Narrative:

I've been in aircraft maintenance now for twenty six years. I'm a member of our air carrier's flight safety team and a union representative for our reporting program. I have seen a lot of changes go on in the airline industry; some good some bad; but what I'm seeing now is getting scary. I know if an airline is going to survive in today's market it's a balancing act between profit and safety. I know the aircraft have to fly to make money; but this lack of quality assurance (qa) oversight and lack of quality workmanship for our aircraft at contract maintenance provider's is an issue.the lack of trained competent people at these facilities needs to be addressed before something bad happens. I also know the bean counters for our air carrier have way to much influence on the directors of maintenance to let them acquire quality repairs and inspections for our aircraft. I was talking to mr. 'X' yesterday on a different quality issue; regarding nose wheel bearings on our fleet of crj's. We talked briefly on the lack of maintenance manual (MM) use by our main wheel repair shop; which led to a fleet inspection of main wheel assemblies.another crj-200 aircraft came out of heavy check in april and was down fourteen out of fifteen days for rework of heavy check induced problems. Some of the issues have already been submitted through NASA reports; like the loss of pressurization with emergency descent due to air conditioning packs being assembled wrong and emergency exit's blocked due to wrong seats being installed in wrong positions. We had overwing emergency exit inner panels installed wrong: left-hand on right-hand; right-hand on left-hand and one of the inner panels belonged to a different airline with a totally different color scheme. We had a large fuel leak in the gear bay which was from the motive flow fuel line being cross-threaded at fuel pressure box. The fuel pressure box was removed at heavy check to repair fuselage frame 559; which leaves to question if the leak check was ever done as it showed complied with on the heavy check work order. Now we are sending out our engines assemblies to a contract maintenance provider for quick engine change (qec) work. We have not received back an engine assembly that has not required rework to make it serviceable prior to installation on an aircraft. We had one engine assembly come back where the micro switch for the thrust reverser circuit was just hanging there by the wires. There is no way the thrust reverser functional check could have been complied with in this configuration as the paperwork from the repair station showed being done. The fuel flow transmitter was just hanging there by the fuel lines as no bracket mounting bolts were installed. We found fuel and air lines chaffed which had to be replaced prior to engine use; had fuel control unit (FCU) power lever bellcrank loose on the FCU; but it at least had a new cotter pin installed. There are many other problems noted on many other engine assemblies which required rework prior to aircraft use. All in all; I like my job at my air carrier; but these changes in the airline industry which puts profit over safety need to be addressed. The FAA's oversight at contract providers is almost non-existent. With the new FAA part 91 ops spec. It is putting more responsibility back on the airlines which are having trouble now; let alone requiring them to provide more oversight. As the saying goes; it's like putting the fox in charge of the henhouse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An experienced Line and Base Maintenance Air Carrier Inspector describes the deteriorating quality of maintenance being performed on their CRJ-200 aircraft by Contract Maintenance Providers. Numerous aircraft and engines out of heavy checks from maintenance providers have to be reworked prior to returning them to revenue service.

Narrative: I've been in aircraft maintenance now for twenty six years. I'm a member of our Air Carrier's flight safety team and a union representative for our reporting program. I have seen a lot of changes go on in the airline industry; some good some bad; but what I'm seeing now is getting scary. I know if an airline is going to survive in today's market it's a balancing act between profit and safety. I know the aircraft have to fly to make money; but this lack of Quality Assurance (QA) oversight and lack of quality workmanship for our aircraft at contract maintenance provider's is an issue.The lack of trained competent people at these facilities needs to be addressed before something bad happens. I also know the bean counters for our Air Carrier have way to much influence on the Directors of Maintenance to let them acquire quality repairs and inspections for our aircraft. I was talking to Mr. 'X' yesterday on a different quality issue; regarding Nose Wheel Bearings on our fleet of CRJ's. We talked briefly on the lack of maintenance manual (MM) use by our main wheel repair shop; which led to a fleet Inspection of main wheel assemblies.Another CRJ-200 aircraft came out of heavy check in April and was down fourteen out of fifteen days for rework of heavy check induced problems. Some of the issues have already been submitted through NASA reports; like the loss of pressurization with emergency descent due to air conditioning packs being assembled wrong and emergency exit's blocked due to wrong seats being installed in wrong positions. We had overwing emergency exit inner panels installed wrong: left-hand on right-hand; right-hand on left-hand and one of the inner panels belonged to a different airline with a totally different color scheme. We had a large fuel leak in the gear bay which was from the motive flow fuel line being cross-threaded at fuel pressure box. The fuel pressure box was removed at heavy check to repair fuselage frame 559; which leaves to question if the leak check was ever done as it showed complied with on the heavy check work order. Now we are sending out our engines assemblies to a contract maintenance provider for quick engine change (QEC) work. We have not received back an engine assembly that has not required rework to make it serviceable prior to installation on an aircraft. We had one engine assembly come back where the micro switch for the thrust reverser circuit was just hanging there by the wires. There is no way the thrust reverser functional check could have been complied with in this configuration as the paperwork from the Repair Station showed being done. The fuel flow transmitter was just hanging there by the fuel lines as no bracket mounting bolts were installed. We found fuel and air lines chaffed which had to be replaced prior to engine use; had Fuel Control Unit (FCU) power lever bellcrank loose on the FCU; but it at least had a new cotter pin installed. There are many other problems noted on many other engine assemblies which required rework prior to aircraft use. All in all; I like my job at my Air Carrier; but these changes in the airline industry which puts profit over safety need to be addressed. The FAA's oversight at Contract Providers is almost non-existent. With the new FAA Part 91 Ops Spec. it is putting more responsibility back on the airlines which are having trouble now; let alone requiring them to provide more oversight. As the saying goes; it's like putting the fox in charge of the henhouse.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.