Narrative:

Mdt X departed cys runway 30 on direct route to shr. I was working local control and observed the approach controller and the facility manager, who was training on approach, discuss sep procedures to be used between mdt X and small transport Y, who was overflying cys. I believe small transport Y was also on a direct route. The 2 controllers discussed how the 2 aircraft would be considered on the same route and then discussed utilizing the 22 KT rule. As I was listening to them discuss this rule it occurred to me that that would be a level transition and that you cannot use the 22 KT rule with a departure in the lead because he is a climbing aircraft and therefore not 22 KTS faster, as mdt X was the departure. However, since I am training on approach, I felt maybe I was wrong and said nothing. I heard the approach controller trnee (supervisor) clear mdt X to climb to FL200 or FL220 after asking small transport Y 'say DME,' which small transport Y responded. Next ZDV called, sector 22 and apparently advised that there was not adequate sep. I observed trnee issuing traffic to small transport Y in the mdt X and then calling ZDV sector 22 controller back and saying that the small transport Y had visual sep with the mdt X. There was apparently only 1/3 mi between the 2 aircraft when mdt X climbed through the altitude of small transport Y. Factors contributing to this system error: wrong understanding of the 22 KT rule from the 7110.65, wrong interpretation of visual sep--visual sep must have another sep before and after applying it, approach controller and trnee (supervisor) lack of knowledge on approach control procedures, approach controller's not verifying the position of small transport Y and the fpl controller training the supervisor did not step in when he should have to stop this almost critical situation (however, since he initiated the application of his interpretation of the 22 KT rule, I doubt he could have known this situation was arising). Supplemental information from acn 90049: on 6/fri/88 I was off work, however heard that this had happened. I also heard that this had been reported. However, since this is a very dangerous situation, I felt that I should report it, in the event it hasn't been reported. This must be investigated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CTLR IN TRAINING USED WRONG NON RADAR PROC TO SEPARATE MDT DEP FROM ENROUTE OVERFLT AND HAD LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION.

Narrative: MDT X DEPARTED CYS RWY 30 ON DIRECT ROUTE TO SHR. I WAS WORKING LCL CTL AND OBSERVED THE APCH CTLR AND THE FAC MGR, WHO WAS TRNING ON APCH, DISCUSS SEP PROCS TO BE USED BTWN MDT X AND SMT Y, WHO WAS OVERFLYING CYS. I BELIEVE SMT Y WAS ALSO ON A DIRECT ROUTE. THE 2 CTLRS DISCUSSED HOW THE 2 ACFT WOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THE SAME ROUTE AND THEN DISCUSSED UTILIZING THE 22 KT RULE. AS I WAS LISTENING TO THEM DISCUSS THIS RULE IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT THAT WOULD BE A LEVEL TRANSITION AND THAT YOU CANNOT USE THE 22 KT RULE WITH A DEP IN THE LEAD BECAUSE HE IS A CLBING ACFT AND THEREFORE NOT 22 KTS FASTER, AS MDT X WAS THE DEP. HOWEVER, SINCE I AM TRNING ON APCH, I FELT MAYBE I WAS WRONG AND SAID NOTHING. I HEARD THE APCH CTLR TRNEE (SUPVR) CLR MDT X TO CLB TO FL200 OR FL220 AFTER ASKING SMT Y 'SAY DME,' WHICH SMT Y RESPONDED. NEXT ZDV CALLED, SECTOR 22 AND APPARENTLY ADVISED THAT THERE WAS NOT ADEQUATE SEP. I OBSERVED TRNEE ISSUING TFC TO SMT Y IN THE MDT X AND THEN CALLING ZDV SECTOR 22 CTLR BACK AND SAYING THAT THE SMT Y HAD VISUAL SEP WITH THE MDT X. THERE WAS APPARENTLY ONLY 1/3 MI BTWN THE 2 ACFT WHEN MDT X CLBED THROUGH THE ALT OF SMT Y. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS SYS ERROR: WRONG UNDERSTANDING OF THE 22 KT RULE FROM THE 7110.65, WRONG INTERP OF VISUAL SEP--VISUAL SEP MUST HAVE ANOTHER SEP BEFORE AND AFTER APPLYING IT, APCH CTLR AND TRNEE (SUPVR) LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ON APCH CTL PROCS, APCH CTLR'S NOT VERIFYING THE POS OF SMT Y AND THE FPL CTLR TRNING THE SUPVR DID NOT STEP IN WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE TO STOP THIS ALMOST CRITICAL SITUATION (HOWEVER, SINCE HE INITIATED THE APPLICATION OF HIS INTERP OF THE 22 KT RULE, I DOUBT HE COULD HAVE KNOWN THIS SITUATION WAS ARISING). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 90049: ON 6/FRI/88 I WAS OFF WORK, HOWEVER HEARD THAT THIS HAD HAPPENED. I ALSO HEARD THAT THIS HAD BEEN RPTED. HOWEVER, SINCE THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION, I FELT THAT I SHOULD RPT IT, IN THE EVENT IT HASN'T BEEN RPTED. THIS MUST BE INVESTIGATED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.