Narrative:

During an ILS approach; the glidepath information was not received by 20 miles from the runway. The captain was the flying pilot and had leveled off 3;000 MSL; which is 1;000 ft above final approach altitude at about 10 miles.weather conditions were daylight and clouds were mixed VMC with occasional IMC in rain showers during the approach to the runway. The captain was using view-limiting foggles during the approach from about 20 miles out. An approach clearance was received at about 20 miles. A landing clearance was received about 10 miles out. ILS minimums were 360 MSL/200 AGL.the crew became more confused by the lack of a glideslope signal reception on either pilot's horizontal situation indicator. However; a normal localizer course was indicated. The captain continued the approach and asked the first officer; the non-flying pilot; to ask ATC if the glideslope was working. Busy radio communications delayed the initial request. The first officer told the captain he would ask ATC when on the ground. The first officer thought the problem might be with the airplane or crew operations. But the captain commanded the first officer to ask ATC right now. The inquiry was made and ATC confirmed normal ILS operations.at 6.9 miles from the runway and the final approach segment; the first officer checked the approach chart and noted a glideslope intercept altitude of 2;000. This is 1;000 below the airplane's current altitude. This altitude discrepancy was immediately reported to the captain. While continuing the approach; the plane was in and out of clouds just before the 5 mile fix and a cumulus cloud blocked the view of the runway. The first officer spotted the runway at about 5 miles and informed the captain that the plane was high. The captain removed the view-limiting foggles and was able to observe the plane's position. A descent was made with the full flaps 40 degrees selection. At about 3 miles out; ATC radioed and asked the crew's intention. The first officer asked the captain if he wanted to go-around? The captain replied 'no'. The first officer informed ATC; 'I think we can make it.' a stabilized approach made by 500 MSL and a normal landing accomplished.after touchdown; the captain asked the first officer about the glideslope. The first officer checked the radio and pushed the frequency selector to the other radio head; resulting in the correct ILS frequency being displayed. An ADI and HSI response with the glideslope was also noted. During taxi; and about 50 yards from the stop point; the captain exclaimed; 'I think you didn't change the radio frequency (to the ILS)'. The first officer believed this was true; but wanted to wait until parking was completed to discuss this and replied; 'let's wait until we're parked...sterile cockpit.' but the captain retorted; 'excuse me?!' showing a dismay with the first officer's response. The captain continued; 'the sterile cockpit allows for conversation related to the flight... This is related to the flight.' the airplane continued the remaining distance to parking; stopped; and a normal shutdown accomplished. After parking; the captain stated; 'I can multi-task!' referring to discussing the event during taxi in.contributing factors included: the first officer's radio was tuned to the VOR. The standby frequency was tuned for ILS but not selected during approach. This resulted in a VOR course only. But the crew forgot about the VHF-2 selector setting which affected both captain and first officers' hsis. The crew mistakenly believed they were on the ILS. The captain's HSI had given an erroneous course reading after departure. The VHF selector was then positioned to VHF-2 (first officer's side). This resulted in a normal captain's-side HSI indication during cruise segment airway tracking. Use of GPS navigation for enroute course guidance was used. During the approach; no station identification check was made.the first officer had not flown for 75 days. He was in B767transition training for the past 10 weeks. The first officer had not had any B767 training in the past 4 weeks; while waiting for B767 simulator training to be available. As a result; scheduling had returned the first officer to B727 flying for a week. The captain and first officer had never flown together.the captain used view-limiting foggles device during the approach. This likely affected his situational awareness to the incorrect radio frequency; target altitude during approach; and descent. Use of view-limiting devices is prohibited while carrying cargo; per company general operations manual. The captain didn't mention this before stating his intention to wear foggles. The first officer was not aware of this rule at the time.conclusions: following company and F.a.a. Procedures is vital to conducting a safe flight. Not selecting the correct radio frequency during approach; not verifying the radio station identification; contributed to this problem. [I will be] reviewing airplane systems knowledge; specifically regarding navigation. See company B727 aircraft operations manual: chap 26; VHF navigation; transfer.crew unfamiliarity played a part in the post-landing and taxi debate. The captain wanted answers and right now. But the first officer sensed this would be a difficult subject and wanted to wait until the airplane was parked. Expectations were different resulting in a dissatisfied captain with the crew communications. Fair weather conditions; visual contact with the runway at about 5 miles; helped to salvage a confusing approach. Post-flight discussion by the crew; reviewing the cause and contributing factors; provided valuable lessons learned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Inappropriate nav system selections; a failure to follow SOP; and a breakdown in flight crew communications contributed to a loss of situational awareness; a barely salvaged unstabilized approach and a conflict between the Captain and First Officer of a B727.

Narrative: During an ILS approach; the glidepath information was not received by 20 miles from the runway. The Captain was the flying pilot and had leveled off 3;000 MSL; which is 1;000 FT above final approach altitude at about 10 miles.Weather conditions were daylight and clouds were mixed VMC with occasional IMC in rain showers during the approach to the runway. The Captain was using view-limiting foggles during the approach from about 20 miles out. An approach clearance was received at about 20 miles. A landing clearance was received about 10 miles out. ILS minimums were 360 MSL/200 AGL.The crew became more confused by the lack of a glideslope signal reception on either pilot's horizontal situation indicator. However; a normal localizer course was indicated. The Captain continued the approach and asked the First Officer; the non-flying pilot; to ask ATC if the glideslope was working. Busy radio communications delayed the initial request. The First Officer told the Captain he would ask ATC when on the ground. The First Officer thought the problem might be with the airplane or crew operations. But the Captain commanded the First Officer to ask ATC right now. The inquiry was made and ATC confirmed normal ILS operations.At 6.9 miles from the runway and the final approach segment; the First Officer checked the approach chart and noted a glideslope intercept altitude of 2;000. This is 1;000 below the airplane's current altitude. This altitude discrepancy was immediately reported to the Captain. While continuing the approach; the plane was in and out of clouds just before the 5 mile fix and a cumulus cloud blocked the view of the runway. The First Officer spotted the runway at about 5 miles and informed the Captain that the plane was high. The Captain removed the view-limiting foggles and was able to observe the plane's position. A descent was made with the full flaps 40 degrees selection. At about 3 miles out; ATC radioed and asked the crew's intention. The First Officer asked the Captain if he wanted to go-around? The Captain replied 'no'. The First Officer informed ATC; 'I think we can make it.' A stabilized approach made by 500 MSL and a normal landing accomplished.After touchdown; the Captain asked the First Officer about the glideslope. The First Officer checked the radio and pushed the frequency selector to the other radio head; resulting in the correct ILS frequency being displayed. An ADI and HSI response with the glideslope was also noted. During taxi; and about 50 yards from the stop point; the Captain exclaimed; 'I think you didn't change the radio frequency (to the ILS)'. The First Officer believed this was true; but wanted to wait until parking was completed to discuss this and replied; 'Let's wait until we're parked...sterile cockpit.' But the Captain retorted; 'Excuse me?!' showing a dismay with the First Officer's response. The Captain continued; 'The sterile cockpit allows for conversation related to the flight... this is related to the flight.' The airplane continued the remaining distance to parking; stopped; and a normal shutdown accomplished. After parking; the Captain stated; 'I can multi-task!' referring to discussing the event during taxi in.Contributing factors included: The First Officer's radio was tuned to the VOR. The standby frequency was tuned for ILS but not selected during approach. This resulted in a VOR course only. But the crew forgot about the VHF-2 selector setting which affected BOTH Captain and First Officers' HSIs. The crew mistakenly believed they were on the ILS. The Captain's HSI had given an erroneous course reading after departure. The VHF selector was then positioned to VHF-2 (First Officer's side). This resulted in a normal Captain's-side HSI indication during cruise segment airway tracking. Use of GPS navigation for enroute course guidance was used. During the approach; no station identification check was made.The First Officer had not flown for 75 days. He was in B767transition training for the past 10 weeks. The First Officer had not had any B767 training in the past 4 weeks; while waiting for B767 simulator training to be available. As a result; scheduling had returned the First Officer to B727 flying for a week. The Captain and First Officer had never flown together.The Captain used view-limiting foggles device during the approach. This likely affected his situational awareness to the incorrect radio frequency; target altitude during approach; and descent. Use of view-limiting devices is prohibited while carrying cargo; per Company General Operations Manual. The Captain didn't mention this before stating his intention to wear foggles. The First Officer was not aware of this rule at the time.Conclusions: Following Company and F.A.A. procedures is vital to conducting a safe flight. Not selecting the correct radio frequency during approach; not verifying the radio station ID; contributed to this problem. [I will be] reviewing airplane systems knowledge; specifically regarding navigation. See Company B727 Aircraft Operations Manual: Chap 26; VHF Navigation; Transfer.Crew unfamiliarity played a part in the post-landing and taxi debate. The Captain wanted answers and right now. But the First Officer sensed this would be a difficult subject and wanted to wait until the airplane was parked. Expectations were different resulting in a dissatisfied Captain with the crew communications. Fair weather conditions; visual contact with the runway at about 5 miles; helped to salvage a confusing approach. Post-flight discussion by the crew; reviewing the cause and contributing factors; provided valuable lessons learned.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.