Narrative:

We were taking off from teb runway 24 using the RUUDY2 departure going to rdu. After crossing wentz at 1;500 MSL we were given a heading to intercept the colts neck (col) VOR radial 350 inbound and a climb to 4;000 ft. Colts neck was not on our flight plan; and we didn't have the departure plate out. It had been reviewed on the ground and we had verified what was in the FMS. So there was the usual scramble to find the identifier for colts neck and get the required information displayed; so we could intercept the desired radial. I had also heard the controller say something about 'departures to follow' but did not catch the entire statement. I wanted to make sure that I intercepted the radial and did not fly through the desired course. I was worried that I would fly through a departure corridor for one of the other airports in the vicinity. What I should have done is had the captain give me a raw data bearing pointer tuned into the col VOR and confirmed that everything was set before turning. What actually happened is that we tried to get the FMS to take a 170 inbound course to col and had trouble getting the FMS to take what we wanted. So while the captain in the right seat was getting col tuned into the NAV2 radio for his side (this is normal for us; usually for raw data the pilot not flying will get their side set first and confirm everything before setting up the pilot flying); I looked down and saw that col was in the active waypoint position in the FMS. So I brought up a bearing pointer slaved to the FMS. I saw that I was going to fly through what I thought was the 350 radial and started to turn in the wrong direction (northwest instead of southeast). What had happened was that the col VOR was in the FMS; but had not been 'executed'; which means it was not yet active. The FMS bearing pointer was still pointing to one of the waypoints on the departure (probably tasca) which was not anywhere I should have been going! About the time I completed my turn; the controller gave us an immediate turn back in the correct direction and we tuned in col. The captain was 'head down' working the FMS/navigation radios during the entire time and was not aware of what I had done until the controller gave me the new heading and scolded me for going in the wrong direction. I was lucky that my error did not cause a loss of separation with another aircraft and that the controller caught my error soon enough. In my haste to intercept the desired course I lost situational awareness and turned the wrong direction. There were several cockpit indications that col was not the active waypoint in the FMS if I had taken the time to look. I am always very uncomfortable when controllers in busy airspace change your clearance right after takeoff. It is one thing to be given a heading off a departure or being cleared to another waypoint in your flight plan; but I think that giving new waypoints/intercepts is not good practice at low altitude in the terminal environment. That being said my error could have been prevented several ways. One is to be more assertive and tell the non flying pilot what I want done. I usually prefer raw data when doing intercepts like this in a glass cockpit since I think it is generally faster and less prone to error than trying to use the FMS. I should also have asked myself if what I was seeing on the screen in front of me made sense and it did not. If I had taken a minute to think I would have known that I needed to turn south east and not to the northwest. I should also have confirmed what I was doing with the other crew member to make sure my side of the cockpit was setup correctly (FMS programmed or navigation tuned and identified) before executing any course changes. As it happened I was lucky that my error did not have more serious consequences. This incident could have been prevented several ways and I think that it will be easily prevented in the future by being more assertive while in the left seat; by better coordination with the other crew member; by maintaining overall situational awareness and not allowing myself to feel rushed in the terminal environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An HS125 crew received an amendment to the TEB Runway 24 RUUDY 2 Departure immediately after takeoff. The First Officer; flying pilot; became confused by the FMS indications and erroneously turned the wrong direction. ATC recleared the flight.

Narrative: We were taking off from TEB Runway 24 using the RUUDY2 Departure going to RDU. After crossing WENTZ at 1;500 MSL we were given a heading to intercept the Colts Neck (COL) VOR Radial 350 inbound and a climb to 4;000 FT. Colts Neck was not on our flight plan; and we didn't have the departure plate out. It had been reviewed on the ground and we had verified what was in the FMS. So there was the usual scramble to find the identifier for Colts Neck and get the required information displayed; so we could intercept the desired radial. I had also heard the Controller say something about 'departures to follow' but did not catch the entire statement. I wanted to make sure that I intercepted the radial and did not fly through the desired course. I was worried that I would fly through a departure corridor for one of the other airports in the vicinity. What I should have done is had the Captain give me a raw data bearing pointer tuned into the COL VOR and confirmed that everything was set before turning. What actually happened is that we tried to get the FMS to take a 170 inbound course to COL and had trouble getting the FMS to take what we wanted. So while the Captain in the right seat was getting COL tuned into the NAV2 radio for his side (this is normal for us; usually for raw data the pilot not flying will get their side set first and confirm everything before setting up the pilot flying); I looked down and saw that COL was in the active waypoint position in the FMS. So I brought up a bearing pointer slaved to the FMS. I saw that I was going to fly through what I thought was the 350 Radial and started to turn in the wrong direction (northwest instead of southeast). What had happened was that the COL VOR was in the FMS; but had not been 'executed'; which means it was not yet active. The FMS bearing pointer was still pointing to one of the waypoints on the departure (probably TASCA) which was not anywhere I should have been going! About the time I completed my turn; the controller gave us an immediate turn back in the correct direction and we tuned in COL. The Captain was 'head down' working the FMS/NAV radios during the entire time and was not aware of what I had done until the Controller gave me the new heading and scolded me for going in the wrong direction. I was lucky that my error did not cause a loss of separation with another aircraft and that the controller caught my error soon enough. In my haste to intercept the desired course I lost situational awareness and turned the wrong direction. There were several cockpit indications that COL was not the active waypoint in the FMS if I had taken the time to look. I am always very uncomfortable when Controllers in busy airspace change your clearance right after takeoff. It is one thing to be given a heading off a departure or being cleared to another waypoint in your flight plan; but I think that giving new waypoints/intercepts is not good practice at low altitude in the terminal environment. That being said my error could have been prevented several ways. One is to be more assertive and tell the non flying pilot what I want done. I usually prefer raw data when doing intercepts like this in a glass cockpit since I think it is generally faster and less prone to error than trying to use the FMS. I should also have asked myself if what I was seeing on the screen in front of me made sense and it did not. If I had taken a minute to think I would have known that I needed to turn south east and not to the northwest. I should also have confirmed what I was doing with the other crew member to make sure my side of the cockpit was setup correctly (FMS programmed or NAV tuned and identified) before executing any course changes. As it happened I was lucky that my error did not have more serious consequences. This incident could have been prevented several ways and I think that it will be easily prevented in the future by being more assertive while in the left seat; by better coordination with the other crew member; by maintaining overall situational awareness and not allowing myself to feel rushed in the terminal environment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.