37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 88160 |
Time | |
Date | 198805 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : clt |
State Reference | NC |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, High Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground other : taxi |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 160 flight time total : 7000 flight time type : 450 |
ASRS Report | 88160 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 300 |
ASRS Report | 88270 |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : runway non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance other |
Consequence | faa : investigated Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Approaching end of runway 36R at clt we switched to tower frequency. We then received a clearance for immediate takeoff. After observing that the small transport Z flight on final was no factor we acknowledged the takeoff clearance. When we moved onto the runway we observed an small aircraft Y on the runway in position about 2000' down the runway. We then brought both engines to idle. Knowing that both of us could not be airborne in time for the small transport Z to land, I let the aircraft roll toward the bypass turn off anticipating a turn off at tower's request. The tower then told the small aircraft Y to turn right and clear the runway, then told us to hold our position. The tower then instructed the small transport Z to go around and then instructed us to taxi up to the bypass and clear the runway, taxiing back to #1 position. We took the takeoff clearance not knowing the small aircraft Y was already on the runway. We were the only aircraft at the end of runway 36R while 36L had many aircraft on another frequency. With departures from multiple intxns, I can understand how this could happen. One way to avoid this would be sequencing by ground control advising of multiple departure points or a second confirmation visually at the runway entrance point. Supplemental information from acn 88270: just as crew of flight xyz was about to inquire with tower about the single engine small aircraft Y, tower instructed flight xyz to hold our position (crew of flight xyz had never even applied takeoff thrust) and for the small aircraft Y to clear the runway. Tower then instructed commuter traffic on final for 36 to go around and for flight xyz to clear the runway onto the parallel and return to the approach end of runway 36R to await further takeoff clearance. This problem was discovered by flight xyz crew the following day as a result of control tower contacting our airline's flight department. Upon discussion with clt tower personnel, it appears flight xyz crew heard the tail end of tower's takeoff clearance to the small aircraft Y (which was making an intersection departure from the opp side of runway 36R that flight xyz was on) and upon reading back that clearance to the tower, taxied onto the runway with a takeoff clearance that was intended for the small aircraft Y. Contributing factors: the crew's mind set that they were the only aircraft in sequence for departure (due to small aircraft Y at intersection being behind crew on parallel taxiway) on runway 36R, the tower not denying takeoff clearance to flight xyz once crew read back the clearance to tower, and the possibility of the small aircraft Y and flight xyz blocking each other's xmissions. Corrective actions: tower denied all clrncs to takeoff and land until situation was cleared up, and flight xyz never applying takeoff thrust. Human performance considerations: as mentioned earlier, flight xyz crew's mind set about being #1 for runway 36R departure. Suggestions: a definitive handoff procedure from ground control to tower giving flight crews a proposed takeoff sequence. Example: 'switch to tower #1 for takeoff,' or 'expect to follow aircraft ahead.' crew should have looked to see if runway was clear before taxiing onto runway.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MLG COPIED TKOF CLRNC FOR SMA AND TAXIED ONTO ACTIVE RWY CAUSING TWR TO CANCEL ALL TKOF CLRNCS AND SEND AN SMT ON FINAL AROUND.
Narrative: APCHING END OF RWY 36R AT CLT WE SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ. WE THEN RECEIVED A CLRNC FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. AFTER OBSERVING THAT THE SMT Z FLT ON FINAL WAS NO FACTOR WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE TKOF CLRNC. WHEN WE MOVED ONTO THE RWY WE OBSERVED AN SMA Y ON THE RWY IN POS ABOUT 2000' DOWN THE RWY. WE THEN BROUGHT BOTH ENGS TO IDLE. KNOWING THAT BOTH OF US COULD NOT BE AIRBORNE IN TIME FOR THE SMT Z TO LAND, I LET THE ACFT ROLL TOWARD THE BYPASS TURN OFF ANTICIPATING A TURN OFF AT TWR'S REQUEST. THE TWR THEN TOLD THE SMA Y TO TURN RIGHT AND CLR THE RWY, THEN TOLD US TO HOLD OUR POS. THE TWR THEN INSTRUCTED THE SMT Z TO GO AROUND AND THEN INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI UP TO THE BYPASS AND CLR THE RWY, TAXIING BACK TO #1 POS. WE TOOK THE TKOF CLRNC NOT KNOWING THE SMA Y WAS ALREADY ON THE RWY. WE WERE THE ONLY ACFT AT THE END OF RWY 36R WHILE 36L HAD MANY ACFT ON ANOTHER FREQ. WITH DEPS FROM MULTIPLE INTXNS, I CAN UNDERSTAND HOW THIS COULD HAPPEN. ONE WAY TO AVOID THIS WOULD BE SEQUENCING BY GND CTL ADVISING OF MULTIPLE DEP POINTS OR A SECOND CONFIRMATION VISUALLY AT THE RWY ENTRANCE POINT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 88270: JUST AS CREW OF FLT XYZ WAS ABOUT TO INQUIRE WITH TWR ABOUT THE SINGLE ENG SMA Y, TWR INSTRUCTED FLT XYZ TO HOLD OUR POS (CREW OF FLT XYZ HAD NEVER EVEN APPLIED TKOF THRUST) AND FOR THE SMA Y TO CLR THE RWY. TWR THEN INSTRUCTED COMMUTER TFC ON FINAL FOR 36 TO GO AROUND AND FOR FLT XYZ TO CLR THE RWY ONTO THE PARALLEL AND RETURN TO THE APCH END OF RWY 36R TO AWAIT FURTHER TKOF CLRNC. THIS PROB WAS DISCOVERED BY FLT XYZ CREW THE FOLLOWING DAY AS A RESULT OF CTL TWR CONTACTING OUR AIRLINE'S FLT DEPT. UPON DISCUSSION WITH CLT TWR PERSONNEL, IT APPEARS FLT XYZ CREW HEARD THE TAIL END OF TWR'S TKOF CLRNC TO THE SMA Y (WHICH WAS MAKING AN INTXN DEP FROM THE OPP SIDE OF RWY 36R THAT FLT XYZ WAS ON) AND UPON READING BACK THAT CLRNC TO THE TWR, TAXIED ONTO THE RWY WITH A TKOF CLRNC THAT WAS INTENDED FOR THE SMA Y. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE CREW'S MIND SET THAT THEY WERE THE ONLY ACFT IN SEQUENCE FOR DEP (DUE TO SMA Y AT INTXN BEING BEHIND CREW ON PARALLEL TXWY) ON RWY 36R, THE TWR NOT DENYING TKOF CLRNC TO FLT XYZ ONCE CREW READ BACK THE CLRNC TO TWR, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SMA Y AND FLT XYZ BLOCKING EACH OTHER'S XMISSIONS. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: TWR DENIED ALL CLRNCS TO TKOF AND LAND UNTIL SITUATION WAS CLRED UP, AND FLT XYZ NEVER APPLYING TKOF THRUST. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: AS MENTIONED EARLIER, FLT XYZ CREW'S MIND SET ABOUT BEING #1 FOR RWY 36R DEP. SUGGESTIONS: A DEFINITIVE HDOF PROC FROM GND CTL TO TWR GIVING FLT CREWS A PROPOSED TKOF SEQUENCE. EXAMPLE: 'SWITCH TO TWR #1 FOR TKOF,' OR 'EXPECT TO FOLLOW ACFT AHEAD.' CREW SHOULD HAVE LOOKED TO SEE IF RWY WAS CLR BEFORE TAXIING ONTO RWY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.