made the same decisions. The only decision we would possibly have changed was to continue the approach after the report of severe turbulence. Since the time between the severe turbulence report and our windshear event was so short; we didn't really have time to discuss that before the event. In my debriefing with the Flight Attendants they advised me that as flight attendant call buttons were pressed they made an announcement to the effect of 'we are required to be seated and seat belts fastened by the Captain; if this is a medical emergency that requires our immediate attention raise your hand; otherwise if passengers in your immediate vicinity can help you; that is the best we can do.' The Flight Attendants also advised me that during this time they knew the flight deck crew was busy; but were unsure of the flight's status and our intentions. They were observing the sterile light and knew based on our experience flying together (good rapport; and the trust they had in us); that we would brief them workload permitting and to standby. They utilized this time via interphone to reassure each other and shared with each other that they were mentally reviewing to themselves test questions and other emergency memory items and procedures. I am very impressed at their discipline actions and keeping their head in the game and making preparing themselves for the worst of their own accord. That should be a model for all flight attendants.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.