Narrative:

When crew arrived; brakes were not set and 'hot brakes delay to' ECAM was indicated. Brake temps were slightly below 400 approximately 45 minutes prior to departure. While pre-flighting the aircraft; ramp crew also disconnected external power without notifying crew and while the APU was off. Crew immediately started APU. When aircraft powered up; we had numerous spurious warnings including master warnings and master cautions that lasted several minutes. Ramp personnel came to the cockpit and informed us that they had proper disconnect indications at the external panel. Ground supervisor came to cockpit with shop steward and informed me that he was going to reprimand the ground crew. We quickly did another preflight to ensure proper departure configuration. We flew the short flight and landed with auto-brakes off; on runway turnoff at the last high speed the brake temperatures were even on all brakes and approximately 80. We taxied to gate and on arrival brake temperature had risen to approximately 280. We had a short turn and requested the wheels to be chocked and fans put on the brakes. Maintenance chocked the wheels but told us they had no fans. We were then assigned to fly another leg in the same aircraft. Prior to departure; ramp personnel called several times to have us set brakes so they could remove the chocks; but we delayed until close to departure and the temperatures had subsided to 'green' indications at approximately 150. We set brakes and pushed on time. During taxi out all checklists were completed and indications appeared normal. At power application we received ECAM flex temperature not set. The proper flex temp from the runway data message was set; but we immediately increased thrust to reject takeoff per SOP (flight manual normals 10.40.2) and continued takeoff. At 80 KTS; when we checked thrust set we noticed we had a red speed sel indication (selected speed data failure) and no speeds on both pfd's (although speeds were set in the FMGC with no amber boxes or check takeoff data message); and being that we were in the low speed regime decided that it was prudent to abort the takeoff. We aborted takeoff and did not achieve max braking; we cleared the runway and coordinated with ground control. They immediately asked why we had aborted the takeoff and we informed them that we had an indication malfunction. They asked if we needed assistance. We informed them that we did not need emergency vehicles at that time; but were coordinating with maintenance to have our wheels chocked. We did not set parking brake and immediately referenced the QRH. We determined that our minimum ground waiting time was 46 minutes based on an overly conservative speed of 120 KTS and 150;000 pounds (we were a lighter weight and aborted at a slower speed). We taxied slowly and shut down one engine. We reiterated our need to have the brakes chocked. Maximum temperature was 735 ten minutes after the abort; and was indicated on left brake #2. We continued to slowly move position to facilitate a rapid response from maintenance. We were told to go to a spot at the maintenance area to await chocking. We continued to ask for a rapid response from maintenance; but were unable to coordinate through the operations frequency. I was holding the brakes manually during this time and slowly rolling when we needed to move. After waiting approximately 15 minutes near the maintenance area; station operations informed us that we needed to go to a terminal gate. At this time brakes had already cooled to 600 so we obtained clearance and taxied toward the gate. While turning into the alley we stopped to confirm the gate location and heard a loud bang indicating a tire explosion. We immediately asked ground control if they could see anything other than a flat tire and both ground vehicles and passing aircraft all reported no indication other than flat tires. We decided to not evacuate the aircraft and requested emergency vehicles. We notified the flight attendants and passengersvia the PA they were to remain seated and not to evacuate the aircraft when they saw the emergency vehicles. At this time we were simultaneously talking to ramp; ground; waiting for maintenance on the interphone; and talking to the emergency vehicles (who informed us that their infrared indicated hot brakes). We coordinated with ground control and had a people mover and air-stairs brought to the airplane so the passengers could be deplaned. When maintenance came on board they informed us that the aircraft had previous brake issues and bscu faults. The brakes had recently been bled to correct a hot brake issue. They informed us they were concerned the brakes were binding. We made following log write-ups: 1) crew report hot brakes. 2) aborted takeoff due to speed select failure on captain's and first officer's pfd. Said speed sel in red. Flex temp was imputed and displayed but on initial power application warning of flex temperature not set appeared. Toga then selected per SOP max speed approx 110 KTS taxied off runway parking brake not set brakes 620 on all 4 brakes. 3) 10 minutes after abort max temp #2 brake was 735 all remaining brakes within 30 degrees. Aircraft weight was 148;000. 4) after applying toga thrust due to flex temperature not set experienced selected speed failure on both pfd's at approximately 80 kts. Aircraft experienced in an external power cord removed on previous preflight and various electronic indications appeared then all back to normal after 10 minutes. When maintenance boarded; they informed us that the two left tires had blown; and the two right tires had deflated. The flight manual states that that blowout plugs prevent over pressurization due to heat buildup; and 'fusible plugs' melt in the event of an overheat to protect the tires from bursting. Why did they not work as advertised in the burst tires? A more timely response and better coordination by station operations and maintenance would have allowed us to avoid this situation by having the wheels properly chocked and allow them to cool instead of having us taxi to the maintenance facility then back to a gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 with a brake overheat history had tire failures while returning to the gate after a rejected takeoff for a FLEX TEMP NOT SET ECAM on takeoff.

Narrative: When crew arrived; brakes were not set and 'HOT BRAKES DELAY TO' ECAM was indicated. Brake temps were slightly below 400 approximately 45 minutes prior to departure. While pre-flighting the aircraft; ramp crew also disconnected external power without notifying crew and while the APU was off. Crew immediately started APU. When aircraft powered up; we had numerous spurious warnings including Master Warnings and Master Cautions that lasted several minutes. Ramp personnel came to the cockpit and informed us that they had proper disconnect indications at the external panel. Ground Supervisor came to cockpit with Shop Steward and informed me that he was going to reprimand the ground crew. We quickly did another preflight to ensure proper departure configuration. We flew the short flight and landed with auto-brakes off; on runway turnoff at the last high speed the brake temperatures were even on all brakes and approximately 80. We taxied to gate and on arrival brake temperature had risen to approximately 280. We had a short turn and requested the wheels to be chocked and fans put on the brakes. Maintenance chocked the wheels but told us they had no fans. We were then assigned to fly another leg in the same aircraft. Prior to departure; ramp personnel called several times to have us set brakes so they could remove the chocks; but we delayed until close to departure and the temperatures had subsided to 'Green' indications at approximately 150. We set brakes and pushed on time. During taxi out all checklists were completed and indications appeared normal. At power application we received ECAM FLEX TEMP NOT SET. The proper Flex temp from the RWY DATA message was set; but we immediately increased thrust to reject takeoff per SOP (Flight Manual Normals 10.40.2) and continued takeoff. At 80 KTS; when we checked THRUST SET we noticed we had a red SPD SEL indication (selected speed data failure) and no speeds on both PFD's (although speeds were set in the FMGC with no amber boxes or CHECK TAKEOFF DATA MSG); and being that we were in the low speed regime decided that it was prudent to abort the takeoff. We aborted takeoff and did not achieve max braking; we cleared the runway and coordinated with Ground Control. They immediately asked why we had aborted the takeoff and we informed them that we had an indication malfunction. They asked if we needed assistance. We informed them that we did not need emergency vehicles at that time; but were coordinating with maintenance to have our wheels chocked. We did not set parking brake and immediately referenced the QRH. We determined that our minimum ground waiting time was 46 minutes based on an overly conservative speed of 120 KTS and 150;000 LBS (we were a lighter weight and aborted at a slower speed). We taxied slowly and shut down one engine. We reiterated our need to have the brakes chocked. Maximum temperature was 735 ten minutes after the abort; and was indicated on left brake #2. We continued to slowly move position to facilitate a rapid response from Maintenance. We were told to go to a Spot at the maintenance area to await chocking. We continued to ask for a rapid response from Maintenance; but were unable to coordinate through the Operations frequency. I was holding the brakes manually during this time and slowly rolling when we needed to move. After waiting approximately 15 minutes near the maintenance area; Station Operations informed us that we needed to go to a terminal gate. At this time brakes had already cooled to 600 so we obtained clearance and taxied toward the gate. While turning into the alley we stopped to confirm the gate location and heard a loud bang indicating a tire explosion. We immediately asked Ground Control if they could see anything other than a flat tire and both ground vehicles and passing aircraft all reported no indication other than flat tires. We decided to not evacuate the aircraft and requested emergency vehicles. We notified the Flight Attendants and passengersvia the PA they were to remain seated and NOT to evacuate the aircraft when they saw the emergency vehicles. At this time we were simultaneously talking to Ramp; Ground; waiting for Maintenance on the interphone; and talking to the emergency vehicles (who informed us that their infrared indicated Hot Brakes). We coordinated with Ground Control and had a people mover and air-stairs brought to the airplane so the passengers could be deplaned. When Maintenance came on board they informed us that the aircraft had previous brake issues and BSCU faults. The brakes had recently been bled to correct a hot brake issue. They informed us they were concerned the brakes were binding. We made following log write-ups: 1) Crew Report Hot Brakes. 2) Aborted Takeoff due to Speed Select failure on Captain's and First Officer's PFD. Said SPD SEL in red. Flex Temp was imputed and displayed but on initial power application warning of FLEX TEMP NOT SET appeared. TOGA then selected per SOP max speed approx 110 KTS taxied off runway parking brake not set brakes 620 on all 4 brakes. 3) 10 minutes after abort max temp #2 brake was 735 all remaining brakes within 30 degrees. Aircraft weight was 148;000. 4) After applying TOGA thrust due to FLEX TEMP NOT SET experienced Selected Speed failure on both PFD's at approximately 80 kts. Aircraft experienced in an external power cord removed on previous preflight and various electronic indications appeared then all back to normal after 10 minutes. When Maintenance boarded; they informed us that the two left tires had blown; and the two right tires had deflated. The flight manual states that that blowout plugs prevent over pressurization due to heat buildup; and 'fusible plugs' melt in the event of an overheat to protect the tires from bursting. Why did they not work as advertised in the burst tires? A more timely response and better coordination by Station Operations and Maintenance would have allowed us to avoid this situation by having the wheels properly chocked and allow them to cool instead of having us taxi to the maintenance facility then back to a gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.