Narrative:

I contacted the tower controller and received our clearance and; per procedure; both pilots wrote down the clearance individually. I read back 'cleared to kenri direct lomta as filed; climb and maintain FL270; mach .78; squawk [code]'. To which the controller replied; 'no sir; your clearance is only to lomta that is your clearance limit.' I acknowledged the clearance limit; verified with the co-pilot we had both copied the clearance correctly and proceeded with engine start and taxied for takeoff. While taxiing into position for takeoff; the controller contacted us and indicated that our clearance had been amended due to conflicting traffic and we were now cleared to maintain flight level two five zero (FL250). I acknowledged our revised altitude of FL250; selected FL250 in the altitude select. At no time during the discussion of maintaining FL250 did I think this would be our final altitude. We had flight planned for an altitude of 36;000 ft and had uploaded fuel accordingly. As with most flights it is not unusual to get an initial altitude from the local controller with the understanding a higher altitude will be given as you progress into another controller's airspace. This was my assumption at this point and we departed. At approximately 80 nautical miles southwest of bgsf; the controller indicated radar service was terminated and requested I contact iceland radio on VHF. When I tuned into iceland radio; there was a lot of radio chatter on the frequency. I patiently waited until the controller had a moment; at which point; I contacted him; gave my position and current altitude and requested higher. He acknowledged my transmission and said 'due to conflicting traffic; a higher flight level is not available.'we were then transferred to gander radio. The radio operator seemed quite overwhelmed with the traffic volume; which was transitioning through her area. [I again requested higher and was denied.] I told her 'due to operational and safety concerns we are unable to maintain mach 78; we are requesting mach 67.' she responded; 'are you requesting mach 67 or are you already at mach 67?' I said; 'we have already reduced to mach 67; we do not have the fuel available to fly at mach 78 at such a low altitude.' after a few minutes the radio operator returned and said; 'you are cleared to maintain mach 67'. At approximately 15-20 minutes from kenri (35 minutes from lomta); I told gander radio that we were approaching our clearance limit and we needed further clearance after lomta. The radio operator acknowledged and told me to contact montreal control on VHF. I was unable to contact montreal so I returned to gander radio on HF and advise them. They responded with another VHF frequency. Again there was no response. After several attempts [to contact montreal we stayed] with gander control and received our clearance only three nautical miles before our clearance limit of lomta. Upon further communication with gander control; we found out the previous gander radio operator had been giving us incorrect frequencies. The radio operator thought we were entering montreal control airspace when in fact our course was through gander control airspace.upon closer examination of the plotting charts it is evident our first entry point; kenri; was in montreal control airspace; just at the edge; but lomta and our subsequent course of flight was in gander control airspace. Further review of the preceding events reveals several circumstances leading up to several points of confusion. When we received our clearance from sondrestrom; there was no entry point; position report; or any intermediate point within the 631 nautical mile leg from sondrestrom to kenri. Then when radar service was terminated and we contacted iceland radio; at no point did they ask for our position; a future position report; nor any estimate to kenri. Although; we had never flown in this region before; we found it odd that no facility seemed interested in our position or our ETA to kenri. This led us to believe we were below all conflicting traffic and we could safely reduce our fuel burn and speed; while waiting for coordination to a higher flight level.because of the radio congestion and excessive response time; it seemed prudent to reduce our fuel burn immediately. To continue flying at mach 78 at FL250 was; in my professional opinion; reckless; considering the amount of fuel required and limited range at an altitude for which we had never intended nor expected to be required to operate at for any extended period of time. 2.) because of the widespread volcanic ash cloud over the north atlantic; the north atlantic tracks were positioned unusually far north. I believe this created a much larger volume of traffic than what the radio operators in the area were used to and they clearly seemed to have been overwhelmed. If the sondrestrom controller was supposed to have included in our clearance; an intermediate position report along our route before kenri; I can see where it may have been overlooked by iceland radio. When communicating with iceland radio; the wait time required to get a momentary break on the frequency in order to: contact the radio operator; make a request for a higher altitude; and then receive a response took; what seemed to be 10-15 minutes. Because of their excessive workload; I believe it is why iceland radio promptly handed me off to gander radio when I subsequently asked; 'at what point can I expect a higher altitude?' in my past experience all of my north atlantic crossings have been conducted in a fairly common and straight forward manner. I always departed from an airport in canada and received my oceanic clearance either on the ground or via ACARS. When I received my oceanic clearance in the past; it was always at the flight level I had requested or within 2000 ft of it. I had never received a clearance in which the altitude was so much lower than my planned altitude that it would severely impact my fuel burn and range. The oceanic clearance always had a definitive entry point and the controller or radio operator would always ask for your ETA before reaching that point. Because the circumstances surrounding this flight lacked the familiar sequence and points of operation as I had experienced in the past; and the seemingly nonchalant attitude regarding my position and lack of position reporting points; when we made the decision to reduce fuel flow while waiting for a higher altitude; it did not seem as though we were jeopardizing safety in any way; but rather increasing the safety of our flight.obviously; emphasis should be placed; not only on the clearance route and altitude; but also on the assigned speed. I believe if iceland radio or gander radio had requested an ETA to a position or included an entry point upon leaving sondrestrom airspace; we would have asked for a revised mach speed sooner. Also; had the sondrestrom controller indicated that no higher altitudes would be available and FL250 would be our final altitude; we would have uploaded additional fuel at that time. An 11;000 ft difference in planned altitude has a tremendous impact on the aircraft operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A G2000 flight crew took off from Sondrestrom heading west and encountered numerous problems with ATC.

Narrative: I contacted the Tower Controller and received our clearance and; per procedure; both pilots wrote down the clearance individually. I read back 'Cleared to KENRI direct LOMTA as filed; climb and maintain FL270; Mach .78; squawk [code]'. To which the Controller replied; 'No sir; your clearance is only to LOMTA that is your clearance limit.' I acknowledged the clearance limit; verified with the Co-pilot we had both copied the clearance correctly and proceeded with engine start and taxied for takeoff. While taxiing into position for takeoff; the Controller contacted us and indicated that our clearance had been amended due to conflicting traffic and we were now cleared to maintain flight level two five zero (FL250). I acknowledged our revised altitude of FL250; selected FL250 in the altitude select. At no time during the discussion of maintaining FL250 did I think this would be our final altitude. We had flight planned for an altitude of 36;000 FT and had uploaded fuel accordingly. As with most flights it is not unusual to get an initial altitude from the Local Controller with the understanding a higher altitude will be given as you progress into another Controller's airspace. This was my assumption at this point and we departed. At approximately 80 nautical miles southwest of BGSF; the Controller indicated radar service was terminated and requested I contact Iceland Radio on VHF. When I tuned into Iceland Radio; there was a lot of radio chatter on the frequency. I patiently waited until the Controller had a moment; at which point; I contacted him; gave my position and current altitude and requested higher. He acknowledged my transmission and said 'Due to conflicting traffic; a higher flight level is not available.'We were then transferred to Gander Radio. The Radio Operator seemed quite overwhelmed with the traffic volume; which was transitioning through her area. [I again requested higher and was denied.] I told her 'Due to operational and safety concerns we are unable to maintain Mach 78; we are requesting Mach 67.' She responded; 'Are you requesting Mach 67 or are you already at Mach 67?' I said; 'We have already reduced to Mach 67; we do not have the fuel available to fly at Mach 78 at such a low altitude.' After a few minutes the Radio Operator returned and said; 'You are cleared to maintain Mach 67'. At approximately 15-20 minutes from KENRI (35 minutes from LOMTA); I told Gander Radio that we were approaching our clearance limit and we needed further clearance after LOMTA. The Radio Operator acknowledged and told me to contact Montreal Control on VHF. I was unable to contact Montreal so I returned to Gander Radio on HF and advise them. They responded with another VHF frequency. Again there was no response. After several attempts [to contact Montreal we stayed] with Gander Control and received our clearance only three nautical miles before our clearance limit of LOMTA. Upon further communication with Gander Control; we found out the previous Gander Radio Operator had been giving us incorrect frequencies. The Radio Operator thought we were entering Montreal Control Airspace when in fact our course was through Gander Control Airspace.Upon closer examination of the plotting charts it is evident our first entry point; KENRI; was in Montreal Control Airspace; just at the edge; but LOMTA and our subsequent course of flight was in Gander Control Airspace. Further review of the preceding events reveals several circumstances leading up to several points of confusion. When we received our clearance from Sondrestrom; there was no entry point; position report; or any intermediate point within the 631 nautical mile leg from Sondrestrom to KENRI. Then when radar service was terminated and we contacted Iceland Radio; at no point did they ask for our position; a future position report; nor any estimate to KENRI. Although; we had never flown in this region before; we found it odd that no facility seemed interested in our position or our ETA to KENRI. This led us to believe we were below all conflicting traffic and we could safely reduce our fuel burn and speed; while waiting for coordination to a higher flight level.Because of the radio congestion and excessive response time; it seemed prudent to reduce our fuel burn immediately. To continue flying at Mach 78 at FL250 was; in my professional opinion; reckless; considering the amount of fuel required and limited range at an altitude for which we had never intended nor expected to be required to operate at for any extended period of time. 2.) Because of the widespread volcanic ash cloud over the North Atlantic; the North Atlantic Tracks were positioned unusually far north. I believe this created a much larger volume of traffic than what the radio operators in the area were used to and they clearly seemed to have been overwhelmed. If the Sondrestrom Controller was supposed to have included in our clearance; an intermediate position report along our route before KENRI; I can see where it may have been overlooked by Iceland Radio. When communicating with Iceland Radio; the wait time required to get a momentary break on the frequency in order to: contact the Radio Operator; make a request for a higher altitude; and then receive a response took; what seemed to be 10-15 minutes. Because of their excessive workload; I believe it is why Iceland Radio promptly handed me off to Gander Radio when I subsequently asked; 'At what point can I expect a higher altitude?' In my past experience all of my North Atlantic crossings have been conducted in a fairly common and straight forward manner. I always departed from an airport in Canada and received my Oceanic Clearance either on the ground or via ACARS. When I received my Oceanic Clearance in the past; it was always at the flight level I had requested or within 2000 FT of it. I had never received a clearance in which the altitude was so much lower than my planned altitude that it would severely impact my fuel burn and range. The Oceanic Clearance always had a definitive entry point and the Controller or Radio Operator would always ask for your ETA before reaching that point. Because the circumstances surrounding this flight lacked the familiar sequence and points of operation as I had experienced in the past; and the seemingly nonchalant attitude regarding my position and lack of position reporting points; when we made the decision to reduce fuel flow while waiting for a higher altitude; it did not seem as though we were jeopardizing safety in any way; but rather increasing the safety of our flight.Obviously; emphasis should be placed; not only on the clearance route and altitude; but also on the assigned speed. I believe if Iceland Radio or Gander Radio had requested an ETA to a position or included an entry point upon leaving Sondrestrom airspace; we would have asked for a revised Mach speed sooner. Also; had the Sondrestrom Controller indicated that no higher altitudes would be available and FL250 would be our final altitude; we would have uploaded additional fuel at that time. An 11;000 FT difference in planned altitude has a tremendous impact on the aircraft operation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.