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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 884454 |
Time | |
Date | 201004 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | LIT.TRACON |
State Reference | AR |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Falcon 2000 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach Departure |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
North flow at lit; training a developmental on all radar positions combined. The positions are normally combined at this time not only because of traffic; but also because of breaks and staffing. Low activity procedures (lap) are in effect between lit and all surrounding ZME sectors. This means that they can send all inbounds direct to the airport to cross 35 miles out at 10;000; unless they're already lower; and we can send out all departures on course climbing to 15;000; unless they're requesting lower. Otherwise; we would be using the in-gates and out-gates. Before this incident; ZME; hro sector; calls to request (aircraft #1) 'descending to 11;000.' descending as opposed to level at the 35 mile mark; developmental approves. Aircraft #2 departs lit on a 020 heading. The developmental gave aircraft #2 a climb to 15;000. At about the same time; aircraft #1 is hand off accepted from the north-northeast; still descending out of the flight levels (still above 220 - he must have gotten stuck above traffic in ZME airspace or something). Aircraft #1 checks on descending to 11;000 and the developmental gives a 210 heading for the visual approach to runway 4L. Both I and the developmental's attention gets diverted to a two-plane sequence that has now become more critical. I'm trying to give the developmental hints on how to solve the sequence dilemma; without my spelling it out. Developmental was still not quite figuring it out. At about the time that I'm going to give the developmental the answer that resolves the situation on final; I hear the developmental give aircraft #2 a right turn to 040. I scan up at that sector of the scope; and I observe aircraft #2 approaching 12;500 in their climb; and aircraft #1 descending through 16;000. I transmit now; telling aircraft #2 to stop at 14;000. I perceive that aircraft #1 is a little right of aircraft #2's heading; so I issue aircraft #1 a left turn to 140 and issue them an altitude of 15;000; but even as I say this; I observe that aircraft #1 is descending rapidly; and has already flown through 15;000. What's worse; on the next few scans; I realize that I had misjudged their respective courses; and aircraft #1 had actually been just a little left of course of aircraft #2's flight path. I realize that my heading actually brought their flight paths closer together. Aircraft #1 states that they are responding to an RA; as the targets come within 2 miles of each other. The targets pass; and aircraft #2 requests a climb. I give them 15;000; and when they reply to this they advise that they had also responded to an RA. Both aircraft on final are now requesting frequency changes to the tower; or their approach clearance; and so I issue those. I realize that at some point; and I'm still not sure as to when; that ZME had already accepted the handoff on aircraft #2; so I gave them on course and switched them to ZME. I'm guessing that aircraft #2 was responding to an RA even before I became aware of the situation; since on the playback; aircraft #2 slowed their rate of climb dramatically; and actually began descending at one point. Their altitude; although was observed by me as climbing past 12;000; never got above 13;000. Aircraft #1 didn't take the heading that I had issued in a timely manner; fortunately; and their altitude never got below 14;000. Recommendation; lots of little things could have helped avoid this situation: I could have denied ZME's request for 'descending'; therefore they would have been level at 10;000. I could have told the developmental not to climb aircraft #2 to 15;000; since ZME had coordinated; and the pilot confirmed; that aircraft #1 would be descending to 11;000; I could have prompted the developmental to stop aircraft #2 to 10;000. I had this compulsion to say something at the moment the developmental climbed aircraft #2; but in my mind I thought we would deal with the two aircraft on final; and I would get back to both aircraft. Thesad truth is that this didn't happen until the situation was imminent. I could have prompted the developmental to issue a heading to both aircraft to ensure that their flight paths would not be so close to each other's. I could have resolved the sequencing issue right off the bat; and then my attention would not have been so singularly directed; which lead me to...I could have scanned better. Since I don't know the timing of the hand offs regarding both aircraft; I'm not sure if this is a valid suggestion; but the ZME controller could have given aircraft #1 a slight vector away from the opposite direction traffic; especially knowing that aircraft #2's on course heading was pretty much where the same direction from which aircraft #1 was entering our airspace.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: LIT controller providing OJT described proximity event when a departure and arrival conflicted during combined position operations; noting several actions that could have been taken to prevent this type of occurrence.
Narrative: North flow at LIT; training a Developmental on all RADAR positions combined. The positions are normally combined at this time not only because of traffic; but also because of breaks and staffing. Low Activity Procedures (LAP) are in effect between LIT and all surrounding ZME Sectors. This means that they can send all inbounds direct to the airport to cross 35 miles out at 10;000; unless they're already lower; and we can send out all departures on course climbing to 15;000; unless they're requesting lower. Otherwise; we would be using the in-gates and out-gates. Before this incident; ZME; HRO Sector; calls to request (Aircraft #1) 'descending to 11;000.' Descending as opposed to level at the 35 mile mark; Developmental approves. Aircraft #2 departs LIT on a 020 heading. The Developmental gave Aircraft #2 a climb to 15;000. At about the same time; Aircraft #1 is hand off accepted from the north-northeast; still descending out of the flight levels (still above 220 - He must have gotten stuck above traffic in ZME airspace or something). Aircraft #1 checks on descending to 11;000 and the Developmental gives a 210 heading for the visual approach to Runway 4L. Both I and the Developmental's attention gets diverted to a two-plane sequence that has now become more critical. I'm trying to give the Developmental hints on how to solve the sequence dilemma; without my spelling it out. Developmental was still not quite figuring it out. At about the time that I'm going to give the Developmental the answer that resolves the situation on final; I hear the Developmental give Aircraft #2 a right turn to 040. I scan up at that sector of the scope; and I observe Aircraft #2 approaching 12;500 in their climb; and Aircraft #1 descending through 16;000. I transmit now; telling Aircraft #2 to stop at 14;000. I perceive that Aircraft #1 is a little right of Aircraft #2's heading; so I issue Aircraft #1 a left turn to 140 and issue them an altitude of 15;000; but even as I say this; I observe that Aircraft #1 is descending rapidly; and has already flown through 15;000. What's worse; on the next few scans; I realize that I had misjudged their respective courses; and Aircraft #1 had actually been just a little left of course of Aircraft #2's flight path. I realize that my heading actually brought their flight paths closer together. Aircraft #1 states that they are responding to an RA; as the targets come within 2 miles of each other. The targets pass; and Aircraft #2 requests a climb. I give them 15;000; and when they reply to this they advise that they had also responded to an RA. Both aircraft on final are now requesting frequency changes to the Tower; or their approach clearance; and so I issue those. I realize that at some point; and I'm still not sure as to when; that ZME had already accepted the handoff on Aircraft #2; so I gave them on course and switched them to ZME. I'm guessing that Aircraft #2 was responding to an RA even before I became aware of the situation; since on the playback; Aircraft #2 slowed their rate of climb dramatically; and actually began descending at one point. Their altitude; although was observed by me as climbing past 12;000; never got above 13;000. Aircraft #1 didn't take the heading that I had issued in a timely manner; fortunately; and their altitude never got below 14;000. Recommendation; lots of little things could have helped avoid this situation: I could have denied ZME's request for 'descending'; therefore they would have been level at 10;000. I could have told the Developmental not to climb Aircraft #2 to 15;000; since ZME had coordinated; and the pilot confirmed; that Aircraft #1 would be descending to 11;000; I could have prompted the Developmental to stop Aircraft #2 to 10;000. I had this compulsion to say something at the moment the Developmental climbed Aircraft #2; but in my mind I thought we would deal with the two aircraft on final; and I would get back to both aircraft. Thesad truth is that this didn't happen until the situation was imminent. I could have prompted the Developmental to issue a heading to both aircraft to ensure that their flight paths would not be so close to each other's. I could have resolved the sequencing issue right off the bat; and then my attention would not have been so singularly directed; which lead me to...I could have scanned better. Since I don't know the timing of the hand offs regarding both aircraft; I'm not sure if this is a valid suggestion; but the ZME Controller could have given Aircraft #1 a slight vector away from the opposite direction traffic; especially knowing that Aircraft #2's on course heading was pretty much where the same direction from which Aircraft #1 was entering our airspace.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.