Narrative:

During the preflight; first officer and mechanics simultaneously notice a sizeable hydraulic leak from the brake assembly of wheel 2R. Maintenance determined that one of the brake cylinders was leaking; and that the brake would have to be replaced. A mechanic (not a supervisor) in the cockpit mentioned that the brake could be deactivated and deferred. Without looking up the penalty; I stated that if needed we would refuse the aircraft in order to help the repair get started more expeditiously instead of messing around deciding whether or not it could be deferred. This refusal decision was solely based on our takeoff weight at max certificated TOGW; which was also the runway limit for the longest runway. Not to mention a brake inoperative landing [at our destination] (elevation 2500') or the subsequent takeoff or potential refusal. (By the way; the takeoff weight penalty would have been 80;000# - that's all the passengers and cargo and a third of the gas; or we could have made three fuel stops.) the mechanic and I agreed that it would help eliminate the messing around if I just called dispatch and had him issue a refusal meter for the brake deactivated. This was done in ninety seconds. The brake change itself took exactly one hour as promised. I did not get any south&H green stamps though. During this process; [the station] assistant chief pilot came to the cockpit to inquire about the refusal. This appears to be standard operating procedures now that a management plot comes to the cockpit to inquire about a refusal. We discussed the situation and explained the refusal being about heading off further delay and angst about an item that should not be deferred. Four problems here yet again: 1. The mentality in line maintenance is that in order to get it fixed at a maintenance base it must be refused. This is not what the MEL was originally created for. 2. The fact that a management pilot comes to the cockpit of a jet that was refused. Friendly or not; intimidation is intimidation. Then people feel threatened; anger builds up; just what I want before a runway-limited mgtow takeoff. 3. The fact that flight operations management tracks captains by refusals; again; intimidation. 4. That after five years of countless [reports] like this; this still takes place. Will anything ever change around here?

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 Captain reported encountering what he termed intimidation when he insisted a brake be replaced rather than deferred prior to departure.

Narrative: During the preflight; First Officer and mechanics simultaneously notice a sizeable hydraulic leak from the brake assembly of wheel 2R. Maintenance determined that one of the brake cylinders was leaking; and that the brake would have to be replaced. A mechanic (not a supervisor) in the cockpit mentioned that the brake could be deactivated and deferred. Without looking up the penalty; I stated that if needed we would refuse the aircraft in order to help the repair get started more expeditiously instead of messing around deciding whether or not it could be deferred. This refusal decision was solely based on our takeoff weight at max certificated TOGW; which was also the runway limit for the longest runway. Not to mention a brake inoperative landing [at our destination] (elevation 2500') or the subsequent takeoff or potential refusal. (By the way; the takeoff weight penalty would have been 80;000# - that's all the passengers and cargo and a third of the gas; or we could have made three fuel stops.) The mechanic and I agreed that it would help eliminate the messing around if I just called Dispatch and had him issue a refusal meter for the brake deactivated. This was done in ninety seconds. The brake change itself took exactly one hour as promised. I did not get any S&H Green Stamps though. During this process; [the station] Assistant Chief Pilot came to the cockpit to inquire about the refusal. This appears to be standard operating procedures now that a management plot comes to the cockpit to inquire about a refusal. We discussed the situation and explained the refusal being about heading off further delay and angst about an item that should not be deferred. Four problems here YET AGAIN: 1. The mentality in line maintenance is that in order to get it fixed at a maintenance base it must be refused. This is not what the MEL was originally created for. 2. The fact that a management pilot comes to the cockpit of a jet that was refused. Friendly or not; intimidation is intimidation. Then people feel threatened; anger builds up; just what I want before a runway-limited MGTOW takeoff. 3. The fact that Flight Operations management tracks Captains by refusals; again; intimidation. 4. That after five years of countless [reports] like this; this still takes place. Will anything ever change around here?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.