Narrative:

On this flight and those of the past few weeks; I find that well after the implementation date of the major changes to our operating manuals; procedures; call-outs; and other terminology; I am failing make required calls at the correct time; or not at all. And when I do attempt to communicate with the captain; I am frequently using incorrect terminology; or distracted with the effort. If it were only I having these problems; then it might be a deficiency of my own to blame; but everyone with whom I have flown has had the same problems. When we learn to perform a task one way; and then must learn that the first way was wrong and a new way is correct; the old ways are never completely forgotten and the new ways are never learned as well. When this error inducing process is repeated again and again; as we have done by repeatedly changing our procedures; as when I was introduced to the airbus; the process gets more and more difficult and performance degrades. I believe that we have passed the point where our pilots can be expected; through self study and rote memory; to adopt more changes to the way we operate our aircraft. Further; I find that whereas I used to have a clear and thorough knowledge and understanding of our manuals and our procedures in their entirety; I now have a high degree of uncertainty in all phases of our operations. This causes further distraction when I must search through manuals for procedures that I should know. Though there may be many various reasons for making large changes to our operating procedures (economics; union negotiations; etc.) none should justify the reduction of safety introduced when the human factors of learning and performance are disregarded.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain laments the many changes to manuals; procedures; call-outs; and terminology that have come to his company since the introduction of the Airbus aircraft.

Narrative: On this flight and those of the past few weeks; I find that well after the implementation date of the major changes to our operating manuals; procedures; call-outs; and other terminology; I am failing make required calls at the correct time; or not at all. And when I do attempt to communicate with the Captain; I am frequently using incorrect terminology; or distracted with the effort. If it were only I having these problems; then it might be a deficiency of my own to blame; but everyone with whom I have flown has had the same problems. When we learn to perform a task one way; and then must learn that the first way was wrong and a new way is correct; the old ways are never completely forgotten and the new ways are never learned as well. When this error inducing process is repeated again and again; as we have done by repeatedly changing our procedures; as when I was introduced to the Airbus; the process gets more and more difficult and performance degrades. I believe that we have passed the point where our pilots can be expected; through self study and rote memory; to adopt more changes to the way we operate our aircraft. Further; I find that whereas I used to have a clear and thorough knowledge and understanding of our manuals and our procedures in their entirety; I now have a high degree of uncertainty in all phases of our operations. This causes further distraction when I must search through manuals for procedures that I should know. Though there may be many various reasons for making large changes to our operating procedures (economics; union negotiations; etc.) none should justify the reduction of safety introduced when the human factors of learning and performance are disregarded.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.