Narrative:

Due to our gross weight 13595# and high temperature, we had to use a wet power setting of 91%. No dry power setting was available. As first officer, applied takeoff power, turned on the awi switch at 40% torque with no indication of a rise in torque. At 20 KTS we aborted the takeoff roll. The awi had worked previously, so I was not sure if it was something we had overlooked or if the awi switch had made good contact and/or if the speed levers had sent the signal to the srl computer. The speed levers were a little loose. With these uncertainties I called for another takeoff. On the second takeoff attempt I manually held the speed levers in place, but still no indication of a torque rise in either engine when I turned on the awi switch. Again we aborted, then returned to the gate. We off loaded passenger and I called maintenance control. During this time the pih agents got 3 passenger to take another flight. This put our weight down to 13000 pounds (including 100 pounds fuel burn). At this weight we could make a dry takeoff using 68%. Maintenance told me they could not do anything in phi, so I told them we could make a dry takeoff and then write up the airplane at boi, our destination. Maintenance and I agreed to this course of action and we left pih with 3 less passenger using 68% dry. When we got to boi, I wrote up the airplane. After having a couple of days to reflect and some recurrent training, I clearly see where the mistakes were made. #1--one takeoff abort would have been sufficient. #2--I misunderstood far 135.179, I should have gotten maintenance to rsi the airplane per the MEL over the phone while I made the appropriate entries in the maintenance log. WX for most of the day had been hot--low hundreds--and this flight was our last of an 8 leg day. I feel that although there was some confusion as to interpretation of legalities, at no time during this flight was safety compromised. If the FAA should decide to press this case, it would do so over a matter of compliance rather than safety. I have recommended to training department that, although I believe ours to be one of the best training facs, we spend more time during recurrent ground schools in the flight operations manual and the far's.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAILED TO MAKE NOTE IN LOGBOOK OF MAINTENANCE RELEASE FOR FLT WITH INOPERATIVE AWI SYSTEM.

Narrative: DUE TO OUR GROSS WT 13595# AND HIGH TEMP, WE HAD TO USE A WET PWR SETTING OF 91%. NO DRY PWR SETTING WAS AVAILABLE. AS F/O, APPLIED TKOF PWR, TURNED ON THE AWI SWITCH AT 40% TORQUE WITH NO INDICATION OF A RISE IN TORQUE. AT 20 KTS WE ABORTED THE TKOF ROLL. THE AWI HAD WORKED PREVIOUSLY, SO I WAS NOT SURE IF IT WAS SOMETHING WE HAD OVERLOOKED OR IF THE AWI SWITCH HAD MADE GOOD CONTACT AND/OR IF THE SPD LEVERS HAD SENT THE SIGNAL TO THE SRL COMPUTER. THE SPD LEVERS WERE A LITTLE LOOSE. WITH THESE UNCERTAINTIES I CALLED FOR ANOTHER TKOF. ON THE SECOND TKOF ATTEMPT I MANUALLY HELD THE SPD LEVERS IN PLACE, BUT STILL NO INDICATION OF A TORQUE RISE IN EITHER ENG WHEN I TURNED ON THE AWI SWITCH. AGAIN WE ABORTED, THEN RETURNED TO THE GATE. WE OFF LOADED PAX AND I CALLED MAINT CONTROL. DURING THIS TIME THE PIH AGENTS GOT 3 PAX TO TAKE ANOTHER FLT. THIS PUT OUR WT DOWN TO 13000 LBS (INCLUDING 100 LBS FUEL BURN). AT THIS WT WE COULD MAKE A DRY TKOF USING 68%. MAINT TOLD ME THEY COULD NOT DO ANYTHING IN PHI, SO I TOLD THEM WE COULD MAKE A DRY TKOF AND THEN WRITE UP THE AIRPLANE AT BOI, OUR DEST. MAINT AND I AGREED TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION AND WE LEFT PIH WITH 3 LESS PAX USING 68% DRY. WHEN WE GOT TO BOI, I WROTE UP THE AIRPLANE. AFTER HAVING A COUPLE OF DAYS TO REFLECT AND SOME RECURRENT TRNING, I CLEARLY SEE WHERE THE MISTAKES WERE MADE. #1--ONE TKOF ABORT WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT. #2--I MISUNDERSTOOD FAR 135.179, I SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN MAINT TO RSI THE AIRPLANE PER THE MEL OVER THE PHONE WHILE I MADE THE APPROPRIATE ENTRIES IN THE MAINT LOG. WX FOR MOST OF THE DAY HAD BEEN HOT--LOW HUNDREDS--AND THIS FLT WAS OUR LAST OF AN 8 LEG DAY. I FEEL THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION AS TO INTERPRETATION OF LEGALITIES, AT NO TIME DURING THIS FLT WAS SAFETY COMPROMISED. IF THE FAA SHOULD DECIDE TO PRESS THIS CASE, IT WOULD DO SO OVER A MATTER OF COMPLIANCE RATHER THAN SAFETY. I HAVE RECOMMENDED TO TRNING DEPT THAT, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE OURS TO BE ONE OF THE BEST TRNING FACS, WE SPEND MORE TIME DURING RECURRENT GND SCHOOLS IN THE FLT OPS MANUAL AND THE FAR'S.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.