Narrative:

The flight was operated to pvg in early may 2010. Flight plan had the and 11A approach listed; and at no time did either shanghai control or shanghai approach tell us to expect any other arrival. During descent; and heading for the first fix on the and 11A approach (and VOR); with bk NDB almost abeam us; they suddenly told us to proceed direct to bk. While switching the FMS to bk; they then gave us a vector to 070. We were told to expect runway 34. Throughout the descent and approach; both shanghai control and shanghai approach (as is the daily custom in china); continued to talk to chinese aircraft in chinese as opposed to english. Since no one on our aircraft spoke chinese; these transmissions were totally useless for situational awareness to us. Zspd was using both 35L and 34 for arrivals; with 35R for departures. Then approach told us to join the bk arrival. With the new arrival in the FMS; and on a heading of 070; LNAV (with autopilot on) was selected. Then they told us to change to runway 35L; leading to more box work. Since the airport/approach appeared to be very busy; the controller was attempting to speak very fast; and his heavy accent started leading to confusion. We had to ask several times to repeat his transmissions. Then after the appropriate runway/arrival was in the box; they changed the runway back to 34; and vectored us to 050; with an instruction we understood as 'join final.' we repeated the instruction; said we were heading 050 to 'join final for runway 34.' as the aircraft is supposed to do; with localizer selected; it joined final. Throughout we saw several aircraft displayed on the nd TCAS; none of which was a conflict; and we thought they were all going to the left runway as both runways were in use. The controllers continued speaking chinese to the other aircraft. Now in an obvious state of concern; approach told us to immediately vector 050. We did so (heading select). We questioned the reason; and now after several attempts; the controller got his point across that he had meant to 'cross' final; not 'join' final. At no time did we receive any TCAS TA's or RA's. Eventually we were vectored back to runway 34 from the east; and landed without incident. The entire episode was primarily caused by china's continuing use of the chinese language in every aspect of ATC. If we would have understood their apparent guidance to a chinese aircraft to get in front of us on the landing runway; it would have explained the first vector. Even though we read back the clearance as 'join;' the controller obviously did not understand; as they did not correct us. All three of us on the flight deck are very experienced international operators; and all three of us understood the ATC instructions as we read them back. The continued use of chinese by the chinese ATC system constantly leads to a loss of situational awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An English speaking crew found the use of the native tongue in China by ATC when communicating with Chinese crews made it difficult for them to maintain situational awareness. A track error resulted from misunderstanding of a clearance.

Narrative: The flight was operated to PVG in early May 2010. Flight plan had the AND 11A approach listed; and at no time did either Shanghai Control or Shanghai Approach tell us to expect any other arrival. During descent; and heading for the first fix on the AND 11A approach (AND VOR); with BK NDB almost abeam us; they suddenly told us to proceed direct to BK. While switching the FMS to BK; they then gave us a vector to 070. We were told to expect Runway 34. Throughout the descent and approach; both Shanghai Control and Shanghai Approach (as is the DAILY custom in China); continued to talk to Chinese aircraft in Chinese as opposed to English. Since no one on our aircraft spoke Chinese; these transmissions were totally useless for situational awareness to us. ZSPD was using both 35L and 34 for arrivals; with 35R for departures. Then Approach told us to join the BK arrival. With the new arrival in the FMS; and on a heading of 070; LNAV (with autopilot on) was selected. Then they told us to change to Runway 35L; leading to more box work. Since the airport/approach appeared to be very busy; the Controller was attempting to speak very fast; and his heavy accent started leading to confusion. We had to ask several times to repeat his transmissions. Then after the appropriate runway/arrival was in the box; they changed the runway back to 34; and vectored us to 050; with an instruction we understood as 'Join final.' We repeated the instruction; said we were heading 050 to 'join final for Runway 34.' As the aircraft is supposed to do; with LOC selected; it joined final. Throughout we saw several aircraft displayed on the ND TCAS; none of which was a conflict; and we thought they were all going to the left runway as both runways were in use. The Controllers continued speaking Chinese to the other aircraft. Now in an obvious state of concern; Approach told us to immediately vector 050. We did so (Heading Select). We questioned the reason; and now after several attempts; the Controller got his point across that he had meant to 'cross' final; not 'join' final. At no time did we receive any TCAS TA's or RA's. Eventually we were vectored back to Runway 34 from the East; and landed without incident. The entire episode was primarily caused by China's continuing use of the Chinese language in every aspect of ATC. If we would have understood their apparent guidance to a Chinese aircraft to get in front of us on the landing runway; it would have explained the first vector. Even though we read back the clearance as 'join;' the Controller obviously did not understand; as they did not correct us. All three of us on the flight deck are very experienced international operators; and all three of us understood the ATC instructions as we read them back. The continued use of Chinese by the Chinese ATC system constantly leads to a loss of situational awareness.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.