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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 892400 |
Time | |
Date | 201006 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Nose Gear Tire |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe |
Narrative:
Upon arrival at aircraft during a [plane] swap; discovered cords showing on left nose gear tire. Maintenance was contacted and they advised they would send a mechanic to evaluate it. We left the aircraft for a short time and when we returned; observed that the tire had not been changed. The flight attendant had remained with the aircraft and told us the mechanic had been there; looked at the tire and had taken the aircraft logbook to signoff the discrepancy. I examined the tire more closely to determine if I was comfortable with not having the tire changed and discovered a second area of wear that included a split in the rubber that was located near the ground in the middle of the tire.I contacted maintenance control again to inquire why the tire was not being changed and was told that a maintenance bulletin allowed one additional revenue flight to a maintenance base. I told him about the other worn area and he told me to show it to the mechanic when he returned with the logbook. I pointed out the second area to the mechanic (he hadn't inspected the tire closely enough to discover it the first time) and he contacted our company maintenance again.the mechanic was apparently instructed to measure the depth and size of the split and determined that the tire was still serviceable according the maintenance bulletin. I made a second logbook entry concerning the second area of wear and the mechanic signed it off. The mechanic stated that cords were visible in the second area; but it had not yet progressed as far as the first. Although I had reservations about the validity of what had happened; I accepted the sign-off after determining that no rain or excessive wind would be present for take-off in or landing. The take-off and landing were uneventful; although rain that was not forecast and a wet runway were present upon arrival.after arriving at the gate; three company mechanics were waiting to take the aircraft to the hangar. When they examined the tire; all three stated that it never should have been signed-off; and that they would not have let it go; maintenance bulletin or not.I believe that maintenance controllers are either independently opting; or bowing to pressure from upper level management; to defer or sign-off maintenance discrepancies in order to maintain the integrity of the schedule and to not incur outstation maintenance costs. Safety is the stated goal of the airline; but it seems as though it is only an afterthought with some of the departments. The lack of a safety first attitude was evidenced by the maintenance controller's initial response to my call; 'oh; and one leg to go.' secondly; I feel that he steered or pressured the mechanic at our departure airport to make the sign-off; through the use of the maintenance bulletin and subsequent telephone conversations.all departments should unquestioningly err on the side of safety without weighing the cost of the action or the efficiency of the operation. If every person adhered to this philosophy; flight crews would not have to make considered decisions regarding whether or not to operate a flight without a given repair being made. Had the tire been changed when it was first brought to the attention of the maintenance department; the potential compromise to safety and the resultant delay of 12 minutes would not have occurred.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A Captain reports that his company Maintenance Controllers are either independently opting or bowing to pressure from upper level management to defer or sign-off maintenance discrepancies in order to maintain flight schedules and to not incur outstation maintenance costs. Base Maintenance mechanics informed Captain that a nose tire on his CRJ-200 should have been changed at an outstation.
Narrative: Upon arrival at aircraft during a [plane] swap; discovered cords showing on left nose gear tire. Maintenance was contacted and they advised they would send a Mechanic to evaluate it. We left the aircraft for a short time and when we returned; observed that the tire had not been changed. The Flight Attendant had remained with the aircraft and told us the Mechanic had been there; looked at the tire and had taken the aircraft logbook to signoff the discrepancy. I examined the tire more closely to determine if I was comfortable with not having the tire changed and discovered a second area of wear that included a split in the rubber that was located near the ground in the middle of the tire.I contacted Maintenance Control again to inquire why the tire was not being changed and was told that a Maintenance Bulletin allowed one additional revenue flight to a Maintenance Base. I told him about the other worn area and he told me to show it to the Mechanic when he returned with the Logbook. I pointed out the second area to the Mechanic (he hadn't inspected the tire closely enough to discover it the first time) and he contacted our Company Maintenance again.The Mechanic was apparently instructed to measure the depth and size of the split and determined that the tire was still serviceable according the Maintenance Bulletin. I made a second logbook entry concerning the second area of wear and the Mechanic signed it off. The Mechanic stated that cords were visible in the second area; but it had not yet progressed as far as the first. Although I had reservations about the validity of what had happened; I accepted the sign-off after determining that no rain or excessive wind would be present for take-off in or landing. The take-off and landing were uneventful; although rain that was not forecast and a wet runway were present upon arrival.After arriving at the gate; three Company Mechanics were waiting to take the aircraft to the hangar. When they examined the tire; all three stated that it never should have been signed-off; and that they would not have let it go; Maintenance Bulletin or not.I believe that Maintenance Controllers are either independently opting; or bowing to pressure from upper level management; to defer or sign-off Maintenance discrepancies in order to maintain the integrity of the schedule and to not incur Outstation Maintenance costs. Safety is the stated goal of the airline; but it seems as though it is only an afterthought with some of the departments. The lack of a Safety First attitude was evidenced by the Maintenance Controller's initial response to my call; 'oh; and one leg to go.' Secondly; I feel that he steered or pressured the Mechanic at our departure airport to make the sign-off; through the use of the Maintenance Bulletin and subsequent telephone conversations.All departments should unquestioningly err on the side of safety without weighing the cost of the action or the efficiency of the operation. If every person adhered to this philosophy; flight crews would not have to make considered decisions regarding whether or not to operate a flight without a given repair being made. Had the tire been changed when it was first brought to the attention of the Maintenance Department; the potential compromise to safety and the resultant delay of 12 minutes would not have occurred.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.