Narrative:

From the maintenance logbook we found that the aircraft had a problem with the left door caution light several times and was brought into maintenance to solve the problem. We flew the aircraft one leg without any problems. Weather that day was uneventful with sun and clear smooth sailing. Immediately after takeoff on the next leg; when the gear retracted the two left door and right door caution lights illuminated and remained lit. My first officer and I discussed the 140 knots and the alternate gear action that is required when two or more door lights illuminated. We checked the emergency checklist for any listing for more than one door caution light and the alternate gear action with all the restrictions. We advised ATC that we had a maintenance item and might have to return. We stated we liked to stay at 5000 feet and contact company. My first officer tried to reach company on all three available cell calls without any success. Although our dispatcher is known for not answering or being extremely slow. ATC then advised us to descend to 4000 feet and would give us delayed vectors instead of a hold. Finally I decided to use my cell phone to reach dispatch and maintenance for any planned action. The dispatcher put us on hold. Finally maintenance control came on and said recycle the gear. I advised we were not at liberty to do so. Then he said to check the alternate doors. I advised we did already. He then stated to hit it hard; whereupon we lost contact. I advised my first officer that we return and since the only restriction we had was 140 knots not to declare at that time. My first officer contacted operations and advised them of the returning to the field. He then continued to notify the flight attendants and a PA was made. Again my first officer and I discussed the action of alternate gear action; inhibit; select; pull; pull. The restriction applied no nose wheel steering and the problem of gear retraction during a go-around. ATC vectored us back to the ILS. We advised ATC numerous times of 140 knots restriction and negative emergency at the time. We landed normally and started to taxi in. Ramp advised us of a gate change. I noticed no maintenance at the gate to install the gear pins as instructed in the emergency checklist. I called and advised the dispatcher of the requirement. He was not interested and wanted to know our gate departure time. I advised him that we had a situation and no time for that and to get maintenance to the gate for the gear pin action. As soon as I disconnected; ramp started to harass us about the times. I advised him that we had a situation and would give it later. He totally ignored us and stated he needed the times. It seems more and more that during abnormal or even emergency situations that no help or advice is being giving by station; flight and maintenance control. The knowledge of the fom and the dash-8 handbook is mostly not present or in some cases very weak! Arguing during these abnormalities is the order of the day. It is amazing that when we arrived in the morning that a mechanic immediately said that the selector valve was bad but he was totally ignored. The next morning after all the cancellations I found that the selector valve was changed and the problem solved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Dash 8 Captain described an air return after illumination of left and right door (landing gear) caution lights on departure. The aircraft had a history of door caution lights that had not been properly address by Maintenance.

Narrative: From the maintenance logbook we found that the aircraft had a problem with the left door caution light several times and was brought into maintenance to solve the problem. We flew the aircraft one leg without any problems. Weather that day was uneventful with sun and clear smooth sailing. Immediately after takeoff on the next leg; when the gear retracted the two left door and right door caution lights illuminated and remained lit. My First Officer and I discussed the 140 knots and the alternate gear action that is required when two or more door lights illuminated. We checked the emergency checklist for any listing for more than one door caution light and the alternate gear action with all the restrictions. We advised ATC that we had a maintenance item and might have to return. We stated we liked to stay at 5000 feet and contact Company. My First Officer tried to reach Company on all three available cell calls without any success. Although our Dispatcher is known for not answering or being extremely slow. ATC then advised us to descend to 4000 feet and would give us delayed vectors instead of a hold. Finally I decided to use my cell phone to reach Dispatch and Maintenance for any planned action. The Dispatcher put us on hold. Finally Maintenance Control came on and said recycle the gear. I advised we were not at liberty to do so. Then he said to check the alternate doors. I advised we did already. He then stated to hit it hard; whereupon we lost contact. I advised my First Officer that we return and since the only restriction we had was 140 knots not to declare at that time. My First Officer contacted Operations and advised them of the returning to the field. He then continued to notify the Flight Attendants and a PA was made. Again my First Officer and I discussed the action of alternate gear action; inhibit; select; pull; pull. The restriction applied no nose wheel steering and the problem of gear retraction during a go-around. ATC vectored us back to the ILS. We advised ATC numerous times of 140 knots restriction and negative emergency at the time. We landed normally and started to taxi in. Ramp advised us of a gate change. I noticed no maintenance at the gate to install the gear pins as instructed in the emergency checklist. I called and advised the Dispatcher of the requirement. He was not interested and wanted to know our gate departure time. I advised him that we had a situation and no time for that and to get maintenance to the gate for the gear pin action. As soon as I disconnected; ramp started to harass us about the times. I advised him that we had a situation and would give it later. He totally ignored us and stated he needed the times. It seems more and more that during abnormal or even emergency situations that no help or advice is being giving by Station; Flight and Maintenance Control. The knowledge of the FOM and the Dash-8 handbook is mostly not present or in some cases very weak! Arguing during these abnormalities is the order of the day. It is amazing that when we arrived in the morning that a Mechanic immediately said that the selector valve was bad but he was totally ignored. The next morning after all the cancellations I found that the selector valve was changed and the problem solved.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.