Narrative:

Ship was dispatched for this flight after the first aircraft assigned to this flight was taken out of service by maintenance for a cracked heat exchanger after that aircraft was boarded. Ship was dispatched for this flight with the left pack in standby and mid cabin trim air zone inoperative; both on separate MEL cards. As a result; crew control of temperature and airflow valve was limited/compromised. Cabin temperatures were uncomfortable; cockpit temperature miserable during ground operations - 85 degrees F and unmanageable by the crew. With tower clearance to position and hold; the equipment cooling overheat light illuminated. Abnormal heat in the equipment compartment was confirmed by touch of center pedestal adjacent to captain's flight management computer. Pedestal was too hot (uncomfortable) to maintain touch for more than a few seconds. After request for a short delay of takeoff clearance with tower for review of QRH and crew discussion/concurrence; I decided to takeoff to increase differential (airflow) and reduce temperature (with altitude) which would alleviate equipment cooling overheat; undoubtedly; the result of the condition/limitations imposed by maintenance dispatch. On takeoff roll at approximately 110 KTS; catastrophic failure of the left hydraulic system occurred. We lost pressure and quantity instantaneously. Progression of associated EICAS messages followed confirmed by lights on my overhead hydraulic panel. Aborted takeoff at 110-120 KTS while relief pilot communicated with #1 flight attendant for crew and passengers to remain seated. All was under control. Copilot communicated with tower; summoned airport fire and rescue for gear/brake inspection while I cleared runway to an adjacent taxiway where we waited for assistance. We established a discrete frequency for the airport authority and requested runways inspection for possible debris/contamination with them. Finally [we were] accompanied to gate uneventfully by airport fire and rescue after inspection. I was faced with a series of bad choices because the airplane was dispatched with limitations; legal but imprudent. Because we can doesn't mean we should be dispatching airplanes with these limitations. Absent the temperature control issues with the airplane; a catastrophic failure of a hydraulic system on takeoff roll did not need to result in an aborted takeoff. However had I continued the takeoff; I would have had to remain at a relatively low altitude to prepare for a night overweight landing and return to the airport. The excessive temperature in the electronics compartment could not have been addressed without differential pressure (increased flow) and decreased temperature (at altitude). Had any electronics started failing due to overheat while we prepared aircraft and passengers for a night overweight landing; I may have had a much worse outcome than the damage the aircraft sustained during the aborted takeoff. The suggestion resolution: fix these airplanes and do not dispatch until fixed. Because we can doesn't mean we should -- this scenario could have easily resulted in an unnecessary evacuation or worse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 Captain rejected a takeoff at 110 KTS after a catastrophic hydraulic system failure. The Equipment Overheat light was also illuminated because of an air conditioning MEL and the Captain did not want to be airborne with multiple malfunctions.

Narrative: Ship was dispatched for this flight after the first aircraft assigned to this flight was taken out of service by Maintenance for a cracked heat exchanger after that aircraft was boarded. Ship was dispatched for this flight with the left pack in standby and mid cabin trim air zone inoperative; both on separate MEL cards. As a result; crew control of temperature and airflow valve was limited/compromised. Cabin temperatures were uncomfortable; cockpit temperature miserable during ground operations - 85 degrees F and unmanageable by the crew. With Tower clearance to position and hold; the equipment cooling overheat light illuminated. Abnormal heat in the equipment compartment was confirmed by touch of center pedestal adjacent to Captain's flight management computer. Pedestal was too hot (uncomfortable) to maintain touch for more than a few seconds. After request for a short delay of takeoff clearance with Tower for review of QRH and crew discussion/concurrence; I decided to takeoff to increase differential (airflow) and reduce temperature (with altitude) which would alleviate equipment cooling overheat; undoubtedly; the result of the condition/limitations imposed by Maintenance Dispatch. On takeoff roll at approximately 110 KTS; catastrophic failure of the left hydraulic system occurred. We lost pressure and quantity instantaneously. Progression of associated EICAS messages followed confirmed by lights on my overhead hydraulic panel. Aborted takeoff at 110-120 KTS while Relief Pilot communicated with #1 Flight Attendant for crew and passengers to remain seated. All was under control. Copilot communicated with Tower; summoned Airport Fire and Rescue for gear/brake inspection while I cleared runway to an adjacent taxiway where we waited for assistance. We established a discrete frequency for the airport authority and requested runways inspection for possible debris/contamination with them. Finally [we were] accompanied to gate uneventfully by Airport Fire and Rescue after inspection. I was faced with a series of bad choices because the airplane was dispatched with limitations; legal but imprudent. Because we can doesn't mean we should be dispatching airplanes with these limitations. Absent the temperature control issues with the airplane; a catastrophic failure of a hydraulic system on takeoff roll did not need to result in an aborted takeoff. However had I continued the takeoff; I would have had to remain at a relatively low altitude to prepare for a night overweight landing and return to the airport. The excessive temperature in the electronics compartment could not have been addressed without differential pressure (increased flow) and decreased temperature (at altitude). Had any electronics started failing due to overheat while we prepared aircraft and passengers for a night overweight landing; I may have had a much worse outcome than the damage the aircraft sustained during the aborted takeoff. The suggestion resolution: FIX THESE AIRPLANES AND DO NOT DISPATCH UNTIL FIXED. Because we can doesn't mean we should -- this scenario could have easily resulted in an unnecessary evacuation or worse.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.