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Attributes | |
ACN | 88163 |
Time | |
Date | 198805 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mci |
State Reference | MO |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 5 agl bound upper : 10 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : mci |
Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Recip Eng |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff other |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 1275 |
ASRS Report | 88163 |
Person 2 | |
Function | controller : local |
Qualification | controller : non radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Consequence | faa : investigated other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
I preflight inspected the airplane which included a physical check of all baggage doors (which were latched and properly secured). I then taxied to the full length of runway 9 (9500' of runway). After receiving takeoff clearance, I began a normal takeoff. At approximately 95 KTS, I began to rotate the airplane. Almost immediately the right nose baggage door separated and xed in front of the windshield and passed off the left side between the left engine and fuselage. The aircraft was about 5-10' in the air when this occurred. There was no prior indications of any sort that the door was about to separate. After assuring that the aircraft was in control and a safe landing was possible with the remaining runway, I reduced power and aborted the takeoff. I then informed the control tower of my intentions and a safe landing was made. After clearing the runway, I informed ground control that the baggage door separated and was probably still on the runway near the C6 intersection. They informed me that it would be retrieved and delivered to the gate and then I proceeded to the gate. After securing the aircraft, I then telephoned the flight coordinator in manhattan and informed him of the situation (as per company policy). He then informed the appropriate personnel/authorities of the situation. I then proceeded to record the mechanical irregularity in the mechanical discrepancy report form in the aaip logbook (as per company policy). This action prevents an aircraft from being flown until a repair is made or a ferry permit is issued and an entry is made on form. The door was then returned and upon inspection, I noticed the zeus fastener was missing and entered this information on form . This fastener is used instead of locking the baggage doors with a key. I believe that this incident is a direct result of improperly adjusted door latches or a failure of these latches. And, due to the missing zeus fastener, I believe that this device also failed. Finally, to prevent a recurrence, maintenance should routinely check for proper adjustments and wear on all components associated with the baggage compartments. Also, a door warning light should be installed with microswitches alerting the pilot if the latches fail. This would be helpful if the latches failed while taxiing. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: camlocks had been added by the airline so that the doors would not have to be locked with a key. The camlocks were worn and were missing when the door was retrieved. The reporter insists that he had checked the camlocks during preflight and they were properly locked. The FAA investigated the incident and dropped the case. The aircraft comes equipped with a door hold open mechanism. This mechanism was missing on this aircraft and the door was propped open with a stick. Doors have come open on similar aircraft with the air carrier, but the door stayed with the aircraft due to the door hold open mechanism limiting door travel.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CARGO DOOR SEPARATED FROM SMT DURING TKOF.
Narrative: I PREFLT INSPECTED THE AIRPLANE WHICH INCLUDED A PHYSICAL CHK OF ALL BAGGAGE DOORS (WHICH WERE LATCHED AND PROPERLY SECURED). I THEN TAXIED TO THE FULL LENGTH OF RWY 9 (9500' OF RWY). AFTER RECEIVING TKOF CLRNC, I BEGAN A NORMAL TKOF. AT APPROX 95 KTS, I BEGAN TO ROTATE THE AIRPLANE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE RIGHT NOSE BAGGAGE DOOR SEPARATED AND XED IN FRONT OF THE WINDSHIELD AND PASSED OFF THE LEFT SIDE BTWN THE LEFT ENG AND FUSELAGE. THE ACFT WAS ABOUT 5-10' IN THE AIR WHEN THIS OCCURRED. THERE WAS NO PRIOR INDICATIONS OF ANY SORT THAT THE DOOR WAS ABOUT TO SEPARATE. AFTER ASSURING THAT THE ACFT WAS IN CTL AND A SAFE LNDG WAS POSSIBLE WITH THE REMAINING RWY, I REDUCED PWR AND ABORTED THE TKOF. I THEN INFORMED THE CTL TWR OF MY INTENTIONS AND A SAFE LNDG WAS MADE. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, I INFORMED GND CTL THAT THE BAGGAGE DOOR SEPARATED AND WAS PROBABLY STILL ON THE RWY NEAR THE C6 INTXN. THEY INFORMED ME THAT IT WOULD BE RETRIEVED AND DELIVERED TO THE GATE AND THEN I PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. AFTER SECURING THE ACFT, I THEN TELEPHONED THE FLT COORDINATOR IN MANHATTAN AND INFORMED HIM OF THE SITUATION (AS PER COMPANY POLICY). HE THEN INFORMED THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL/AUTHORITIES OF THE SITUATION. I THEN PROCEEDED TO RECORD THE MECHANICAL IRREGULARITY IN THE MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY RPT FORM IN THE AAIP LOGBOOK (AS PER COMPANY POLICY). THIS ACTION PREVENTS AN ACFT FROM BEING FLOWN UNTIL A REPAIR IS MADE OR A FERRY PERMIT IS ISSUED AND AN ENTRY IS MADE ON FORM. THE DOOR WAS THEN RETURNED AND UPON INSPECTION, I NOTICED THE ZEUS FASTENER WAS MISSING AND ENTERED THIS INFO ON FORM . THIS FASTENER IS USED INSTEAD OF LOCKING THE BAGGAGE DOORS WITH A KEY. I BELIEVE THAT THIS INCIDENT IS A DIRECT RESULT OF IMPROPERLY ADJUSTED DOOR LATCHES OR A FAILURE OF THESE LATCHES. AND, DUE TO THE MISSING ZEUS FASTENER, I BELIEVE THAT THIS DEVICE ALSO FAILED. FINALLY, TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE, MAINT SHOULD ROUTINELY CHK FOR PROPER ADJUSTMENTS AND WEAR ON ALL COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENTS. ALSO, A DOOR WARNING LIGHT SHOULD BE INSTALLED WITH MICROSWITCHES ALERTING THE PLT IF THE LATCHES FAIL. THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE LATCHES FAILED WHILE TAXIING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: CAMLOCKS HAD BEEN ADDED BY THE AIRLINE SO THAT THE DOORS WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE LOCKED WITH A KEY. THE CAMLOCKS WERE WORN AND WERE MISSING WHEN THE DOOR WAS RETRIEVED. THE RPTR INSISTS THAT HE HAD CHKED THE CAMLOCKS DURING PREFLT AND THEY WERE PROPERLY LOCKED. THE FAA INVESTIGATED THE INCIDENT AND DROPPED THE CASE. THE ACFT COMES EQUIPPED WITH A DOOR HOLD OPEN MECHANISM. THIS MECHANISM WAS MISSING ON THIS ACFT AND THE DOOR WAS PROPPED OPEN WITH A STICK. DOORS HAVE COME OPEN ON SIMILAR ACFT WITH THE ACR, BUT THE DOOR STAYED WITH THE ACFT DUE TO THE DOOR HOLD OPEN MECHANISM LIMITING DOOR TRAVEL.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.