Narrative:

Weather was broken to overcast approximately 700 feet to 1000 feet with multiple layers up to about 4000 feet. Visibility was about 4 miles and mist wind variable at three; thunderstorms en route. Captain turned from an inbound flight. Captain had ground shuttled one leg and dead headed another to join the first officer who had also been on reserve and had flown into the station from cid. He had departed cid eight hours prior; and runway 9-27 had been open. For our flight to cid the NOTAMS showed nothing about runway 9-27 being closed nor did they mention a runway 8-26. They did mention multiple lighting issues on both runways 9-27 and 13-31. The closure was a complete surprise to us. During the arrival into cid the weather was marginal at best with broken to overcast decks. After listening to the ATIS when the tower opened at dawn we found out that runway 9-27 was closed? The first officer said that they had been working on that runway - but the weather being good enough; we briefed a visual to runway 31. Being a shorter runway; I pulled out my manual to check the landing distance to get a feel for what level of auto brakes I wanted to use based on the runway 31 length and aircraft weight. We briefed the visual and the exit from the runway 31 and loaded it into the FMC. Upon contacting the approach controller; he descended us to 2500 and started to vector us for the 'RNAV runway 31'. We told him that we were not authorized to do that approach and he then started to vector us to the 'visual 31'. We were in and out of the clouds and passing through about 4000 feet en route to 2500 feet entered the weather completely and were on a short vector when he then stated that there was a broken deck that would not allow the visual and asked us what we wanted to do. We started to discuss it when the controller came right back and said that he could give us the VOR to runway 26. We had just leveled off at 2500 feet. Now; the database in the FMC had just changed over and the VOR 26 was now in the database whereas it had not been in the old database. It was now approximately an hour and a half after the database change. We had also gotten a new chart revision before departing that had the VOR 26 or VOR 8 in it effective the current day. I initially thought that is was a renaming of runway 9-27. We pulled out the plate; discussed it; briefed it; and loaded the FMC rapidly as we were being tightly vectored at 2500 for the VOR to 26. I quickly briefed all the extra items that are involved with a non-precision VOR approach in the 757; and mentioned the runway length again. Fortunately for me the first officer was a strong performer and kept up with the quickly changing situation and demands. He was able to enter all the needed adjustments in the FMC. During this time we were having some communication confusion with the controller as to whether he was vectoring us for the straight in; or the procedure turn; and we were trying to clarify this when at one point he said we were cleared the 'GPS to 26'. We corrected him and all seemed cleared up that we were doing the straight-in VOR to 26. He came across as a bit perturbed. At this time; we were in the clouds and did not have any visual contact with the ground. Our vectors were tight and we elected to configure early (as is recommended on a non-precision); and to buy us time to make sure procedurally we had done everything necessary. Once we were handed over to tower about a mile or so out of the FAF the first officer asked the tower to confirm the landing distance available on runway 26. They stated it as 7600 feet. This being longer than that of runway 13-31; I felt that the auto brakes setting that I had selected based on the manual landing data charts for a dry runway gave us a good stopping margin. Just about at minimums; we broke out and had the runway end identifier lights (REIL) in sight. There are no approach lights to runway 26; and there was no PAPI or VASI. I stated that wealso had a runway 27 closure 'X' in sight and that we were lined up with the correct runway and also on a normal/stable approach for the position and distance from the runway. We touched down on centerline and had a normal reduction in speed and rollout with plenty of runway to spare. At this time I started to realize that the runway appeared 'skinnier' that I normally thought it should be. I mentioned it aloud and the first officer stated that he felt the same. Tower instructed us to go to the end of the runway where there was a turn-around/hammerhead off to the right and to do a 180 and back taxi on the runway to exit to the ramp. The taxi and parking was uneventful. At this time the first officer and I reviewed the airport chart page and came to find that the new runway was indeed only 125 feet wide. In summary; I shot the VOR 26 into cid on an approach plate effective on our flight day that was in our database which had changed one hour twenty minutes prior to our shooting the approach; and landed on a runway that was found to be 125 feet wide - all uneventfully. I didn't think we were authorized per our operations manual to use this size runway unless we had special approval in that it states that the minimum width is 148 feet or 45 meters. I would like to have it verified that either we had special approval; or in the case that we did not; that the approach should not have been in either our paper charts or in the FMC database; and in addition also in the notams as unusable. In all the compression of time procedurally flying a demanding not expected non-precision approach in marginal weather during short vectors we had concerned ourselves with only the runway length and not noticed the runway width. My mistake was not actually reviewing the true dimensions of the runway in regards to width in my haste to cover everything else involved and to continue to juggle all the balls after a long duty day and dodging thunderstorms in a fast changing situation. Fortunately; our landing was completely uneventful. Factors involved were; weather; fatigue; communications confusion with ATC; time compression; change of database and charts; and unfamiliarity with airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 crew discovered upon landing on Runway 26 at CID that it 'appeared skinnier' than they expected. After finding their company policy did not authorize landing on this narrow runway they went on to detail the factors that led up to it.

Narrative: Weather was broken to overcast approximately 700 feet to 1000 feet with multiple layers up to about 4000 feet. Visibility was about 4 miles and mist wind variable at three; thunderstorms en route. Captain turned from an inbound flight. Captain had ground shuttled one leg and dead headed another to join the First Officer who had also been on reserve and had flown into the station from CID. He had departed CID eight hours prior; and Runway 9-27 had been open. For our flight to CID the NOTAMS showed nothing about Runway 9-27 being closed nor did they mention a Runway 8-26. They did mention multiple lighting issues on both Runways 9-27 and 13-31. The closure was a complete surprise to us. During the arrival into CID the weather was marginal at best with broken to overcast decks. After listening to the ATIS when the Tower opened at dawn we found out that runway 9-27 was closed? The First Officer said that they had been working on that runway - but the weather being good enough; we briefed a visual to Runway 31. Being a shorter runway; I pulled out my manual to check the landing distance to get a feel for what level of auto brakes I wanted to use based on the Runway 31 length and aircraft weight. We briefed the visual and the exit from the Runway 31 and loaded it into the FMC. Upon contacting the Approach Controller; he descended us to 2500 and started to vector us for the 'RNAV Runway 31'. We told him that we were not authorized to do that approach and he then started to vector us to the 'visual 31'. We were in and out of the clouds and passing through about 4000 feet en route to 2500 feet entered the weather completely and were on a short vector when he then stated that there was a broken deck that would not allow the visual and asked us what we wanted to do. We started to discuss it when the Controller came right back and said that he could give us the VOR to Runway 26. We had just leveled off at 2500 feet. Now; the database in the FMC had just changed over and the VOR 26 was now in the database whereas it had not been in the old database. It was now approximately an hour and a half after the database change. We had also gotten a new chart revision before departing that had the VOR 26 or VOR 8 in it effective the current day. I initially thought that is was a renaming of Runway 9-27. We pulled out the plate; discussed it; briefed it; and loaded the FMC rapidly as we were being tightly vectored at 2500 for the VOR to 26. I quickly briefed all the extra items that are involved with a non-precision VOR approach in the 757; and mentioned the runway length again. Fortunately for me the First Officer was a strong performer and kept up with the quickly changing situation and demands. He was able to enter all the needed adjustments in the FMC. During this time we were having some communication confusion with the Controller as to whether he was vectoring us for the straight in; or the procedure turn; and we were trying to clarify this when at one point he said we were cleared the 'GPS to 26'. We corrected him and all seemed cleared up that we were doing the straight-in VOR to 26. He came across as a bit perturbed. At this time; we were in the clouds and did not have any visual contact with the ground. Our vectors were tight and we elected to configure early (as is recommended on a non-precision); and to buy us time to make sure procedurally we had done everything necessary. Once we were handed over to Tower about a mile or so out of the FAF the First Officer asked the Tower to confirm the landing distance available on Runway 26. They stated it as 7600 feet. This being longer than that of Runway 13-31; I felt that the auto brakes setting that I had selected based on the manual landing data charts for a dry runway gave us a good stopping margin. Just about at minimums; we broke out and had the runway end identifier lights (REIL) in sight. There are no approach lights to Runway 26; and there was no PAPI or VASI. I stated that wealso had a Runway 27 closure 'X' in sight and that we were lined up with the correct runway and also on a normal/stable approach for the position and distance from the runway. We touched down on centerline and had a normal reduction in speed and rollout with plenty of runway to spare. At this time I started to realize that the runway appeared 'skinnier' that I normally thought it should be. I mentioned it aloud and the First Officer stated that he felt the same. Tower instructed us to go to the end of the runway where there was a turn-around/hammerhead off to the right and to do a 180 and back taxi on the runway to exit to the ramp. The taxi and parking was uneventful. At this time the First Officer and I reviewed the airport chart page and came to find that the new runway was indeed only 125 feet wide. In summary; I shot the VOR 26 into CID on an approach plate effective on our flight day that was in our database which had changed one hour twenty minutes prior to our shooting the approach; and landed on a runway that was found to be 125 feet wide - all uneventfully. I didn't think we were authorized per our Operations Manual to use this size runway unless we had special approval in that it states that the minimum width is 148 feet or 45 meters. I would like to have it verified that either we had special approval; or in the case that we did not; that the approach should not have been in either our paper charts or in the FMC database; and in addition also in the NOTAMs as unusable. In all the compression of time procedurally flying a demanding not expected non-precision approach in marginal weather during short vectors we had concerned ourselves with only the runway length and not noticed the runway width. My mistake was not actually reviewing the true dimensions of the runway in regards to width in my haste to cover everything else involved and to continue to juggle all the balls after a long duty day and dodging thunderstorms in a fast changing situation. Fortunately; our landing was completely uneventful. Factors involved were; weather; fatigue; communications confusion with ATC; time compression; change of database and charts; and unfamiliarity with airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.