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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 883549 |
Time | |
Date | 201004 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Ignition Exciter Box |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural MEL |
Narrative:
When we accepted the aircraft; the inbound crew told us that we had a right igniter on the #2 engine MEL'd. When we read the MEL; it stated that we had to do an operational check when we started the engines. The MEL said that we were to start the engine with the ignition selector on right; and then after start; move the selector switch to the both position. This didn't sound correct since the right igniter was the one broken. We called maintenance control and queried the rationalization as to why we were to select the right igniter during start. Maintenance control advised us that is what the MEL says. We followed the MEL procedure; the engine started; and we pressed on. When we started the #2 engine prior to the next departure; the engine did not start. We returned to the gate and notified maintenance. This time when I again queried why we had to select the right igniter; maintenance control advised me that the MEL was wrong and it should say that we are to select the left igniter. They told me that it should be fixed on the next revision. I was told to just start the engine with the selector in the left position. However in doing so; I would have not been in compliance with the way the MEL is currently written. I was told by maintenance control that they would send me a boeing dispatch deviation guide that would give me guidance to continue. I then queried that I didn't think a faxed piece of paper can supersede an FAA-approved MEL. I called the chief pilot and discussed the matter with him. He agreed that a fax from maintenance control cannot supersede our MEL. The aircraft was grounded and we waited for a new jet.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-300 MEL stated that with an inoperative igniter the engine should be started with the right igniter selected. Maintenance stated that was incorrect and that the left ignitor must be used. The MEL error forced grounding of the aircraft.
Narrative: When we accepted the aircraft; the inbound Crew told us that we had a right igniter on the #2 engine MEL'd. When we read the MEL; it stated that we had to do an operational check when we started the engines. The MEL said that we were to start the engine with the ignition selector on right; and then after start; move the selector switch to the both position. This didn't sound correct since the right igniter was the one broken. We called Maintenance Control and queried the rationalization as to why we were to select the right igniter during start. Maintenance Control advised us that is what the MEL says. We followed the MEL procedure; the engine started; and we pressed on. When we started the #2 engine prior to the next departure; the engine did not start. We returned to the gate and notified Maintenance. This time when I again queried why we had to select the right igniter; Maintenance Control advised me that the MEL was wrong and it should say that we are to select the left igniter. They told me that it should be fixed on the next revision. I was told to just start the engine with the selector in the left position. However in doing so; I would have not been in compliance with the way the MEL is currently written. I was told by Maintenance Control that they would send me a Boeing Dispatch Deviation Guide that would give me guidance to continue. I then queried that I didn't think a faxed piece of paper can supersede an FAA-approved MEL. I called the Chief Pilot and discussed the matter with him. He agreed that a fax from Maintenance Control cannot supersede our MEL. The aircraft was grounded and we waited for a new jet.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.