37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 892379 |
Time | |
Date | 201006 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Parked Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80 Flight Crew Total 20000 Flight Crew Type 3000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I am writing about two concerns. How and who flies maintenance ferry flights and continued concern about a published system fault reset procedure outlined in the flight manual that cannot be accomplished due to the permanent disabling of a switch by heavy safety wire. I was assigned a 'reposition' flight. This turned out to be a maintenance ferry flight being conducted under far part 91. The flight was for corrosion in excess of limits in the galley floor structure. The flight was to arrive after the tower closed. Upon taxi-in the airplane annunciated several faults; including APU bleed fault; hydraulic reservoir overheat; avionics cooling fault and uncommanded evacuation horn. The flight operations manual (fom) stipulates line pilots may fly maintenance ferry flights provided it can be operated within the flight manual; MEL; and cdl. It then stipulates that a special flight permit (part 91) flight will be issued for flights that 'may' not meet MEL/cdl requirements. I was assured by the operations manager and dispatch that I was authorized to conduct this flight; however I believe these two statements are in contradiction to each other... And that line pilots should not be conducting special flight permit flights. These flights are operated under far part 91; and whereas our fom provides guidance for no-tower operations for charter flights; it provides no guidance for ferry flights into non-tower airports. In particular; this flight was for a corrosion issue that appeared non-critical; but upon arrival the airplane exhibited several faults that may have been related to the reason for the ferry flight (corrosion due to spills in galley). Had these faults occurred in flight it would have been a much more serious problem. On arrival; unlike a charter flight with a charter kit -- we were provided very limited information as to where to park the aircraft or how to get to our hotel. The ground crew did not provide a 'follow me' vehicle as we were told via ACARS. The crew used non-standard hand signals with no wands. They approached the aircraft without communicating to us and placed a stairway to the aircraft and then did not open the door. As we were parking; several faults began appearing; including uncommanded evacuate/evacuation horn. Per a previous note the procedure cannot be performed as the switch is permanently hard wired in the capt/purser position. I continue to feel strongly this tool should be available to the captain in the event of a fault to silence the horn to allow the cids fault reset to be performed in a quieter and less stressful environment. I believe in particular this flight should have been an engineering crew; and all part 91 maintenance flights in general should be non line pilots. Absent that; a 'charter' kit should be provided with all the applicable information.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An A320 Captain reported conducting a maintenance ferry flight to a non Tower airport late at night. After landing he found MEL/CDL discrepancies which may have required an engineering crew to fly the flight according to the Company's policy.
Narrative: I am writing about two concerns. How and who flies maintenance ferry flights and continued concern about a published system fault reset procedure outlined in the Flight Manual that cannot be accomplished due to the permanent disabling of a switch by heavy safety wire. I was assigned a 'reposition' flight. This turned out to be a maintenance ferry flight being conducted under FAR Part 91. The flight was for corrosion in excess of limits in the galley floor structure. The flight was to arrive after the Tower closed. Upon taxi-in the airplane annunciated several faults; including APU Bleed Fault; Hydraulic Reservoir Overheat; Avionics Cooling Fault and uncommanded Evacuation Horn. The Flight Operations Manual (FOM) stipulates line pilots may fly maintenance ferry flights provided it can be operated within the Flight Manual; MEL; and CDL. It then stipulates that a special flight permit (Part 91) flight will be issued for flights that 'MAY' not meet MEL/CDL requirements. I was assured by the Operations Manager and Dispatch that I was authorized to conduct this flight; however I believe these two statements are in contradiction to each other... and that line pilots should not be conducting Special Flight Permit flights. These flights are operated under FAR Part 91; and whereas our FOM provides guidance for no-tower operations for charter flights; it provides no guidance for ferry flights into non-tower airports. In particular; this flight was for a corrosion issue that appeared non-critical; but upon arrival the airplane exhibited several faults that may have been related to the reason for the ferry flight (corrosion due to spills in galley). Had these faults occurred in flight it would have been a much more serious problem. On arrival; unlike a charter flight with a charter kit -- we were provided very limited information as to where to park the aircraft or how to get to our hotel. The ground crew did not provide a 'follow me' vehicle as we were told via ACARS. The crew used non-standard hand signals with no wands. They approached the aircraft without communicating to us and placed a stairway to the aircraft and then did not open the door. As we were parking; several faults began appearing; including uncommanded EVAC horn. Per a previous note the procedure cannot be performed as the switch is permanently hard wired in the Capt/Purser position. I continue to feel strongly this tool should be available to the Captain in the event of a fault to silence the horn to allow the CIDS fault reset to be performed in a quieter and less stressful environment. I believe in particular this flight should have been an Engineering crew; and all Part 91 maintenance flights in general should be non line pilots. Absent that; a 'charter' kit should be provided with all the applicable information.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.