37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
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Attributes | |
ACN | 89696 |
Time | |
Date | 198806 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : 0o1 airport : mer |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 3700 msl bound upper : 3700 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : mer |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : private |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 32 flight time total : 1134 flight time type : 183 |
ASRS Report | 89696 |
Person 2 | |
Function | other personnel other |
Qualification | pilot : private |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : nmac |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : insufficient time |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 300 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Climbing through 1000' I put on my foggles, reminding my safety pilot that he had the outside of the aircraft. (Note: visibility had been reported as 10 mi, but looking westerly into the haze, it was much less.) my clearance from castle approach was to climb to 6000' via radar vectors to V23. Moments before the incident, a castle controller (on 124.8) instructed me to contact castle approach on 126.5. At this point no traffic advisories had been given to me. As I leaned slightly to change frequencys, out of the corner of my foggles I noticed something. I looked up and saw an small aircraft between 1-2 O'clock, at our same altitude, in level flight about 300' away, opp direction. My safety pilot saw it about the same moment I did. I had no time to take evasive action and I did not observe any evasive action and I did not observe any evasive action on the part of the small aircraft. I then reported in with the controller to which I was being handed off. When I asked her why I was not warned of the traffic, she stated that she was not required to maintain sep between IFR and VFR traffic. I told her I agreed. I told her that the other aircraft was obviously in the arsa and that I assumed castle approach was talking to him. She stated that they were not, and that the other targets (VFR west/O mode C) were assumed to be outside the arsa. That is why she felt no need to warn me of the traffic. After my return flight to merced, I talked to the operations chief at castle on the phone and we seemed to agree on what happened and how. He offered no solution to the problem, however. I would make the following observations/recommendations: controllers be strongly encouraged or required to give traffic advisories to IFR flts within the arsa. The controller who handed me off should have first warned me of the traffic. Mode C transponders be required on all aircraft, especially those aircraft flying in, near, or above an arsa. I will delay putting my foggles on until after I have climbed out of the haze/until after I reach cruising altitude. (Note: at 6000' MSL, my cruise altitude, visibility was much better than at lower altitudes.) in the future, I will try to take 2 safety pilots along when I practice simulated instrument flight.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: NMAC WITH SMA ACFT TRANSITING THE ARSA WITHOUT CONTACT WITH TRACON.
Narrative: CLBING THROUGH 1000' I PUT ON MY FOGGLES, REMINDING MY SAFETY PLT THAT HE HAD THE OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT. (NOTE: VIS HAD BEEN RPTED AS 10 MI, BUT LOOKING WESTERLY INTO THE HAZE, IT WAS MUCH LESS.) MY CLRNC FROM CASTLE APCH WAS TO CLB TO 6000' VIA RADAR VECTORS TO V23. MOMENTS BEFORE THE INCIDENT, A CASTLE CTLR (ON 124.8) INSTRUCTED ME TO CONTACT CASTLE APCH ON 126.5. AT THIS POINT NO TFC ADVISORIES HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ME. AS I LEANED SLIGHTLY TO CHANGE FREQS, OUT OF THE CORNER OF MY FOGGLES I NOTICED SOMETHING. I LOOKED UP AND SAW AN SMA BTWN 1-2 O'CLOCK, AT OUR SAME ALT, IN LEVEL FLT ABOUT 300' AWAY, OPP DIRECTION. MY SAFETY PLT SAW IT ABOUT THE SAME MOMENT I DID. I HAD NO TIME TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION AND I DID NOT OBSERVE ANY EVASIVE ACTION AND I DID NOT OBSERVE ANY EVASIVE ACTION ON THE PART OF THE SMA. I THEN RPTED IN WITH THE CTLR TO WHICH I WAS BEING HANDED OFF. WHEN I ASKED HER WHY I WAS NOT WARNED OF THE TFC, SHE STATED THAT SHE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SEP BTWN IFR AND VFR TFC. I TOLD HER I AGREED. I TOLD HER THAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS OBVIOUSLY IN THE ARSA AND THAT I ASSUMED CASTLE APCH WAS TALKING TO HIM. SHE STATED THAT THEY WERE NOT, AND THAT THE OTHER TARGETS (VFR W/O MODE C) WERE ASSUMED TO BE OUTSIDE THE ARSA. THAT IS WHY SHE FELT NO NEED TO WARN ME OF THE TFC. AFTER MY RETURN FLT TO MERCED, I TALKED TO THE OPS CHIEF AT CASTLE ON THE PHONE AND WE SEEMED TO AGREE ON WHAT HAPPENED AND HOW. HE OFFERED NO SOLUTION TO THE PROB, HOWEVER. I WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS: CTLRS BE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED OR REQUIRED TO GIVE TFC ADVISORIES TO IFR FLTS WITHIN THE ARSA. THE CTLR WHO HANDED ME OFF SHOULD HAVE FIRST WARNED ME OF THE TFC. MODE C TRANSPONDERS BE REQUIRED ON ALL ACFT, ESPECIALLY THOSE ACFT FLYING IN, NEAR, OR ABOVE AN ARSA. I WILL DELAY PUTTING MY FOGGLES ON UNTIL AFTER I HAVE CLBED OUT OF THE HAZE/UNTIL AFTER I REACH CRUISING ALT. (NOTE: AT 6000' MSL, MY CRUISE ALT, VIS WAS MUCH BETTER THAN AT LOWER ALTS.) IN THE FUTURE, I WILL TRY TO TAKE 2 SAFETY PLTS ALONG WHEN I PRACTICE SIMULATED INSTRUMENT FLT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.