Narrative:

Report concerning fatigue issue: passenger; crew; and aircraft safety as related to pilot crew rest facilities and fatigue; and airline management failure. I was scheduled for a XA30 report with a scheduled 4 hour and 55 minute break before continuing with a 2 hour and 41 minute block flight to an ron. After a poor nights rest I related to the captain I was flying with; that I was very tired and needed to rest. In an effort to avoid becoming fatigued I would call airline and request a hotel room for the nearly 5 hour break in lga before continuing our next leg. Airline regularly schedules multi-hour breaks at airports where they do not provide flight crews with any way to get adequate rest between legs. Lga is just a common example. I placed a call to crew scheduling at xd:42 and spoke with a crew scheduler. I explained that I was tired and was requesting a hotel room during my lengthy break. She told me that the break time between legs must be at least 5 hours and 30 minutes; but she would ask her supervisor for approval. After consulting with her supervisor for a minute; she came back on the line and told me that her supervisor said 'they have been cracking down on us with the 5 hours and 30 minutes. Supervisor would not provide me with a room to rest. I asked to be transferred to a chief pilot. My call was transferred to the chief pilots office. I explained to the chief pilot that I had a terrible nights sleep and asked if he could get me a hotel day room to get an effective use of a nap while I was in lga before my next flight leg. The chief pilot told me 'they will not let me do that'. 'We have gone down this road before' (writers note: you can see a pattern developing here). 'We have actually had discussions with the union'. The chief pilot goes on to say: 'they' (the union) don't even want us (management) below five and a half hours; to issue rooms. The chief pilot continues: 'they (the union) don't want us (management) to use our judgment to decide when to issue rooms; and when not to issue rooms'. I made a suggestion to the chief pilot that for safety concerns we need to get some sort of facility with lounge chairs here in lga. The chief pilot told me that he agreed with my statement 100%. He told me that the space was taken away by another carrier. He went on to say that the corporate real estate department had been transferred; but we have been looking for joint space between us and all the other carriers. He told me that he would like to help me but 'my hands are kind of tied' (writers note: by whom? The union?). So I sat in the busy lga terminal for nearly 4 hours until departure time. At this point I realized that for safety reasons I was tired; exhausted and fatigued. I could no longer continue this trip safely; morally; or legally; I called scheduling and advised them that I was fatigued; and could no longer continue my trip. I asked to be transferred to the chief pilot on duty in the operations control center and advised him of the same. I then went to the lga hotel (writers note: this hotel is directly across from the lga airport terminal and takes only about 10 to 15 minutes to get there including van waiting time). Summation: airline management could have used discretion to issue me a hotel room to get rest before my next leg and prevent a fatigue call. They chose not to. Airline management could plan trips more effectively; and reduce or eliminate the all too common multi-hour breaks between legs. They chose not to. Airline management could mitigate the effects of fatigue on flight crew members by providing lounge chairs in a quite place; out of public view where long breaks are unavoidable. They chose not to. Airline management knows that when a pilot must stand strong against them with a fatigue issue; the pilot loses all flight pay for the legs lost. If this is not a strong enough disincentive to stop a pilot from calling in fatigued; the pilot knows that he will have to explain himself to management and hope that his explanation is sufficient enough to avoid disciplinary action. The cost to airlines to pay for a hotel to provide adequate rest to a pilot to prevent fatigue is certainly cheaper than the financial repercussions due to disrupted flight schedules; and canceled flights. Airline management is willing to cut off its proverbial nose in spite of its face over a pilot safety issue. All of these actions have developed a corporate culture that has led to an unsafe condition at this airline. Suggestions for change airline should rethink and change its schedules to eliminate multi-hour breaks. Where multi-hour breaks are unavoidable (understaffing is not an excuse); airline management should ensure that lounge chairs (not office chairs) are available in a quite area away from public view. If adequate break room facilities are not available; airline management should have the authority and predisposition to offer hotel rooms to flight crews when asked. Airline management should be willing to meet with the airline pilot's union immediately and come up with a new safety policy; or memorandum of understanding; which addresses pilot fatigue with clear language; that is does not financially penalize a pilot from calling in fatigued; and that also protects the pilot from unreasonable disciplinary action. Supplemental information in the airline's own published information on 'fatigue countermeasures' states that 'adhering to the preventive countermeasures is the best way to combat fatigue long term'. Airline goes on to state that 'these (measures) will help prevent fatigue'. 'Effective use of naps' - 'naps can acutely improve alertness'. 'Short nap (30-45 minutes or less) - should be used just before work or during breaks: writers note: airline management should pay closer attention to their own advice to flight crews with regard to short naps.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier First Officer attempted to get a hotel room during an extended lay over at the Airlines expense because of a poor nights sleep and a long day. The Airline refused and prior to departure the pilot called in fatigued and went to a hotel.

Narrative: Report Concerning Fatigue Issue: Passenger; Crew; and Aircraft Safety as related to pilot crew rest facilities and fatigue; and Airline Management failure. I was scheduled for a XA30 report with a scheduled 4 hour and 55 minute break before continuing with a 2 hour and 41 minute block flight to an RON. After a poor nights rest I related to the Captain I was flying with; that I was very tired and needed to rest. In an effort to avoid becoming fatigued I would call Airline and request a hotel room for the nearly 5 hour break in LGA before continuing our next leg. Airline regularly schedules multi-hour breaks at airports where they do not provide flight crews with any way to get adequate rest between legs. LGA is just a common example. I placed a call to crew scheduling at XD:42 and spoke with a crew scheduler. I explained that I was tired and was requesting a hotel room during my lengthy break. She told me that the break time between legs must be at least 5 hours and 30 minutes; but she would ask her supervisor for approval. After consulting with her supervisor for a minute; she came back on the line and told me that her supervisor said 'they have been cracking down on us with the 5 hours and 30 minutes. Supervisor would not provide me with a room to rest. I asked to be transferred to a Chief Pilot. My call was transferred to the Chief Pilots Office. I explained to the Chief Pilot that I had a terrible nights sleep and asked if he could get me a hotel day room to get an effective use of a nap while I was in LGA before my next flight leg. The Chief Pilot told me 'they will not let me do that'. 'We have gone down this road before' (writers note: you can see a pattern developing here). 'We have actually had discussions with the union'. The Chief Pilot goes on to say: 'They' (the union) don't even want us (management) below five and a half hours; to issue rooms. The Chief Pilot continues: 'They (the union) don't want us (management) to use our judgment to decide when to issue rooms; and when not to issue rooms'. I made a suggestion to the Chief Pilot that for safety concerns we need to get some sort of facility with lounge chairs here in LGA. The Chief Pilot told me that he agreed with my statement 100%. He told me that the space was taken away by another carrier. He went on to say that the Corporate Real Estate Department had been transferred; but we have been looking for joint space between us and all the other carriers. He told me that he would like to help me but 'my hands are kind of tied' (writers note: by whom? the Union?). So I sat in the busy LGA terminal for nearly 4 hours until departure time. At this point I realized that for safety reasons I was tired; exhausted and fatigued. I could no longer continue this trip safely; morally; or legally; I called scheduling and advised them that I was fatigued; and could no longer continue my trip. I asked to be transferred to the Chief Pilot on duty in the Operations Control Center and advised him of the same. I then went to the LGA hotel (writers note: this hotel is directly across from the LGA airport terminal and takes only about 10 to 15 minutes to get there including van waiting time). Summation: Airline Management could have used discretion to issue me a hotel room to get rest before my next leg and prevent a fatigue call. They chose not to. Airline Management could plan trips more effectively; and reduce or eliminate the all too common multi-hour breaks between legs. They chose not to. Airline Management could mitigate the effects of fatigue on flight crew members by providing lounge chairs in a quite place; out of public view where long breaks are unavoidable. They chose not to. Airline Management knows that when a pilot must stand strong against them with a fatigue issue; the pilot loses all flight pay for the legs lost. If this is not a strong enough disincentive to stop a pilot from calling in fatigued; the pilot knows that he will have to explain himself to management and hope that his explanation is sufficient enough to avoid disciplinary action. The cost to Airlines to pay for a hotel to provide adequate rest to a pilot to prevent fatigue is certainly cheaper than the financial repercussions due to disrupted flight schedules; and canceled flights. Airline Management is willing to cut off its proverbial nose in spite of its face over a pilot safety issue. All of these actions have developed a corporate culture that has led to an unsafe condition at this Airline. Suggestions for change Airline should rethink and change its schedules to eliminate multi-hour breaks. Where multi-hour breaks are unavoidable (understaffing is not an excuse); Airline Management should ensure that lounge chairs (not office chairs) are available in a quite area away from public view. If adequate break room facilities are not available; Airline Management should have the authority and predisposition to offer hotel rooms to flight crews when asked. Airline Management should be willing to meet with the Airline Pilot's Union immediately and come up with a new safety policy; or memorandum of understanding; which addresses pilot fatigue with clear language; that is does not financially penalize a pilot from calling in fatigued; and that also protects the pilot from unreasonable disciplinary action. Supplemental information in the Airline's own published information on 'Fatigue Countermeasures' states that 'Adhering to the Preventive Countermeasures is the best way to combat fatigue long term'. Airline goes on to state that 'These (measures) will help prevent fatigue'. 'Effective Use of Naps' - 'Naps can acutely improve alertness'. 'Short Nap (30-45 minutes or less) - should be used just before work or during breaks: Writers note: Airline Management should pay closer attention to their own advice to flight crews with regard to short naps.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.