Narrative:

Working local/tower controller in charge (tcic) as well as being the shift-controller in charge. Developmentals working ground controller (ground control) and clearance delivery/flight data (clearance delivery/FD). Smoke and haze in the vicinity and slowly worsening. I had consistent traffic since taking the position. There were two aircraft in the pattern and numerous aircraft arriving and departing fai as well as satellite airports. It was getting increasingly difficult to observe the aircraft in the pattern and so I was constantly manipulating each aircraft's pattern to ensure the sequence and separation. I had begun to think about simply issuing full-stop landings to the pattern traffic. A C172 was a very problematic aircraft which was inbound to fai. Between it being difficult to visually observe the aircraft and the C172's inability to properly follow air traffic instructions; I was completely absorbed in working my traffic. An approach controller came over the shoutline and asked if I was aware the field was now IFR. Although the visibility had been decreasing; I had not had time between working my traffic to notice anything different on the ASOS. There had been no indication of activity by the controllers working clearance delivery/FD or ground control either; so this information came as a surprise. After glancing at the ASOS and ids to confirm that the speci had transmitted; I immediately entered what was essentially a recovery mode and began getting the aircraft on the ground as safely and quickly as possible. I requested and received control of the fai class-D airspace and I doubt I issued SVFR clearances to all the aircraft in the surface area at the time. I decided; given the difficult nature of the interaction so far; that it would be best to allow the C172 to land despite the fact that I could have issued him instructions to exit the class-D and contact the approach control. Eventually all aircraft landed without incident and the operation adjusted to 'normal' for IFR/SVFR conditions. Given the complexity of working the traffic due to the weather conditions; I was not directly monitoring the ASOS. In that regard; my mistake was relying on the controllers working the clearance delivery/FD and ground control positions to keep me apprised of changes to the ASOS. It is my opinion that this event was exacerbated by the poor operational knowledge and lack of experience between the controllers working clearance delivery/FD and ground control. Had a more experienced controller been working either of these positions; or had there been a stand-alone tcic; I believe I would have been made aware of the changing weather conditions as soon as the speci message was pending instead of minutes after the speci had transmitted. Had I received the information regarding the speci; as it was pending; I would have been able to handle the situation more appropriately and could possibly have had some or all of the aircraft on the ground before the IFR weather had transmitted. I did not staff a stand-alone tcic because I was attempting to maximize the training given the staffing available. Additionally; the ASOS could have a more audibly distinct notification when the weather is decreasing to below VFR to aid the controller's situation awareness of pending weather which will have an impact on the operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAI local controller described a procedural error when allowing continued VFR operations after the airport weather changed to IFR; noting preoccupation with a confused inbound and failed notification by others in the tower.

Narrative: Working Local/Tower Controller in Charge (TCIC) as well as being the shift-Controller in Charge. Developmentals working Ground Controller (GC) and Clearance Delivery/Flight Data (CD/FD). Smoke and haze in the vicinity and slowly worsening. I had consistent traffic since taking the position. There were two aircraft in the pattern and numerous aircraft arriving and departing FAI as well as satellite airports. It was getting increasingly difficult to observe the aircraft in the pattern and so I was constantly manipulating each aircraft's pattern to ensure the sequence and separation. I had begun to think about simply issuing full-stop landings to the pattern traffic. A C172 was a very problematic aircraft which was inbound to FAI. Between it being difficult to visually observe the aircraft and the C172's inability to properly follow air traffic instructions; I was completely absorbed in working my traffic. An Approach Controller came over the shoutline and asked if I was aware the field was now IFR. Although the visibility had been decreasing; I had not had time between working my traffic to notice anything different on the ASOS. There had been no indication of activity by the controllers working CD/FD or GC either; so this information came as a surprise. After glancing at the ASOS and IDS to confirm that the SPECI had transmitted; I immediately entered what was essentially a recovery mode and began getting the aircraft on the ground as safely and quickly as possible. I requested and received control of the FAI Class-D airspace and I doubt I issued SVFR clearances to all the aircraft in the surface area at the time. I decided; given the difficult nature of the interaction so far; that it would be best to allow the C172 to land despite the fact that I could have issued him instructions to exit the Class-D and contact the approach control. Eventually all aircraft landed without incident and the operation adjusted to 'normal' for IFR/SVFR conditions. Given the complexity of working the traffic due to the weather conditions; I was not directly monitoring the ASOS. In that regard; my mistake was relying on the controllers working the CD/FD and GC positions to keep me apprised of changes to the ASOS. It is my opinion that this event was exacerbated by the poor operational knowledge and lack of experience between the controllers working CD/FD and GC. Had a more experienced controller been working either of these positions; or had there been a stand-alone TCIC; I believe I would have been made aware of the changing weather conditions as soon as the SPECI message was pending instead of minutes after the SPECI had transmitted. Had I received the information regarding the SPECI; as it was pending; I would have been able to handle the situation more appropriately and could possibly have had some or all of the aircraft on the ground before the IFR weather had transmitted. I did not staff a stand-alone TCIC because I was attempting to maximize the training given the staffing available. Additionally; the ASOS could have a more audibly distinct notification when the weather is decreasing to below VFR to aid the controller's situation awareness of pending weather which will have an impact on the operation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.