Narrative:

A B737 departed for bwi into a line of thunderstorms that were about 20 miles south of buf. The B737 checked on frequency; I climbed the aircraft to FL230. The B737 asked to deviate to the right for the storms; which I approved and then initiated a hand off to sector 73 which was combined with sector 70. Sector 70/73 flashed the aircraft to sector 36 and before the aircraft hand off was accepted by sector 36. The B737 advise me he was going direct slt; no longer deviating; so I removed that from the 4th line of the data block. Sector 36 then accepted the hand off and removed the interim altitude and flashed to sector 74. While the aircraft was flashing to sector 74; sector 74 called sector 36 and pointed out a crj at FL270 descending. The sector 36 controller approved the point out; and because the B737 was flashing to sector 74; believed that the sector 74 controller saw the B737; in fact; the sector 74 controller said afterward; that he ran the lines out and believed they were clean. Unfortunately; they weren't; because of all the flash through; I was working the aircraft approximately 30-40 miles from my airspace and 2;000 ft above my airspace. Right before the incident; ZNY center called with a manual hand off on a VFR aircraft which involved both my and my d-sides attention. When my attention was returned the conflict alert was activated and I immediately turned the B737 30 degrees right to avoid an error; which wasn't quite enough. I'm not even going to explain the flash through procedure for two reasons. First it is so patched together that not many people fully understand it. Second it is constantly done incorrectly; the flash through procedure is designed to allow a controller; to flash to the next guy down the line; an aircraft that may just hit a corner of their airspace; thus negating a land line call and decreasing workload. But due to operational errors over the years; management keeps adding and removing rules to handle certain situations thus confusing the issue. Currently; you shouldn't be able to flash through more than once; but the current rules allow for the bfd controller to flash through to the dsv controller who then can flash through to the ont controller who then; depending on direction could flash through to the next guy. If working buf and your attention is drawn away and then you look back and sector 3-4 has the hand off with a completely different altitude then you assigned in the data block; confusing; extremely! I believe this procedure; while not completely to blame; definitely added to the problem. Also; the fact that the sector 74 controller chose to not separate his traffic from a known aircraft; flashing means you can see it; was an issue. Recommendation; I recommend a major re-think of the flash through procedures and airspace in that area. The procedure keeps getting modified to patch deals that have happened because of it; which has made it very choppy and hard to understand. We've had many issues with the procedure amongst these sectors and it has been brought to management's attention many times but management sits on their hands until something happens and then still does nothing. The area has had two deals that were almost collisions. The airspace has 4-5 controllers flashing through without talking to the aircraft. It's a bad design and a bad procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOB Controller described a loss of separation event involving two air carrier aircraft; the reporter claiming the facilities 'flash through' procedure was a contributing factor.

Narrative: A B737 departed for BWI into a line of thunderstorms that were about 20 miles south of BUF. The B737 checked on frequency; I climbed the aircraft to FL230. The B737 asked to deviate to the right for the storms; which I approved and then initiated a hand off to Sector 73 which was combined with Sector 70. Sector 70/73 flashed the aircraft to Sector 36 and before the aircraft hand off was accepted by Sector 36. The B737 advise me he was going direct SLT; no longer deviating; so I removed that from the 4th line of the data block. Sector 36 then accepted the hand off and removed the interim altitude and flashed to Sector 74. While the aircraft was flashing to Sector 74; Sector 74 called Sector 36 and pointed out a CRJ at FL270 descending. The Sector 36 Controller approved the point out; and because the B737 was flashing to Sector 74; believed that the Sector 74 Controller saw the B737; in fact; the Sector 74 Controller said afterward; that he ran the lines out and believed they were clean. Unfortunately; they weren't; because of all the flash through; I was working the aircraft approximately 30-40 miles from my airspace and 2;000 FT above my airspace. Right before the incident; ZNY Center called with a manual hand off on a VFR aircraft which involved both my and my D-Sides attention. When my attention was returned the Conflict Alert was activated and I immediately turned the B737 30 degrees right to avoid an error; which wasn't quite enough. I'm not even going to explain the Flash Through procedure for two reasons. First it is so patched together that not many people fully understand it. Second it is constantly done incorrectly; the flash through procedure is designed to allow a controller; to flash to the next guy down the line; an aircraft that may just hit a corner of their airspace; thus negating a land line call and decreasing workload. But due to Operational Errors over the years; Management keeps adding and removing rules to handle certain situations thus confusing the issue. Currently; you shouldn't be able to flash through more than once; but the current rules allow for the BFD Controller to flash through to the DSV Controller who then can flash through to the ONT Controller who then; depending on direction could flash through to the next guy. If working BUF and your attention is drawn away and then you look back and Sector 3-4 has the hand off with a completely different altitude then you assigned in the data block; confusing; extremely! I believe this procedure; while not completely to blame; definitely added to the problem. Also; the fact that the Sector 74 Controller chose to not separate his traffic from a known aircraft; flashing means you can see it; was an issue. Recommendation; I recommend a major re-think of the flash through procedures and airspace in that area. The procedure keeps getting modified to patch deals that have happened because of it; which has made it very choppy and hard to understand. We've had many issues with the procedure amongst these sectors and it has been brought to management's attention many times but management sits on their hands until something happens and then still does nothing. The area has had two deals that were almost collisions. The airspace has 4-5 controllers flashing through without talking to the aircraft. It's a bad design and a bad procedure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.