Narrative:

I was performing OJT (on the job training) with at ind hi radar. We had the hand off on air carrier X; level at FL310 (stopped short of ral for traffic). We then received the hand off on air carrier Y from rsh; requesting FL360. Air carrier Y was initially climbed to FL300 because air carrier X was recognized as potential traffic. We had been on position for about 1+30 when then event occurred. I had just finished a short discussion with my trainee concerning a situation in another section of the airspace when I was asked if I wanted a break. I declined initially; wanting to see the plan to deal with the situation developing over vhp with air carrier X and air carrier Y. The flm (front line manager) advised me that if I declined that break opportunity; the next one was a little more than 15 minutes away and would present a less than advantageous staffing situation. Upon hearing this; I agreed to the relief break. As I was agreeing to the break; I heard air carrier Z aircraft ask for permission to deviate for weather ahead. Instead of the permission for deviation to the air carrier Z aircraft I was expecting to hear in response; I heard my trainee issue a clearance to an air carrier Y aircraft. As I was attempting to locate the aircraft the clearance was issued to on the scope; I saw ca activate on air carrier X and air carrier X (which I mistook for air carrier Z due to data block congestion over vhp). I then heard my trainee issue a 30 degree left turn to air carrier Y. Seeing that neither the turn nor the climb were going to retain separation; I attempted to issue a left turn of approximately 60 degrees to the air carrier X aircraft. I mistakenly used air carrier Z in the call sign and had to reissue the clearance to air carrier X. I then reissued the climb clearance to air carrier Y and requested they expedite that climb. Air carrier Y rogered and reported 'only about 500 ft to go'. I observed the air carrier X in the issued turn. The halo was on the air carrier Y the entire time; and it appeared to me that air carrier X stayed on the edge of the ring or just outside of it during the entire incident. Once the aircraft were securely separated; they were each cleared on course and a relief briefing was conducted. Radar data later showed that the two aircraft crossed 4.97 miles and 700 ft apart; sadly; less than the minimum separation necessary. I believe the entire event arose from a combination of factors that all intermixed to create both the false impression of an opportunity to climb the air carrier Y aircraft on my trainee's part; and a momentary lapse of focus on mine. Vhp lies very close to the indianapolis radar site. This can sometimes lead to target 'jumps' near the VOR. My trainee later said he observed one of these target jumps just after issuing the climb clearance to the air carrier Y aircraft. As I said; we had been engaged in an active training status for approximately 90 minutes. Some of that time was spent dealing with heavier than normal traffic volume and complexity; which was partially due to aircraft deviating for an area of weather approximately 150 miles to the southwest. Fatigue may have begun to set in. Initially; the air carrier Y had been cleared to FL300 to stay under air carrier X. There was a short window of opportunity for the air carrier Y to climb through air carrier X's altitude; but the sector team's focus was distracted from this by another traffic situation. By the time the trainee returned to the air carrier Y/air carrier X situation; that window had passed; but he still tried to utilize his original plan. On top of all of that; and perhaps worst of all; the instructor's; my attention and focus; were distracted at what turned out to be the most inopportune of times. Recommendation; as I stated in the earlier narrative; I believe this event was a culmination of a lot of individual factors occurring at just the right time and in the right order to produce a less than satisfactory result. On my trainees part (and I suppose in some ways for me as well); it was an unfortunate reinforcement of a few different discussions we've had covering a few different topics. First; it was a lesson in how being too focused on one area of the sector can lead to problems in another. Secondly; it showed what can result from not using positive separation at all times. Third; it was concrete evidence of how 'target jump' close to the radar site can influence traffic situations. Fourth; it was an object lesson in what effect a turn has on the climb rate of an aircraft. Finally; it showed how quickly a situation can go from being under control with good separation to less than standard separation and in need of control actions. For my part; it reemphasized the need to keep my attention focused in on my trainee at all times during a training session. I allowed myself to be distracted momentarily; but that was long enough for a clearance to be given that; had I been focused on task; I would not have allowed. We are reminded over and over again about the importance of constant attention; but; unfortunately; sometimes we need a jolt for that reminder to be internalized.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZID controller providing OJT described a loss of separation event between two air carrier aircraft; the reporter listing 'target jump'; loss of focus and lack of aircraft performance knowledge as causal factors.

Narrative: I was performing OJT (on the job training) with at IND HI RADAR. We had the hand off on Air Carrier X; level at FL310 (stopped short of RAL for traffic). We then received the hand off on Air Carrier Y from RSH; requesting FL360. Air Carrier Y was initially climbed to FL300 because Air Carrier X was recognized as potential traffic. We had been on position for about 1+30 when then event occurred. I had just finished a short discussion with my trainee concerning a situation in another section of the airspace when I was asked if I wanted a break. I declined initially; wanting to see the plan to deal with the situation developing over VHP with Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y. The FLM (Front Line Manager) advised me that if I declined that break opportunity; the next one was a little more than 15 minutes away and would present a less than advantageous staffing situation. Upon hearing this; I agreed to the relief break. As I was agreeing to the break; I heard Air Carrier Z aircraft ask for permission to deviate for weather ahead. Instead of the permission for deviation to the Air Carrier Z aircraft I was expecting to hear in response; I heard my trainee issue a clearance to an Air Carrier Y aircraft. As I was attempting to locate the aircraft the clearance was issued to on the scope; I saw CA activate on Air Carrier X and Air Carrier X (which I mistook for Air Carrier Z due to data block congestion over VHP). I then heard my trainee issue a 30 degree left turn to Air Carrier Y. Seeing that neither the turn nor the climb were going to retain separation; I attempted to issue a left turn of approximately 60 degrees to the Air Carrier X aircraft. I mistakenly used Air Carrier Z in the call sign and had to reissue the clearance to Air Carrier X. I then reissued the climb clearance to Air Carrier Y and requested they expedite that climb. Air Carrier Y rogered and reported 'only about 500 ft to go'. I observed the Air Carrier X in the issued turn. The HALO was on the Air Carrier Y the entire time; and it appeared to me that Air Carrier X stayed on the edge of the ring or just outside of it during the entire incident. Once the aircraft were securely separated; they were each cleared on course and a relief briefing was conducted. RADAR data later showed that the two aircraft crossed 4.97 miles and 700 ft apart; sadly; less than the minimum separation necessary. I believe the entire event arose from a combination of factors that all intermixed to create both the false impression of an opportunity to climb the Air Carrier Y aircraft on my trainee's part; and a momentary lapse of focus on mine. VHP lies very close to the Indianapolis RADAR site. This can sometimes lead to target 'jumps' near the VOR. My trainee later said he observed one of these target jumps just after issuing the climb clearance to the Air Carrier Y aircraft. As I said; we had been engaged in an active training status for approximately 90 minutes. Some of that time was spent dealing with heavier than normal traffic volume and complexity; which was partially due to aircraft deviating for an area of weather approximately 150 miles to the southwest. Fatigue may have begun to set in. Initially; the Air Carrier Y had been cleared to FL300 to stay under Air Carrier X. There was a short window of opportunity for the Air Carrier Y to climb through Air Carrier X's altitude; but the sector team's focus was distracted from this by another traffic situation. By the time the trainee returned to the Air Carrier Y/Air Carrier X situation; that window had passed; but he still tried to utilize his original plan. On top of all of that; and perhaps worst of all; the instructor's; my attention and focus; were distracted at what turned out to be the most inopportune of times. Recommendation; as I stated in the earlier narrative; I believe this event was a culmination of a lot of individual factors occurring at just the right time and in the right order to produce a less than satisfactory result. On my trainees part (and I suppose in some ways for me as well); it was an unfortunate reinforcement of a few different discussions we've had covering a few different topics. First; it was a lesson in how being too focused on one area of the sector can lead to problems in another. Secondly; it showed what can result from not using positive separation at all times. Third; it was concrete evidence of how 'target jump' close to the RADAR site can influence traffic situations. Fourth; it was an object lesson in what effect a turn has on the climb rate of an aircraft. Finally; it showed how quickly a situation can go from being under control with good separation to less than standard separation and in need of control actions. For my part; it reemphasized the need to keep my attention focused in on my trainee at all times during a training session. I allowed myself to be distracted momentarily; but that was long enough for a clearance to be given that; had I been focused on task; I would not have allowed. We are reminded over and over again about the importance of constant attention; but; unfortunately; sometimes we need a jolt for that reminder to be internalized.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.