37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 89674 |
Time | |
Date | 198806 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : ubg |
State Reference | OR |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 36500 msl bound upper : 37000 |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zse |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : flight data |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller military : 6 controller non radar : 2 controller radar : 5 |
ASRS Report | 89674 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | atc equipment other atc equipment : unspecified other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance none taken : insufficient time other |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 22200 vertical : 500 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
I was working the D side on sector 42/46 combined as one sector. Small transport X was being followed by medium large transport Y both aircraft with an assigned altitude of FL370. At approximately XA29, I as d-side asked r-side what we had going and asked why does the a-area do this to us. The right side acknowledged my comments and acted unconcerned. I thought he had stopped medium large transport Y at FL330 and had not entered an interim altitude. At XA32 the immediate alert sounded and the r-side immediately issued diverging headings to both aircraft. At the time, we were metering arrs and a lot of energy was being diverted to mental calculations associated with meeting times at outer fixes in sector 46. My recommendation is that transferring controller do one of 3 things with a significant overtake situation: altitude stop one of the aircraft, assign diverging headings to aircraft or call receiving controller and alert him to the developing situation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed following. Reporter was not directly involved in the system error. After investigation, it was determined that the radar controller in sector 42/46 was only partially at fault for this loss of sep. Part of the error was given to the sending controller for not doing one of the three things recommended by reporter. The proximity of traffic was ascertained, as well as reporter's experience level. Reporter stated that the difference in speed of these 2 act was 120 KTS, and that the loss of sep occurred 3 minutes after the transfer of control took place.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CPR SMT OVERTAKEN BY ACR MLG AT SAME ALT RESULTING IN LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION.
Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE D SIDE ON SECTOR 42/46 COMBINED AS ONE SECTOR. SMT X WAS BEING FOLLOWED BY MLG Y BOTH ACFT WITH AN ASSIGNED ALT OF FL370. AT APPROX XA29, I AS D-SIDE ASKED R-SIDE WHAT WE HAD GOING AND ASKED WHY DOES THE A-AREA DO THIS TO US. THE R SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED MY COMMENTS AND ACTED UNCONCERNED. I THOUGHT HE HAD STOPPED MLG Y AT FL330 AND HAD NOT ENTERED AN INTERIM ALT. AT XA32 THE IMMEDIATE ALERT SOUNDED AND THE R-SIDE IMMEDIATELY ISSUED DIVERGING HDGS TO BOTH ACFT. AT THE TIME, WE WERE METERING ARRS AND A LOT OF ENERGY WAS BEING DIVERTED TO MENTAL CALCULATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH MEETING TIMES AT OUTER FIXES IN SECTOR 46. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT TRANSFERRING CTLR DO ONE OF 3 THINGS WITH A SIGNIFICANT OVERTAKE SITUATION: ALT STOP ONE OF THE ACFT, ASSIGN DIVERGING HDGS TO ACFT OR CALL RECEIVING CTLR AND ALERT HIM TO THE DEVELOPING SITUATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED FOLLOWING. RPTR WAS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE SYS ERROR. AFTER INVESTIGATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE RADAR CTLR IN SECTOR 42/46 WAS ONLY PARTIALLY AT FAULT FOR THIS LOSS OF SEP. PART OF THE ERROR WAS GIVEN TO THE SENDING CTLR FOR NOT DOING ONE OF THE THREE THINGS RECOMMENDED BY RPTR. THE PROX OF TFC WAS ASCERTAINED, AS WELL AS RPTR'S EXPERIENCE LEVEL. RPTR STATED THAT THE DIFFERENCE IN SPD OF THESE 2 ACT WAS 120 KTS, AND THAT THE LOSS OF SEP OCCURRED 3 MINUTES AFTER THE TRANSFER OF CTL TOOK PLACE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.