37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 897509 |
Time | |
Date | 201007 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Flap Vane |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
This event was a trailing edge (te) flap disagree malfunction; which lead to B757 QRH checklist involuntary non-compliance. At approximately 1;600 ft AGL on the visual approach we received an EICAS message te flap disagree along with a te flap light. As pilot flying I suggested a go-around with the present configuration (gear down and 25 flaps) to allow the configuration warning system to remain silent and to facilitate the accomplishment of the te flap disagree checklist. The captain agreed and we went around to setup for vectors to work the appropriate checklist. Once we were established at 5;000 ft and approximately 150 KTS; the captain began working the checklist; communicating with flight attendants and apparently making a PA. While the captain was doing this I was simply flying the airplane and trying to back up the captain on the checklist. I made some inputs to try to help the captain but among much distraction my inputs were not acknowledged or were not agreed with. The captain configured the airplane to 20 degrees of flaps with the alternate system which caught me off guard since my speed was not appropriate for this flap setting then set flaps 25 and finally 30 using the alternate system. With 30 flaps out we elected to land as an emergency and have the arff meet us for an inspection. The landing was uneventful and we taxied to the gate.as the captain and I had a chance to debrief; we disagreed on the appropriate checklist procedure for the emergency and its implementation. This report is to inform that some steps in the application of the checklist in flight were; in my opinion; involuntarily left out and others were done without concurrence or acknowledgment between crew members.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B757 First Officer reports lack of coordination and communication between flight crew during the application of a QRH procedure for TE Flap Disagree. After a go-around the flight landed with flaps 30 using the alternate flap selector; which the reporter believes is not in compliance with the QRH procedure.
Narrative: This event was a Trailing Edge (TE) Flap Disagree malfunction; which lead to B757 QRH checklist involuntary non-compliance. At approximately 1;600 FT AGL on the visual approach we received an EICAS message TE Flap Disagree along with a TE Flap light. As pilot flying I suggested a go-around with the present configuration (gear down and 25 flaps) to allow the configuration warning system to remain silent and to facilitate the accomplishment of the TE Flap disagree checklist. The Captain agreed and we went around to setup for vectors to work the appropriate checklist. Once we were established at 5;000 FT and approximately 150 KTS; the Captain began working the checklist; communicating with flight attendants and apparently making a PA. While the Captain was doing this I was simply flying the airplane and trying to back up the Captain on the checklist. I made some inputs to try to help the Captain but among much distraction my inputs were not acknowledged or were not agreed with. The Captain configured the airplane to 20 degrees of flaps with the alternate system which caught me off guard since my speed was not appropriate for this flap setting then set flaps 25 and finally 30 using the alternate system. With 30 flaps out we elected to land as an emergency and have the ARFF meet us for an inspection. The landing was uneventful and we taxied to the gate.As the Captain and I had a chance to debrief; we disagreed on the appropriate checklist procedure for the emergency and its implementation. This report is to inform that some steps in the application of the checklist in flight were; in my opinion; involuntarily left out and others were done without concurrence or acknowledgment between crew members.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.