Narrative:

I was the non flying pilot; the weather was VFR upon our arrival. We were cleared for a visual approach. The captain who was the flying pilot was flying a very fast approach. He was maintaining 250 KTS until approx 2.5 miles from the outer marker. He began configuring by calling for gear just below 250 KTS. At 210 KTS he called for flaps 1 shortly thereafter we received a flight control slats locked ECAM. I was starting to analyze the ECAM message; and first noted a maximum speed message which I read aloud. During this process the captain continued to call for flaps as he was trying to configure the airplane for landing and trying to maintain stabilized approach criteria. I also was trying to finish the landing checklist to comply with stabilized approach criteria. I double checked we had the correct speed for the next flap setting and complied with his command to set flaps. I was momentarily distracted by his approach speed and wondering if we were going to be stabilized. When I returned to the ECAM; I realized we had a slat issue and was beginning to brief the captain on what we had so far. The captain continued the approach and was still calling for flaps. Once again my attention was diverted from the ECAM. By the time I set the final flaps; and returned to ECAM we were on short final. I looked at the airspeed indicator and realized vls was indicating higher than normal; I believe I said something to the extent that something seems not correct and that we have a slat problem. The captain said he agreed; but decided to continue the approach. Our airspeed at this time was still considerably higher than normal. The captain maintained this higher airspeed until touchdown. The touchdown and rollout were normal. I did not feel it was prudent to have my head buried in the ECAM on short final; and since the airplane appeared to be flying normally I focused my attention on landing and abandoned the ECAM. I also felt the extra airspeed was prudent at the time given the fact we did have a slat malfunction. After landing and clearing the runway; I finally had a chance to perform the rest of the ECAM procedure. It was then clear we had a slat malfunction. I realized immediately we should have abandoned the approach and gone around in order to troubleshoot the problem. I attribute the failure to properly carry out ECAM procedures to two major issues. The first was the captain's unconventional high speed approach. Second; was my distraction in trying to comply with the captain's commands to configure the airplane. I was also distracted while trying to ensure the captain was flying a stabilized approach. Additionally; I only was able to see the first page of ECAM which listed a maximum speed; each time I set flaps the ECAM page changed which meant I had to reinterpret the new page and subsequently was unable to move to additional ECAM pages. I disagree with flying high speed approaches in this manner. Even if the approach is stabilized it creates a huge distraction for the non flying pilot. Things were happening fast enough during the approach; that I never really had time to complete ECAM and to analyze what the extent of the problem was. I feel quite comfortable in the airplane; but even so I simply did not have enough time to complete the procedure. I also did not have enough information on what the failure was at the time to call for the captain to abandon the approach. Obviously there are several rather important considerations associated with this particular ECAM. Once the captain realized as well we had some type of malfunction; he used prudent judgment and increased approach speed to a margin well above vls.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 First Officer reported noticing F/CTRL Slats Locked ECAM on approach; but the workload imposed by the high speed approach led the crew to ignore the message and continue to a landing.

Narrative: I was the non flying pilot; the weather was VFR upon our arrival. We were cleared for a visual approach. The Captain who was the flying pilot was flying a very fast approach. He was maintaining 250 KTS until approx 2.5 miles from the outer marker. He began configuring by calling for gear just below 250 KTS. At 210 KTS he called for flaps 1 shortly thereafter we received a Flight Control Slats Locked ECAM. I was starting to analyze the ECAM message; and first noted a maximum speed message which I read aloud. During this process the Captain continued to call for flaps as he was trying to configure the airplane for landing and trying to maintain stabilized approach criteria. I also was trying to finish the landing checklist to comply with stabilized approach criteria. I double checked we had the correct speed for the next flap setting and complied with his command to set flaps. I was momentarily distracted by his approach speed and wondering if we were going to be stabilized. When I returned to the ECAM; I realized we had a slat issue and was beginning to brief the Captain on what we had so far. The Captain continued the approach and was still calling for flaps. Once again my attention was diverted from the ECAM. By the time I set the final flaps; and returned to ECAM we were on short final. I looked at the airspeed indicator and realized VLS was indicating higher than normal; I believe I said something to the extent that something seems not correct and that we have a slat problem. The Captain said he agreed; but decided to continue the approach. Our airspeed at this time was still considerably higher than normal. The Captain maintained this higher airspeed until touchdown. The touchdown and rollout were normal. I did not feel it was prudent to have my head buried in the ECAM on short final; and since the airplane appeared to be flying normally I focused my attention on landing and abandoned the ECAM. I also felt the extra airspeed was prudent at the time given the fact we did have a slat malfunction. After landing and clearing the runway; I finally had a chance to perform the rest of the ECAM procedure. It was then clear we had a slat malfunction. I realized immediately we should have abandoned the approach and gone around in order to troubleshoot the problem. I attribute the failure to properly carry out ECAM procedures to two major issues. The first was the Captain's unconventional high speed approach. Second; was my distraction in trying to comply with the Captain's commands to configure the airplane. I was also distracted while trying to ensure the Captain was flying a stabilized approach. Additionally; I only was able to see the first page of ECAM which listed a maximum speed; each time I set flaps the ECAM page changed which meant I had to reinterpret the new page and subsequently was unable to move to additional ECAM pages. I disagree with flying high speed approaches in this manner. Even if the approach is stabilized it creates a huge distraction for the non flying pilot. Things were happening fast enough during the approach; that I never really had time to complete ECAM and to analyze what the extent of the problem was. I feel quite comfortable in the airplane; but even so I simply did not have enough time to complete the procedure. I also did not have enough information on what the failure was at the time to call for the Captain to abandon the approach. Obviously there are several rather important considerations associated with this particular ECAM. Once the Captain realized as well we had some type of malfunction; he used prudent judgment and increased approach speed to a margin well above VLS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.