Narrative:

On arrival; planned and briefed for the xxl approach. On descent and approach check below the line the pilot not flying started the APU because we knew we would need power on the ground. The start was normal but approximately 4 to 5 minutes later when switching the bleeds the APU over temped; received APU overtemp warning message for about 20-30 seconds. Temperature returned to normal range. Completed the QRH for the event and it asked whether or not we needed the APU. When the pilot not flying asked me this question he had to do it twice because it didn't register with me. I was thinking 'shut it down'; I asked 'what?' and he said it says if we need it to keep it running and we kind of needed because we were going to a gate with no ground power. It was a fair question; but confused me for some unknown reason. The next thing I remember of this event is me trying to read the QRH in his lap while we were descending on the arrival. All I saw on the check list from my seat; looking across center pedestal was a 'yes'...line going down and 'land at nearest suitable airport'. I thought about it for a second and then told him to just shut it down. I knew we were not going to be operating in icing; we had both engines and there would be ground support equipment of some type and I just didn't want to think about it. He shut it down. This festered with me for a while wondering if it would come back as an APU fire. This was completely unfounded but it was bugging me anyway. I believe we were at 6;000 ft at the moment. Approach tells us to expect the ILS xxr. We were both rather happy with this change of events knowing that it was a shorter taxi. The pilot not flying loaded the xxr approach and set up the radios; etc... Received a descent to 3;000 ft and began turning to the airport. We were looking at the weather which was closing on the field and I was hoping we would get in and not have to divert now that we had a bad APU; I didn't want to time out and get stuck somewhere. All the wrong things to be thinking about and then probably the worst that could happen; happens. We receive a turn to intercept the ILS xxl at 3;000 ft between the final fix and IAF. The GS intercept was 1;900 ft. The pilot not flying first switches the navigation frequencies and then reloads the approach and asks me if I want a lower alt. The aircraft immediately starts capturing the localizer. I told him to set 3;100 ft just so I could start down because we were way high. Then out of nowhere the GS jumps from off the scale high to low and the autopilot captures the glide slope. The aircraft dives to chase it and the speed increases substantially exceeding 230 almost instantaneously; I deployed the spoilers to slow the aircraft down. We both immediately determined that this was obviously not going to work. I kicked off the autopilot and started to climb back up and returned to the localizer because the aircraft overshot it by about a dot and half (it was correcting back) which was expected giving the close intercept. We advised ATC that we were going around. If I remember correctly the controller said 'what?' we asked him if he had an altitude and he said 3;000 ft heading of 330. Pilot not flying sets altimeter to 3;000 from the maa. We were climbing through 2;500 ft at this point and I turned the autopilot on. We then received the spoilers deploy caution the pilot not flying stows them immediately. The aircraft pitches up due to the now horribly incorrect pitch trim and I attempt to pitch the nose down (autopilot is on) because our excessive climb rate was going to put us through 3;000 ft. Unfortunately; due to just bad timing I hit the pitch wheel at the same time as altscap and the aircraft reverted to pitch and then back to altscap. The altitude alerter flashes climb is not stopping so I click the autopilot back off and arrest the climb and descend back to the assigned altitude. I do not believe we exceeded 250 ft but it was definitely close. Leveled the aircraft slowed to 210 and re-engaged the autopilot. This is when I realized I was getting way behind the plane. We were handed to the next controller who had no idea of who we were or what we need at first then began to vector us now reassigning us xxl. The pilot not flying again resets the approach in the FMS and the radios. We re-brief and continue our vectors. On what was crosswind the FMS cycled through and distracted again I asked him to reload the approach on the downwind. We were flying at 210 KTS as assigned by ATC. When we were given the approach clearance and the vector to join final we were assigned 180 KTS; or better to the marker and I flew 210 KTS to the marker. I wasn't thinking ahead anymore and was stuck on essentially one thing at a time. While intercepting final the aircraft overshot again and then the glide slope jumped up a dot and a half and the aircraft captures and chased it again. I kicked off the autopilot and began to fly the approach visually in MVFR. We were fast because I failed to think to slow down the aircraft by the marker. I was too busy trying to figure out why the GS was so erratic. The pilot not flying recognized that I was fast and asked if I wanted the gear down to help slow the aircraft. Called for gear down; leveled off to slow and added flaps to 20 began descent at 180 asked for flaps 30; landing check to the line; momentarily got the clacker as always for being near 185 and finally flaps 45 landing check below the line. I believe we were finally stable by 300 ft. I didn't want to go around because at this point as I sincerely believed there was something wrong with the aircraft and I knew I could visually fly the approach. I was worried that if we did go around the weather would close the field and I was not confident that we would be able to fly an ILS to get back in. By the point in the trip when this started to happen I was on my 13th hour of duty from a report time of 0720. I received the call for the change to my trip at 2103 the night before and giving that it takes nearly an hour to get from the parking lot to operations; I had to arrive at the airport at 0620 in the morning. Got up at 0520; and was probably asleep by 2300. I got to bed at about 2230 after packing my bags etc... I got a phone call from my fiance at 0223 waking me up; I got back to sleep shortly thereafter but I still was up two hours later. I got to work and looked at the weather. It was not going to be an easy day. Got a bagel and went to the aircraft for the first departure to ZZZ. Flew the first round trip and deadheaded back. I received a new first officer and flight attendant for the ZZZ2 round-trip. Got back and got some lunch. I tried to take a nap but by the time got back to the aircraft after getting lunch I would have had about 20 minutes to sleep before I had to go and get the release. So sitting in the cockpit nodding off before my last round trip; why didn't I call in fatigued? Fear of a trip failure. This is from prior experience. About a year ago; I spoke to a chief pilot about fatigue because of how we kept getting pushed back due to weather in the ZZZ3 area. I contacted scheduling when I found out that our aircraft had not left ZZZ3 yet and asked if we could wait at the airport. They said sure and pushed our duty-in back two hours to about 1600. We started our trip and two ground stops later we were about to leave for our overnight at 0130. We were supposed to be done around 2200. After speaking to the crew I told scheduling we were too tired for the trip. They told me to contact a chief pilot. I did and was told by him that we are expected to be rested for a 16 hour duty day and that if I refused the trip it was all on me. We flew the flight and got in around 0445. Recently; there has been a new practice utilized by crew scheduling. For the 0900 reserve period they will call you around 1200 and put you to rest and then give you a nap that night. About the third time they did this I asked them which reserve period they wanted me rested for; 0900 or 1800. They said both. I brought this up with management about three weeks ago who gave me essentially the same answer and added that it was to keep us on a consistent schedule. Really? What good is it to teaching us about the importance of sleep and the circadian rhythm if we are scheduled for multiple duty periods throughout the day? How are we supposed to be rested for 16 hour work periods twice a day? Thank you for your time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Confusion regarding runway assignments; malfunctioning aircraft systems; questionable ATC handling and flight crew fatigue contributed to an unstabilized approach and go-around for an air carrier flight crew.

Narrative: On arrival; planned and briefed for the XXL approach. On descent and approach check below the line the pilot not flying started the APU because we knew we would need power on the ground. The start was normal but approximately 4 to 5 minutes later when switching the bleeds the APU over temped; received APU OVERTEMP warning message for about 20-30 seconds. Temperature returned to normal range. Completed the QRH for the event and it asked whether or not we needed the APU. When the pilot not flying asked me this question he had to do it twice because it didn't register with me. I was thinking 'shut it down'; I asked 'what?' and he said it says if we need it to keep it running and we kind of needed because we were going to a gate with no ground power. It was a fair question; but confused me for some unknown reason. The next thing I remember of this event is me trying to read the QRH in his lap while we were descending on the arrival. All I saw on the check list from my seat; looking across center pedestal was a 'YES'...Line going down and 'Land at nearest suitable airport'. I thought about it for a second and then told him to just shut it down. I knew we were not going to be operating in icing; we had both engines and there would be ground support equipment of some type and I just didn't want to think about it. He shut it down. This festered with me for a while wondering if it would come back as an APU fire. This was completely unfounded but it was bugging me anyway. I believe we were at 6;000 FT at the moment. Approach tells us to expect the ILS XXR. We were both rather happy with this change of events knowing that it was a shorter taxi. The pilot not flying loaded the XXR approach and set up the radios; etc... Received a descent to 3;000 FT and began turning to the airport. We were looking at the weather which was closing on the field and I was hoping we would get in and not have to divert now that we had a bad APU; I didn't want to time out and get stuck somewhere. All the wrong things to be thinking about and then probably the worst that could happen; happens. We receive a turn to intercept the ILS XXL at 3;000 FT between the final fix and IAF. The GS intercept was 1;900 FT. The pilot not flying first switches the NAV frequencies and then reloads the approach and asks me if I want a lower alt. The aircraft immediately starts capturing the LOC. I told him to set 3;100 FT just so I could start down because we were way high. Then out of nowhere the GS jumps from off the scale high to low and the autopilot captures the glide slope. The aircraft dives to chase it and the speed increases substantially exceeding 230 almost instantaneously; I deployed the spoilers to slow the aircraft down. We both immediately determined that this was obviously not going to work. I kicked off the autopilot and started to climb back up and returned to the LOC because the aircraft overshot it by about a dot and half (it was correcting back) which was expected giving the close intercept. We advised ATC that we were going around. If I remember correctly the Controller said 'what?' We asked him if he had an altitude and he said 3;000 FT heading of 330. Pilot not flying sets altimeter to 3;000 from the MAA. We were climbing through 2;500 FT at this point and I turned the autopilot on. We then received the spoilers deploy caution the pilot not flying stows them immediately. The aircraft pitches up due to the now horribly incorrect pitch trim and I attempt to pitch the nose down (autopilot is on) because our excessive climb rate was going to put us through 3;000 FT. Unfortunately; due to just bad timing I hit the pitch wheel at the same time as ALTSCAP and the aircraft reverted to pitch and then back to ALTSCAP. The ALT alerter flashes climb is not stopping so I click the autopilot back off and arrest the climb and descend back to the assigned altitude. I do not believe we exceeded 250 FT but it was definitely close. Leveled the aircraft slowed to 210 and re-engaged the autopilot. This is when I realized I was getting way behind the plane. We were handed to the next Controller who had no idea of who we were or what we need at first then began to vector us now reassigning us XXL. The pilot not flying again resets the approach in the FMS and the radios. We re-brief and continue our vectors. On what was crosswind the FMS cycled through and distracted again I asked him to reload the approach on the downwind. We were flying at 210 KTS as assigned by ATC. When we were given the approach clearance and the vector to join final we were assigned 180 KTS; or better to the marker and I flew 210 KTS to the marker. I wasn't thinking ahead anymore and was stuck on essentially one thing at a time. While intercepting final the aircraft overshot again and then the glide slope jumped up a dot and a half and the aircraft captures and chased it again. I kicked off the autopilot and began to fly the approach visually in MVFR. We were fast because I failed to think to slow down the aircraft by the marker. I was too busy trying to figure out why the GS was so erratic. The pilot not flying recognized that I was fast and asked if I wanted the gear down to help slow the aircraft. Called for gear down; leveled off to slow and added flaps to 20 began descent at 180 asked for flaps 30; landing check to the line; momentarily got the clacker as always for being near 185 and finally flaps 45 landing check below the line. I believe we were finally stable by 300 FT. I didn't want to go around because at this point as I sincerely believed there was something wrong with the aircraft and I knew I could visually fly the approach. I was worried that if we did go around the weather would close the field and I was not confident that we would be able to fly an ILS to get back in. By the point in the trip when this started to happen I was on my 13th hour of duty from a report time of 0720. I received the call for the change to my trip at 2103 the night before and giving that it takes nearly an hour to get from the parking lot to Operations; I had to arrive at the airport at 0620 in the morning. Got up at 0520; and was probably asleep by 2300. I got to bed at about 2230 after packing my bags etc... I got a phone call from my fiance at 0223 waking me up; I got back to sleep shortly thereafter but I still was up two hours later. I got to work and looked at the weather. It was not going to be an easy day. Got a bagel and went to the aircraft for the first departure to ZZZ. Flew the first round trip and deadheaded back. I received a new First Officer and flight attendant for the ZZZ2 round-trip. Got back and got some lunch. I tried to take a nap but by the time got back to the aircraft after getting lunch I would have had about 20 minutes to sleep before I had to go and get the release. So sitting in the cockpit nodding off before my last round trip; why didn't I call in fatigued? Fear of a trip failure. This is from prior experience. About a year ago; I spoke to a Chief Pilot about fatigue because of how we kept getting pushed back due to weather in the ZZZ3 area. I contacted scheduling when I found out that our aircraft had not left ZZZ3 yet and asked if we could wait at the airport. They said sure and pushed our duty-in back two hours to about 1600. We started our trip and two ground stops later we were about to leave for our overnight at 0130. We were supposed to be done around 2200. After speaking to the crew I told scheduling we were too tired for the trip. They told me to contact a Chief Pilot. I did and was told by him that we are expected to be rested for a 16 hour duty day and that if I refused the trip it was all on me. We flew the flight and got in around 0445. Recently; there has been a new practice utilized by crew scheduling. For the 0900 reserve period they will call you around 1200 and put you to rest and then give you a nap that night. About the third time they did this I asked them which reserve period they wanted me rested for; 0900 or 1800. They said both. I brought this up with Management about three weeks ago who gave me essentially the same answer and added that it was to keep us on a consistent schedule. Really? What good is it to teaching us about the importance of sleep and the circadian rhythm if we are scheduled for multiple duty periods throughout the day? How are we supposed to be rested for 16 hour work periods twice a day? Thank you for your time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.