37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 900137 |
Time | |
Date | 201007 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZOB.ARTCC |
State Reference | OH |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet CL65 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Person 2 | |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Developmental |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I was working the ontario and warren sectors; (FL240-FL340) combined; with moderate traffic levels. I rated the complexity higher due to the multiple aircraft that were deviating on the frequency before; during; and after the event occurred. The air carrier Y was northbound descending out of FL290 for FL240 and direct to roc airport. My d-side pointed the air carrier Y out to the dsv sector; (FL240-FL320); who in turn approved the point out and the aircraft was flashed on to the bfd sector (FL230 and below). During this time air carrier X was departing the buf airport southeast bound and conducting a deviation; (direction unconfirmed); climbing to FL230. The aircraft was being worked by the buf sector (FL230 and below) and handed the aircraft off to the bfd sector (FL230 and below) who in turn flashed air carrier X to the dsv sector (FL240-FL320). The dsv controller took the hand off; removed the interim altitude and flashed the hand off to me; the ontario sector (FL240-FL340); climbing to FL250. It is currently unknown when the air carrier X was done with the weather deviation and back on course. Although the investigation has yet to reach the quality assurance department at ZOB; the supervisor assigned to the day shift had me view the falcon before my interview. According to the video data on the falcon; the air carrier Y (descending in roc) was pointed out to the dsv sector before the hand off was taken on the air carrier X. Going briefly back to the ontario/warren sector; I was handling multiple deviations simultaneously while issuing weather depicted precipitation to all aircraft entering my sector. After I descended the air carrier Y to FL240; I recognized that the dsv sector (FL240-FL320) was now flashing me the hand off on the air carrier X climbing to FL250. I recall running out my vector lines and saw that the air carrier X was showing to pass well behind the air carrier Y descending and gave it no further thought. After a short period of time; I looked back towards the air carrier X and saw that the aircraft had taken a more east southeast course of flight and was getting tighter with the air carrier Y. At this time both aircraft were in the dsv sector (FL240-FL320) so the most immediate action I thought to be appropriate was to continue an expeditious descent for the air carrier Y that was already in a descent profile. I turned to the bfd controller (FL230 and below) and asked him if I could go lower with the air carrier Y into his altitudes which he replied with an affirmative. I issued the air carrier Y FL220 and asked for an expeditious descent. The air carrier X was not on my frequency for me to issue any control instructions and it was not until later that I learned the air carrier X was still in communications with the buf sector (FL230 and below) and was turned when the conflict alert activated. This event has yet to be reviewed by the quality assurance department so I do not have all the pieces of the puzzle that could help me in providing a solid recommendation to prevent the re-occurrence of this event. However; with limited information and being a controller involved with this event; I would recommend the following: 1. Return area 7 low altitude sectors (dkk and bfd) back to FL270 and below. This event; plus countless other ones; constantly involves aircraft transitioning through the altitudes of FL230-FL260. The ontario sector (FL240-FL280) was poorly designed with 4;000 ft and has become almost completely dependent on other sectors giving lower/higher altitudes and/or approving point outs. Furthermore; in this specific event if the bfd sector had owned FL270 and below; there would have been only one controller talking to the planes from start to finish. Instead we had 4 sectors involved with multiple ait's (automatic information transfer) occurring at once. Originally area 7 capped both the dkk and bfd sectors to FL230 and below due to the 10;000 plus operations on a daily basis which turned these sectors into almost unmanageable beasts at times. However; due to the reduction of traffic at ZOB; surrounding regional airports and airline consolidation/merging; these sectors have become very tame while having a front row seat to the events that occur above them with multiple sectors handling situations that one controller should be. 2. Some ait procedures need to be re-evaluated as well as common ait vs. Point out vs. 'Hand off; radar contact' refreshers. It seems more and more that some controllers will take a hand off and flash them through just for the simple fact of not wanting to talk to the aircraft. This of course becomes a hazardous situation when we become complacent with flashing an aircraft through even though a traffic situation exists. Which leads to the next problem; someone assuming someone else will do something about the situation because they 'see it'.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZOB Controller described a loss of separation event involving two air carrier aircraft; listing both local hand off/point out procedures and sector alignments as contributing factors.
Narrative: I was working the Ontario and Warren Sectors; (FL240-FL340) combined; with moderate traffic levels. I rated the complexity higher due to the multiple aircraft that were deviating on the frequency before; during; and after the event occurred. The Air Carrier Y was northbound descending out of FL290 for FL240 and direct to ROC Airport. My D-Side pointed the Air Carrier Y out to the DSV Sector; (FL240-FL320); who in turn approved the point out and the aircraft was flashed on to the BFD Sector (FL230 and below). During this time Air Carrier X was departing the BUF Airport southeast bound and conducting a deviation; (direction unconfirmed); climbing to FL230. The aircraft was being worked by the BUF Sector (FL230 and below) and handed the aircraft off to the BFD Sector (FL230 and below) who in turn flashed Air Carrier X to the DSV Sector (FL240-FL320). The DSV Controller took the hand off; removed the interim altitude and flashed the hand off to me; the Ontario Sector (FL240-FL340); climbing to FL250. It is currently unknown when the Air Carrier X was done with the weather deviation and back on course. Although the investigation has yet to reach the Quality Assurance Department at ZOB; the Supervisor assigned to the day shift had me view the FALCON before my interview. According to the video data on the FALCON; the Air Carrier Y (descending in ROC) was pointed out to the DSV Sector before the hand off was taken on the Air Carrier X. Going briefly back to the Ontario/Warren Sector; I was handling multiple deviations simultaneously while issuing weather depicted precipitation to all aircraft entering my sector. After I descended the Air Carrier Y to FL240; I recognized that the DSV Sector (FL240-FL320) was now flashing me the hand off on the Air Carrier X climbing to FL250. I recall running out my vector lines and saw that the Air Carrier X was showing to pass well behind the Air Carrier Y descending and gave it no further thought. After a short period of time; I looked back towards the Air Carrier X and saw that the aircraft had taken a more east southeast course of flight and was getting tighter with the Air Carrier Y. At this time both aircraft were in the DSV Sector (FL240-FL320) so the most immediate action I thought to be appropriate was to continue an expeditious descent for the Air Carrier Y that was already in a descent profile. I turned to the BFD Controller (FL230 and below) and asked him if I could go lower with the Air Carrier Y into his altitudes which he replied with an affirmative. I issued the Air Carrier Y FL220 and asked for an expeditious descent. The Air Carrier X was not on my frequency for me to issue any control instructions and it was not until later that I learned the Air Carrier X was still in communications with the BUF Sector (FL230 and below) and was turned when the conflict alert activated. This event has yet to be reviewed by the Quality Assurance Department so I do not have all the pieces of the puzzle that could help me in providing a solid recommendation to prevent the re-occurrence of this event. However; with limited information and being a controller involved with this event; I would recommend the following: 1. Return Area 7 low altitude sectors (DKK and BFD) back to FL270 and below. This event; plus countless other ones; constantly involves aircraft transitioning through the altitudes of FL230-FL260. The Ontario Sector (FL240-FL280) was poorly designed with 4;000 FT and has become almost completely dependent on other sectors giving lower/higher altitudes and/or approving point outs. Furthermore; in this specific event if the BFD Sector had owned FL270 and below; there would have been only ONE controller talking to the planes from start to finish. Instead we had 4 sectors involved with multiple AIT's (Automatic Information Transfer) occurring at once. Originally Area 7 capped both the DKK and BFD Sectors to FL230 and below due to the 10;000 plus operations on a daily basis which turned these sectors into almost unmanageable beasts at times. However; due to the reduction of traffic at ZOB; surrounding regional airports and airline consolidation/merging; these sectors have become very tame while having a front row seat to the events that occur above them with multiple sectors handling situations that one controller should be. 2. Some AIT procedures need to be re-evaluated as well as common AIT vs. point out vs. 'hand off; radar contact' refreshers. It seems more and more that some controllers will take a hand off and flash them through just for the simple fact of not wanting to talk to the aircraft. This of course becomes a hazardous situation when we become complacent with flashing an aircraft through even though a traffic situation exists. Which leads to the next problem; someone assuming someone else will do something about the situation because they 'see it'.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.