Narrative:

It was the end of our third leg flying this tail number that day and we had had no malfunctions or ECAM messages on any of the three flights. I was the pilot not flying. On final approach between 1200' and 800' I began to smell what seemed like smoke in the cockpit. After a few seconds; the smell seemed to intensify so; ruling out the possibility of smell due to us over flying a brush fire on the ground; I mentioned what I was sensing to the pilot flying. He indicated that he too was smelling smoke. At this point we were probably crossing 500' and took no action to correct the problem; as landing was imminent. I remember bringing up the electrical and bleed pages on the ECAM and all parameters seemed normal to me. Upon landing; we cleared the runway and after being switched to ground; I got the first call from the flight attendant's who indicated to me the presence of visible smoke in the main cabin; I asked ground to stop the aircraft somewhere on the taxiway to look at a possible smoke problem. We were cleared as requested and stopped and set the parking brake on. Since I was monitoring the cabin interphone; I could hear conversation between the flight attendant's about the presence of smoke in the cabin. I get a second call from the back about the presence of cabin smoke and I ask my first officer to get the fom out. We opened up the fom to the cabin smoke/fire checklist. I remembered getting frustrated with the procedure; as its items were mostly in-flight items. We still could not tell what system the smoke was emanating from. I then put the checklist down and chose to open the cockpit door to look down the main aisle from the cockpit and personally assess the situation in the back. ATC; at this time wants to now if we need assistance. We accepted the offer for them to get the emergency equipment out. Calls from the back of the airplane continued informing me that the situation was getting worse; the amount of smoke was slowly increasing. At this point; I elected to stop the fom and proceed to evacuate the airplane. My first officer reported to the tower that we were evacuating; and we gave them the number of souls on board and the amount of fuel in hours. We stopped twice during the course of conducting the checklist: once to determine the need to fire the fire bottles and the second time to once again assess the need for evacuation. At that time I took a second look through the opened cockpit door and determined that the smoke was still present at which point I gave the evacuation command. Three slides were deployed; the two in the back and the L1 slide. I asked my first officer to double check the items in the evacuation checklist to make sure nothing was missed as I got up from my seat to help out in the back. With only 91 passengers on board and most of them young and middle aged; the evacuation went fairly quick. My first officer exited the aircraft and started to assess the situation on the ground and to keep the passengers all in one group with the help of emergency personnel. Once I determined that no one else was on board; I was the last one to exit the airplane. I saw two passengers who were apparently injured. One young lady was on the ground being assisted by paramedics who was complaining of pain in her ankle. Another older lady was being helped to walk by a paramedic. I heard from my first officer later that she had hit her tail bone on the ground as she came off the bottom of the slide. Once on the ground and after a few minutes; passengers and crew were bussed to the terminal. I believe that given the limited information that we had at the time and given the fact that conditions were not improving as time went by; I took the only action that I deemed appropriate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Flight Crew detects smoke during approach. After landing Flight Attendants also report smoke and Captain elects to evacuate the aircraft on a taxiway.

Narrative: It was the end of our third leg flying this tail number that day and we had had no malfunctions or ECAM messages on any of the three flights. I was the pilot not flying. On final approach between 1200' and 800' I began to smell what seemed like smoke in the cockpit. After a few seconds; the smell seemed to intensify so; ruling out the possibility of smell due to us over flying a brush fire on the ground; I mentioned what I was sensing to the pilot flying. He indicated that he too was smelling smoke. At this point we were probably crossing 500' and took no action to correct the problem; as landing was imminent. I remember bringing up the electrical and bleed pages on the ECAM and all parameters seemed normal to me. Upon landing; we cleared the runway and after being switched to ground; I got the first call from the Flight Attendant's who indicated to me the presence of visible smoke in the main cabin; I asked Ground to stop the aircraft somewhere on the taxiway to look at a possible smoke problem. We were cleared as requested and stopped and set the parking brake ON. Since I was monitoring the cabin interphone; I could hear conversation between the Flight Attendant's about the presence of smoke in the cabin. I get a second call from the back about the presence of cabin smoke and I ask my First Officer to get the FOM out. We opened up the FOM to the Cabin Smoke/Fire checklist. I remembered getting frustrated with the procedure; as its items were mostly in-flight items. We still could not tell what system the smoke was emanating from. I then put the checklist down and chose to open the cockpit door to look down the main aisle from the cockpit and personally assess the situation in the back. ATC; at this time wants to now if we need assistance. We accepted the offer for them to get the emergency equipment out. Calls from the back of the airplane continued informing me that the situation was getting worse; the amount of smoke was slowly increasing. At this point; I elected to stop the FOM and proceed to evacuate the airplane. My First Officer reported to the Tower that we were evacuating; and we gave them the number of souls on board and the amount of fuel in hours. We stopped twice during the course of conducting the checklist: once to determine the need to fire the fire bottles and the second time to once again assess the need for evacuation. At that time I took a second look through the opened cockpit door and determined that the smoke was still present at which point I gave the evacuation command. Three slides were deployed; the two in the back and the L1 slide. I asked my First Officer to double check the items in the evacuation checklist to make sure nothing was missed as I got up from my seat to help out in the back. With only 91 passengers on board and most of them young and middle aged; the evacuation went fairly quick. My First Officer exited the aircraft and started to assess the situation on the ground and to keep the passengers all in one group with the help of emergency personnel. Once I determined that no one else was on board; I was the last one to exit the airplane. I saw two passengers who were apparently injured. One young lady was on the ground being assisted by paramedics who was complaining of pain in her ankle. Another older lady was being helped to walk by a paramedic. I heard from my First Officer later that she had hit her tail bone on the ground as she came off the bottom of the slide. Once on the ground and after a few minutes; passengers and crew were bussed to the terminal. I believe that given the limited information that we had at the time and given the fact that conditions were not improving as time went by; I took the only action that I deemed appropriate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.