Narrative:

Aircraft refused due to repeated unresolved aileron lockout discrepancies and unacceptable MEL restrictions. Upon arrival at the gate we discovered our airplane was still at the hanger undergoing maintenance. Although I had check on the computer prior to leaving the hotel; the only information available to me is that the airplane is at the airport. When maintenance has control of the airplane and we are generally kept out of the loop as to the aircraft status until it is brought to the gate for departure. It turned out to be a hydraulic leak discovered and repaired. Just prior to departure after I turned on the hydraulic system per checklist we noticed an aileron lockout EICAS caution. After calling maintenance again and informing the passengers of a (seemingly) small problem we waited for mechanics to arrive. At this point I expected an electronic glitch. I referred to the MEL EICAS message references and noted aileron lockout. . . None. The first mechanic arrived and we began trouble shooting; with hydraulics and flight controls but to no avail. The next mechanic arrived and got on the phone to research the issue. It turned out this problem had been written up 3 times in the last 15 days and most recently caused a ground interrupt. Most importantly the new mechanic who would be authorizing the airworthiness said he was refusing to sign off the airplane and was taking it out of service. After a phone conversation he informed me a maintenance supervisor would be out shortly to discuss the issue with me. When the supervisor arrived we could see clearly out to the ramp what appeared to be heated discussion and the refusing mechanic was motioned away from the airplane. During all of this I was doing my best to keep the passengers informed of the proceedings as they had now been on the plane well over an hour. The supervisor introduced himself and indicated the aircraft was being placarded and was suitable to fly. When queried about the other mechanics refusal to sign off the aircraft and the repeated unresolved discrepancies he replied he doesn't know what he's talking about. According to the supervisor the aircraft was allowed to fly if it had three legs without a repeat of the alert; the 3 leg rule. Coincidently we knew the aircraft had 3 legs prior to this one. I informed him that if it was legal and the caution cleared I would take the flight. It then became clear his intent was to placard the entire system or the indicating system per MEL 27-14 not referenced in the index. I had previously spoken to our dispatcher about finding a replacement aircraft if this one went out of service. He informed me he didn't want to tell me what to do but that it would be legal with MEL restrictions of 270 KTS and .73 mach flight planned at FL240 and that he didn't think turbulence would be an issue. I told him I wasn't comfortable with FL240 and 270 KTS is below our turbulence speed of 290/.78 and it was unlikely on a flight well over 6 hours at FL240 not to encounter any turbulence. I got the impression his flight planning was going to require manual modifications when I queried him about the details and I told him I would call back rather to continue to wait on hold. I hung up and spoke to him after my conversation with the maintenance supervisor. With my later dispatcher conversation he had a flight plan which legally worked. Meanwhile I had been attempting to contact the chief pilot on duty for the weekend but the line had been busy. I then called the cell phone of my base chief pilot who as it turned out was the duty chief for the weekend. I gave him a brief summary with pertinent details and informed him I was not comfortable taking this flight. He said it was my call but to keep in mind the inconvenience to the customers. Indeed I had been keeping them in mind as I myself wanted to get home too. In fact the reason we had taken so long is my hope things could be resolved. I chose to refuse the aircraft due to repeated unresolved aileron lockout discrepancies and unacceptable MEL restrictions. At this point the first officer informed me that passengers had been on board nearly 2 hours. I directed the gate agent and ramp tower that they should be deplaned for their own comfort until our maintenance issues could be resolved or another aircraft found. I made a PA relaying the same information. I found out later the flight cancelled. In retrospect legal minimums are not always the best option. On a VFR transcontinental you could accept 45 minute reserve fuel and be legal; but I don't. Supervisory personnel overriding a line mechanic to a lesser level of safety is an [action that] makes me uneasy even though legal. The MEL index referencing none; yet in the systems portion being able to be completely inoperative is contradicting and confusing at best.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 Captain refused an aircraft with an AILERON LOCKOUT indication which was a repeat item. A Line Mechanic refused to sign it off but a Supervisor attempted to MEL it and dispatch the aircraft at FL240 and 270 KTS which is below turbulence speed.

Narrative: Aircraft refused due to repeated unresolved Aileron Lockout discrepancies and unacceptable MEL restrictions. Upon arrival at the gate we discovered our airplane was still at the hanger undergoing maintenance. Although I had check on the computer prior to leaving the hotel; the only information available to me is that the airplane is at the airport. When maintenance has control of the airplane and we are generally kept out of the loop as to the aircraft status until it is brought to the gate for departure. It turned out to be a hydraulic leak discovered and repaired. Just prior to departure after I turned on the hydraulic system per checklist we noticed an Aileron Lockout EICAS Caution. After calling maintenance again and informing the passengers of a (seemingly) small problem we waited for mechanics to arrive. At this point I expected an electronic glitch. I referred to the MEL EICAS message references and noted AILERON LOCKOUT. . . NONE. The first mechanic arrived and we began trouble shooting; with hydraulics and flight controls but to no avail. The next mechanic arrived and got on the phone to research the issue. It turned out this problem had been written up 3 times in the last 15 days and most recently caused a ground interrupt. Most importantly the new mechanic who would be authorizing the airworthiness said he was refusing to sign off the airplane and was taking it out of service. After a phone conversation he informed me a Maintenance Supervisor would be out shortly to discuss the issue with me. When the Supervisor arrived we could see clearly out to the ramp what appeared to be heated discussion and the refusing mechanic was motioned away from the airplane. During all of this I was doing my best to keep the passengers informed of the proceedings as they had now been on the plane well over an hour. The Supervisor introduced himself and indicated the aircraft was being placarded and was suitable to fly. When queried about the other mechanics refusal to sign off the aircraft and the repeated unresolved discrepancies he replied he doesn't know what he's talking about. According to the Supervisor the aircraft was allowed to fly if it had three legs without a repeat of the alert; the 3 leg rule. Coincidently we knew the aircraft had 3 legs prior to this one. I informed him that if it was legal and the caution cleared I would take the flight. It then became clear his intent was to placard the entire system or the indicating system per MEL 27-14 not referenced in the index. I had previously spoken to our Dispatcher about finding a replacement aircraft if this one went out of service. He informed me he didn't want to tell me what to do but that it would be legal with MEL restrictions of 270 KTS and .73 Mach flight planned at FL240 and that he didn't think turbulence would be an issue. I told him I wasn't comfortable with FL240 and 270 KTS is below our turbulence speed of 290/.78 and it was unlikely on a flight well over 6 hours at FL240 not to encounter any turbulence. I got the impression his flight planning was going to require manual modifications when I queried him about the details and I told him I would call back rather to continue to wait on hold. I hung up and spoke to him after my conversation with the Maintenance Supervisor. With my later Dispatcher conversation he had a flight plan which legally worked. Meanwhile I had been attempting to contact the Chief Pilot on Duty for the weekend but the line had been busy. I then called the cell phone of my base Chief Pilot who as it turned out was the Duty Chief for the weekend. I gave him a brief summary with pertinent details and informed him I was not comfortable taking this flight. He said it was my call but to keep in mind the inconvenience to the customers. Indeed I had been keeping them in mind as I myself wanted to get home too. In fact the reason we had taken so long is my hope things could be resolved. I chose to refuse the aircraft due to repeated unresolved Aileron Lockout discrepancies and unacceptable MEL restrictions. At this point the First Officer informed me that passengers had been on board nearly 2 hours. I directed the Gate Agent and Ramp Tower that they should be deplaned for their own comfort until our maintenance issues could be resolved or another aircraft found. I made a PA relaying the same information. I found out later the flight cancelled. In retrospect legal minimums are not always the best option. On a VFR transcontinental you could accept 45 minute reserve fuel and be legal; but I don't. Supervisory personnel overriding a line mechanic to a lesser level of safety is an [action that] makes me uneasy even though legal. The MEL Index referencing NONE; yet in the Systems portion being able to be completely inoperative is contradicting and confusing at best.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.