Narrative:

I lined the aircraft on the centerline and turned the controls over to the first officer. He applied the power and commenced the takeoff roll. I fined tuned the power settings and monitored the takeoff and engine instruments. At 104 KTS, I made the 100 KTS call and then checked the engine instruments again. By now we were passing 115 KTS and I noticed that the aircraft was drifting to the left of the centerline. I thought that the first officer was a little slow in correcting for a wind gust. (Prior to takeoff, the winds were reported to be approximately 150 degrees at 14 KTS gusting to 18 KTS.) when we reached about 120 KTS, the aircraft continued to drift left of the centerline -- I'm guessing that the right main gear was about to cross the centerline. Suspecting a possible problem at this time, I was just about to say something to the first officer, when he said something to the effect 'you need to take the aircraft.' we were now at approximately 125 KTS with approximately 3700 ft of runway remaining. (Note V1 was 155 KTS.) I immediately took control of the aircraft. I checked the engine instruments -- they were normal. The aircraft was wings level, so I didn't think we blew a tire. I ultimately came to the conclusion that we had a possible flight control (rudder) problem. In light of this consideration, I elected to abort the takeoff. I returned the aircraft to the runway heading and executed an abort. Once stopped, the first officer and I completed the company approved 'rejected takeoff' checklist. We didn't have a fire, however, I requested the control tower to have the crash trucks come out and check for hot brakes. I would say it took in excess of 5 mins for the crash trucks to get to the aircraft. In the meantime, according to our procedures, we had to stop the aircraft and set the parking brake. Consequently, the brakes locked up due to the heat buildup. As it turned out, the first officer's seat had become unlocked and rolled back in 2 increments. The first time was when the aircraft started drifting, and the second time the seat rolled full aft, at which time the first officer relinquished control of the aircraft to me. As this occurred, I was concentrating on the aircraft track down the runway and didn't notice the first officer's plight. As a monday morning quarterback, I could say that the first officer could have given me more information or possibly I could have checked on the first officer. Well, my comment is, first of all, at 125 KTS with 3700 ft of runway remaining, my attention was directed toward keeping the aircraft on the runway. Secondly, by checking around to see how the first officer was, we would now be at 130+ KTS with less than 3000 ft of runway remaining, further restricting the safe abort envelope. Thirdly, we're talking about just a few seconds to analyze and make decisions. I don't know about our monday morning quarterbacks, but I'm not willing to take an aircraft airborne if I suspect flight control problems. Smoking holes don't have the opportunity to defend comments made on a 'flight recorder tape.' finally, I'm quite sure the seat rolling back startled the first officer and the most important thing on his mind, rightly so, was that someone take control of the aircraft. Considering the few seconds time frame, and I can't over emphasize short amount of time we're talking about. By the time I took complete and positive control of the aircraft and analyzed the situation, the first officer's amplifying comments would have most likely been moot. In my opinion, this appears to be an unsafe situation created by a defective part, the first officer's seat. The seat failed and a difficult situation developed. In the short span of time available, a decision was made based on the information at hand and an aborted takeoff was executed. All the appropriate procedures and checklists were followed. No one was injured. The only problem that evolved was that the brakes and tires had to be changed. Unfortunately, the monday morning quarterbacks that I'm referring to, ie, air carrier management and the FAA appear to be on a witch hunt. For reasons beyond my understanding, they are requiring me to take a few hours of simulator practice reviewing aborted takeoff procedures and then a line check. Out of all these people, only one has discussed the situation with me and his comment was neutral other than stating that the company feels the FAA would be satisfied if I were to bechked out on these procedures. The rest of these people have passed judgement with no first-hand knowledge or second-hand knowledge. I can't understand why they couldn't simply call me or meet with me face-to-face to talk about the situation. I've heard talks of these sits in the crew room but never believed them. What I see here is a knee jerk reaction by the FAA and the corporate management to document the resolution of a problem that never existed. They're creating a mentality that fosters cover-ups and non compliance with procedures in order to 'keep the heat off of oneself.' (I could probably document that with a little research.) my concern is that good judgement will be sacrificed in fear of being placed under the microscope. I hope to god that in the future, my decisions will continue to be based on what's right and safe, and not what's expedient. I guess it's easier to attach some sort of blame to the pilot rather than a defective part or possible lax maintenance procedures. I would venture to say that this particular aircraft has had previous maintenance write-ups on this seat. I'm currently researching this. I also know that there are several aircraft in the fleet with similar seat problems. Just look at it this way -- if the seat hadn't failed, there would have been no aborted takeoff. Where does the problem really rest? When is common sense going to prevail?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ACFT ON TKOF ROLL, FO FLYING, WHEN FO'S SEAT SLID BACK ON TRACK RESULTING IN INABILITY TO CTL RUDDERS. AS ACFT DRIFTED TOWARD EDGE OF RWY FO CALLED FOR CAPT TO TAKE OVER, HE DID AND ABORTED TKOF. HOT BRAKES AND SUBSEQUENT SETTING OF THE BRAKES CAUSED BRAKES AND TIRES TO REQUIRE CHANGING.

Narrative: I LINED THE ACFT ON THE CTRLINE AND TURNED THE CTLS OVER TO THE FO. HE APPLIED THE PWR AND COMMENCED THE TKOF ROLL. I FINED TUNED THE PWR SETTINGS AND MONITORED THE TKOF AND ENG INSTS. AT 104 KTS, I MADE THE 100 KTS CALL AND THEN CHKED THE ENG INSTS AGAIN. BY NOW WE WERE PASSING 115 KTS AND I NOTICED THAT THE ACFT WAS DRIFTING TO THE L OF THE CTRLINE. I THOUGHT THAT THE FO WAS A LITTLE SLOW IN CORRECTING FOR A WIND GUST. (PRIOR TO TKOF, THE WINDS WERE RPTED TO BE APPROX 150 DEGS AT 14 KTS GUSTING TO 18 KTS.) WHEN WE REACHED ABOUT 120 KTS, THE ACFT CONTINUED TO DRIFT L OF THE CTRLINE -- I'M GUESSING THAT THE R MAIN GEAR WAS ABOUT TO CROSS THE CTRLINE. SUSPECTING A POSSIBLE PROB AT THIS TIME, I WAS JUST ABOUT TO SAY SOMETHING TO THE FO, WHEN HE SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT 'YOU NEED TO TAKE THE ACFT.' WE WERE NOW AT APPROX 125 KTS WITH APPROX 3700 FT OF RWY REMAINING. (NOTE V1 WAS 155 KTS.) I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT. I CHKED THE ENG INSTS -- THEY WERE NORMAL. THE ACFT WAS WINGS LEVEL, SO I DIDN'T THINK WE BLEW A TIRE. I ULTIMATELY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE HAD A POSSIBLE FLT CTL (RUDDER) PROB. IN LIGHT OF THIS CONSIDERATION, I ELECTED TO ABORT THE TKOF. I RETURNED THE ACFT TO THE RWY HDG AND EXECUTED AN ABORT. ONCE STOPPED, THE FO AND I COMPLETED THE COMPANY APPROVED 'REJECTED TKOF' CHKLIST. WE DIDN'T HAVE A FIRE, HOWEVER, I REQUESTED THE CTL TWR TO HAVE THE CRASH TRUCKS COME OUT AND CHK FOR HOT BRAKES. I WOULD SAY IT TOOK IN EXCESS OF 5 MINS FOR THE CRASH TRUCKS TO GET TO THE ACFT. IN THE MEANTIME, ACCORDING TO OUR PROCS, WE HAD TO STOP THE ACFT AND SET THE PARKING BRAKE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE BRAKES LOCKED UP DUE TO THE HEAT BUILDUP. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE FO'S SEAT HAD BECOME UNLOCKED AND ROLLED BACK IN 2 INCREMENTS. THE FIRST TIME WAS WHEN THE ACFT STARTED DRIFTING, AND THE SECOND TIME THE SEAT ROLLED FULL AFT, AT WHICH TIME THE FO RELINQUISHED CTL OF THE ACFT TO ME. AS THIS OCCURRED, I WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE ACFT TRACK DOWN THE RWY AND DIDN'T NOTICE THE FO'S PLIGHT. AS A MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACK, I COULD SAY THAT THE FO COULD HAVE GIVEN ME MORE INFO OR POSSIBLY I COULD HAVE CHKED ON THE FO. WELL, MY COMMENT IS, FIRST OF ALL, AT 125 KTS WITH 3700 FT OF RWY REMAINING, MY ATTN WAS DIRECTED TOWARD KEEPING THE ACFT ON THE RWY. SECONDLY, BY CHKING AROUND TO SEE HOW THE FO WAS, WE WOULD NOW BE AT 130+ KTS WITH LESS THAN 3000 FT OF RWY REMAINING, FURTHER RESTRICTING THE SAFE ABORT ENVELOPE. THIRDLY, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT JUST A FEW SECONDS TO ANALYZE AND MAKE DECISIONS. I DON'T KNOW ABOUT OUR MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKS, BUT I'M NOT WILLING TO TAKE AN ACFT AIRBORNE IF I SUSPECT FLT CTL PROBS. SMOKING HOLES DON'T HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND COMMENTS MADE ON A 'FLT RECORDER TAPE.' FINALLY, I'M QUITE SURE THE SEAT ROLLING BACK STARTLED THE FO AND THE MOST IMPORTANT THING ON HIS MIND, RIGHTLY SO, WAS THAT SOMEONE TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT. CONSIDERING THE FEW SECONDS TIME FRAME, AND I CAN'T OVER EMPHASIZE SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME WE'RE TALKING ABOUT. BY THE TIME I TOOK COMPLETE AND POSITIVE CTL OF THE ACFT AND ANALYZED THE SIT, THE FO'S AMPLIFYING COMMENTS WOULD HAVE MOST LIKELY BEEN MOOT. IN MY OPINION, THIS APPEARS TO BE AN UNSAFE SIT CREATED BY A DEFECTIVE PART, THE FO'S SEAT. THE SEAT FAILED AND A DIFFICULT SIT DEVELOPED. IN THE SHORT SPAN OF TIME AVAILABLE, A DECISION WAS MADE BASED ON THE INFO AT HAND AND AN ABORTED TKOF WAS EXECUTED. ALL THE APPROPRIATE PROCS AND CHKLISTS WERE FOLLOWED. NO ONE WAS INJURED. THE ONLY PROB THAT EVOLVED WAS THAT THE BRAKES AND TIRES HAD TO BE CHANGED. UNFORTUNATELY, THE MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKS THAT I'M REFERRING TO, IE, ACR MGMNT AND THE FAA APPEAR TO BE ON A WITCH HUNT. FOR REASONS BEYOND MY UNDERSTANDING, THEY ARE REQUIRING ME TO TAKE A FEW HRS OF SIMULATOR PRACTICE REVIEWING ABORTED TKOF PROCS AND THEN A LINE CHK. OUT OF ALL THESE PEOPLE, ONLY ONE HAS DISCUSSED THE SIT WITH ME AND HIS COMMENT WAS NEUTRAL OTHER THAN STATING THAT THE COMPANY FEELS THE FAA WOULD BE SATISFIED IF I WERE TO BECHKED OUT ON THESE PROCS. THE REST OF THESE PEOPLE HAVE PASSED JUDGEMENT WITH NO FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OR SECOND-HAND KNOWLEDGE. I CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THEY COULDN'T SIMPLY CALL ME OR MEET WITH ME FACE-TO-FACE TO TALK ABOUT THE SIT. I'VE HEARD TALKS OF THESE SITS IN THE CREW ROOM BUT NEVER BELIEVED THEM. WHAT I SEE HERE IS A KNEE JERK REACTION BY THE FAA AND THE CORPORATE MGMNT TO DOCUMENT THE RESOLUTION OF A PROB THAT NEVER EXISTED. THEY'RE CREATING A MENTALITY THAT FOSTERS COVER-UPS AND NON COMPLIANCE WITH PROCS IN ORDER TO 'KEEP THE HEAT OFF OF ONESELF.' (I COULD PROBABLY DOCUMENT THAT WITH A LITTLE RESEARCH.) MY CONCERN IS THAT GOOD JUDGEMENT WILL BE SACRIFICED IN FEAR OF BEING PLACED UNDER THE MICROSCOPE. I HOPE TO GOD THAT IN THE FUTURE, MY DECISIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON WHAT'S RIGHT AND SAFE, AND NOT WHAT'S EXPEDIENT. I GUESS IT'S EASIER TO ATTACH SOME SORT OF BLAME TO THE PLT RATHER THAN A DEFECTIVE PART OR POSSIBLE LAX MAINT PROCS. I WOULD VENTURE TO SAY THAT THIS PARTICULAR ACFT HAS HAD PREVIOUS MAINT WRITE-UPS ON THIS SEAT. I'M CURRENTLY RESEARCHING THIS. I ALSO KNOW THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL ACFT IN THE FLEET WITH SIMILAR SEAT PROBS. JUST LOOK AT IT THIS WAY -- IF THE SEAT HADN'T FAILED, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO ABORTED TKOF. WHERE DOES THE PROB REALLY REST? WHEN IS COMMON SENSE GOING TO PREVAIL?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.