Narrative:

I was working local control 3 and 4. I cleared air carrier X on runway 25 heading 260 climbing to 10;000. About the time that air carrier X was rotating I noticed a flight of 4 F16's approximately 7 miles northwest of the airport south southeast bound at 8;500 VFR. I stopped air carrier X climb at 8;000. Denver TRACON then called me about the military flight. I told the TRACON controller that I stopped air carrier X at 8;000. I then saw the F16's altitude descend below 8;500. I then told air carrier X to maintain 7;000. I also told the TRACON controller to climb the F16's I had a B757 at the departure end of runway 25. Traffic information was issued to air carrier X and they had the traffic in sight. I issued additional traffic to insure they saw the entire flight since they were spread out. When I was sure they saw all 4 F16's; I climbed air carrier X to 10;000. During all of this air carrier X exited my airspace to the west without being told to contact departure. There was no time to coordinate this with the DR1 controller. The F16 flight was not coordinated to enter my departure corridor. I was told the flight was indicating over 500 KTS. Approximately 15 seconds before I noticed the flight I had an air carrier; on a half mile final landing runway 34R; tell me they were going around. I called air carrier X by the other air carrier's company during some of the traffic calls because of the missed approach. Air carrier X knew that I was calling them and answered all my transmissions without confusion. About two minutes prior to this incident the airport was changing landing configuration from land north to land north and south. This required me to give the TRACON the north departure corridor. With the change in landing configuration this left me very little options to deal with the missed approach without coordination the other local control positions and with the TRACON. This was accomplished by the osic. Recommendation; insure aircraft remain clear of departure corridors without timely coordination. I doubt that the military required an overflight at 500 KTS and 8;500 MSL in the B airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DEN and D01 Controllers described an event when a military flight was routed through the area and conflicted with DEN traffic; both reporters questioned the actions of the other.

Narrative: I was working Local Control 3 and 4. I cleared Air Carrier X on Runway 25 heading 260 climbing to 10;000. About the time that Air Carrier X was rotating I noticed a flight of 4 F16's approximately 7 miles northwest of the airport south southeast bound at 8;500 VFR. I stopped Air Carrier X climb at 8;000. Denver TRACON then called me about the military flight. I told the TRACON Controller that I stopped Air Carrier X at 8;000. I then saw the F16's altitude descend below 8;500. I then told Air Carrier X to maintain 7;000. I also told the TRACON Controller to climb the F16's I had a B757 at the departure end of Runway 25. Traffic information was issued to Air Carrier X and they had the traffic in sight. I issued additional traffic to insure they saw the entire flight since they were spread out. When I was sure they saw all 4 F16's; I climbed Air Carrier X to 10;000. During all of this Air Carrier X exited my airspace to the west without being told to contact departure. There was no time to coordinate this with the DR1 Controller. The F16 flight was not coordinated to enter my departure corridor. I was told the flight was indicating over 500 KTS. Approximately 15 seconds before I noticed the flight I had an air carrier; on a half mile final landing Runway 34R; tell me they were going around. I called Air Carrier X by the other air carrier's company during some of the traffic calls because of the missed approach. Air Carrier X knew that I was calling them and answered all my transmissions without confusion. About two minutes prior to this incident the airport was changing landing configuration from land north to land north and south. This required me to give the TRACON the north departure corridor. With the change in landing configuration this left me very little options to deal with the missed approach without coordination the other Local Control positions and with the TRACON. This was accomplished by the OSIC. Recommendation; insure aircraft remain clear of departure corridors without timely coordination. I doubt that the military required an overflight at 500 KTS and 8;500 MSL in the B airspace.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.