Narrative:

I was working sector 61; a high altitude sector overlying denver approach control; for some time and was directed to combine the sector with sector 7; a low altitude departure sector for east gate departures off of den. This is the unusual combination. Although we have been combining these sectors for several years it continues to be a problem. Our airspace was redesigned without our area's input. Combining sector 61 with sector 7 creates clutter because all of den approach control's traffic is now depicted on the scope. Sector 61 is one of the busiest high altitude sectors in the center and you now have to try and differentiate full data blocks from approach traffic which at times is so dense it makes the process very difficult. This raises the complexity factor of these two sectors tremendously. When sector 61 is opened alone the filter settings eliminate all of this clutter and you can clearly see your traffic. Likewise; when sector 7 is opened alone you only look at traffic within your stratum and you can more effectively monitor your departure traffic without the distraction of high altitude enroute traffic at the same time. Because of the ridiculous redesign of area 2's airspace; this is the only logical combination of these sectors when combining is necessary. I assumed sector 7 with sector 61 combined. Departure aircraft where experiencing moderate chop and turbulence through FL240 and enroute aircraft where complaining of light to moderate chop. All aircraft where either complaining about the rides or I was trying to inform them of what to expect. Air carrier X following another air carrier jet (air carrier west) refused to come out of the east departure gate on route due to a thunderstorm that was not depicted on radar. Approach control called me to inform me of this and that he was assigning speeds to the aircraft. I instead directed him to use altitude and stop air carrier X at FL220. The other air carrier jet was only 3 or 4 miles in front of air carrier X and climbing to FL230 where I was going to leave him because of aircraft Y east of there positions. They flew approximately 180 headings until clear of the weather. The next jet out on that same route (air carrier Z) did not deviate and was joining the hct transition; which is the most northern of our 4 departure routes; which air carrier X had also filed. Prior to all of this occurring; departure control apreqed a fort collins departure climbing to FL230 which I had approved and subsequently climbed to fl 250 and placed a J ring on him; knowing he would be a problem with future den departures due to his very slow airspeed (estimate at 220 knots). This routing had the aircraft (aircraft Y) crossing my sector from northwest to southeast crossing all four of my departure routes. Aircraft departing denver are climbed to FL230 by approach and then we climb them to FL290 or higher when combined with sector 61; thus the need to j-ring aircraft Y as he would be a factor for all departures until clear of my airspace. Air carrier X and the preceding aircraft jet deviated south of the mck transition before informing me they could turn to the 90 degree heading given them by approach when they were able reference the weather. Air carrier west reported turning to this heading and I cleared him direct pwe and climbed him to FL290. I observed his position relative to aircraft Y and knew this would separate the two of them. At this time; the d-side trainee had plugged in and the evening crew was just coming into the area. One member of this crew was reading the latest mandatory reading item in the mandatory reading binder advising that we would be directed to park either in the east parking lot or west parking lot depending on the last digit of our parking passes. The controller reading this began complaining loudly about this and the rest of the crew joined in. The noise level was so high that I turned to look at what was occurring. I noticed DV2 standing by the area 2 desk and then heard the omic on duty proclaim the noise level in the area sounded like a barand directed the area supervisor to squelch it. This mandatory reading item was an april fools joke placed in the binder by someone in management and had caused many similar distractions through out the day. Because of this noise I had missed a couple of aircraft check on my frequency or otherwise speak to me. As I turned back to my sector; I had only looked away for seconds; as this all occurred in that time frame; I was playing catch up to find out who had been calling; causing me to get behind the power curve. Also; the d-side trainer had arrived and they had called me for a briefing which I was now to busy to accomplish. I responded to a pilot checking on complaining of chop and to air carrier Z's check on and climbed him to FL290 as he was also clear of aircraft Y. Air carrier X then reported on the 90 heading. I did a flight plan readout by clicking on his call sign and saw that he was a hct transition going to ord. I also noticed he had ashby intersection in his route of flight and decide to clear him there to rejoin his route. I then issued the clearance and climbed him to FL290 and got a good read back and turned to my uret screen to update his route in the NAS. As I turned my attention back to my scope I saw that this clearance would place him in conflict with air carrier Z whom I then amended his altitude below the air carrier X's current altitude. It was at this time I saw the confliction of air carrier X with aircraft Y and issued a 30 right turn to air carrier X and a expedited climb. I then descended aircraft Y to FL240. I was not successful in maintaining standard separation between them. Recommendation; redesign the airspace to preclude combing this high altitude airspace with a departure corridor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDV controller experienced a loss of separation event when distracted by over lapping data blocks due to sector configuration/s and conversations at the sector.

Narrative: I was working Sector 61; a high altitude sector overlying Denver Approach Control; for some time and was directed to combine the sector with Sector 7; a low altitude departure sector for East gate departures off of DEN. This is the unusual combination. Although we have been combining these sectors for several years it continues to be a problem. Our airspace was redesigned without our area's input. Combining Sector 61 with Sector 7 creates clutter because all of DEN approach control's traffic is now depicted on the scope. Sector 61 is one of the busiest High Altitude Sectors in the Center and you now have to try and differentiate full data blocks from approach traffic which at times is so dense it makes the process very difficult. This raises the complexity factor of these two sectors tremendously. When Sector 61 is opened alone the filter settings eliminate all of this clutter and you can clearly see your traffic. Likewise; when Sector 7 is opened alone you only look at traffic within your stratum and you can more effectively monitor your departure traffic without the distraction of High altitude enroute traffic at the same time. Because of the ridiculous redesign of Area 2's airspace; this is the only logical combination of these sectors when combining is necessary. I assumed Sector 7 with Sector 61 combined. Departure aircraft where experiencing moderate chop and turbulence through FL240 and enroute aircraft where complaining of light to moderate chop. All aircraft where either complaining about the rides or I was trying to inform them of what to expect. ACR X following another air carrier jet (ACR W) refused to come out of the East departure gate on route due to a thunderstorm that was not depicted on RADAR. Approach control called me to inform me of this and that he was assigning speeds to the aircraft. I instead directed him to use altitude and stop ACR X at FL220. The other air carrier jet was only 3 or 4 miles in front of ACR X and climbing to FL230 where I was going to leave him because of ACFT Y East of there positions. They flew approximately 180 headings until clear of the weather. The next jet out on that same route (ACR Z) did not deviate and was joining the HCT transition; which is the most northern of our 4 departure routes; which ACR X had also filed. Prior to all of this occurring; departure control APREQED a Fort Collins Departure climbing to FL230 which I had approved and subsequently climbed to FL 250 and placed a J ring on him; knowing he would be a problem with future DEN departures due to his very slow airspeed (estimate at 220 knots). This routing had the aircraft (ACFT Y) crossing my sector from Northwest to Southeast crossing all four of my departure routes. Aircraft departing Denver are climbed to FL230 by approach and then we climb them to FL290 or higher when combined with Sector 61; thus the need to J-ring ACFT Y as he would be a factor for all departures until clear of my airspace. ACR X and the preceding aircraft jet deviated South of the MCK transition before informing me they could turn to the 90 degree heading given them by approach when they were able reference the weather. ACR W reported turning to this heading and I cleared him direct PWE and climbed him to FL290. I observed his position relative to ACFT Y and knew this would separate the two of them. At this time; the D-side trainee had plugged in and the evening crew was just coming into the area. One member of this crew was reading the latest Mandatory reading item in the Mandatory Reading Binder advising that we would be directed to park either in the East Parking lot or West parking lot depending on the last digit of our parking passes. The controller reading this began complaining loudly about this and the rest of the crew joined in. The noise level was so high that I turned to look at what was occurring. I noticed DV2 standing by the Area 2 desk and then heard the OMIC on duty proclaim the noise level in the area sounded like a barand directed the Area Supervisor to squelch it. This Mandatory reading item was an April Fools Joke placed in the binder by someone in management and had caused many similar distractions through out the day. Because of this noise I had missed a couple of aircraft check on my frequency or otherwise speak to me. As I turned back to my sector; I had only looked away for seconds; as this all occurred in that time frame; I was playing catch up to find out who had been calling; causing me to get behind the power curve. Also; the D-side trainer had arrived and they had called me for a briefing which I was now to busy to accomplish. I responded to a pilot checking on complaining of chop and to ACR Z's check on and climbed him to FL290 as he was also clear of ACFT Y. ACR X then reported on the 90 heading. I did a flight plan readout by clicking on his call sign and saw that he was a HCT transition going to ORD. I also noticed he had ASHBY intersection in his route of flight and decide to clear him there to rejoin his route. I then issued the clearance and climbed him to FL290 and got a good read back and turned to my URET screen to update his route in the NAS. As I turned my attention back to my scope I saw that this clearance would place him in conflict with ACR Z whom I then amended his altitude below the ACR X's current altitude. It was at this time I saw the confliction of ACR X with ACFT Y and issued a 30 right turn to ACR X and a expedited climb. I then descended ACFT Y to FL240. I was not successful in maintaining standard separation between them. Recommendation; redesign the airspace to preclude combing this High Altitude Airspace with a departure corridor.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.